Is There Moral Hazard in Islamic Rural Bank Financing?
Abstract
Keywords
Full Text:
PDFReferences
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488-500
Anggarwal, R., Yousef, T. (2009). Islamic banks and investment financing. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32(1):93-120.
Antonio (2001). Bank Syariah dari Teori ke Praktik. Jakarta (ID): Gema Insani.
Armanto, B. Fenomena credit crunch dalam pasar kredit dan implikasinya terhadap intermediasi perbankan Indonesia: analisis empiris perbankan Indonesia sebelum dan setelah periode krisis .[disertasi]. Depok : Universitas Indonesia
Avery, R.B., Berger, A.N. (1991). Loan commitments and bank risk exposure.Journal of Banking and Finance 15 : 173-192
Bakhtiar, T., Sugema, I. (2012). Masalah informasi asimetrik dalam sistem perbankan syariah: adverse selection problem.eprints.unisbank.ac.id
Besanko, D., Kanatas, G . (1993). Credit market equilibrium with bank monitoring and moral hazard. The Review off Financial Studies 6(1): 213-232
[BI] Bank Indonesia. (2007). Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor: 9/17/PBI/2007 tentang Sistem Penilaian Tingkat Kesehatan Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Berdasarkan Prinsip Syariah.[Internet]. [diunduh: 2017 Maret 8]. Tersedia pada: http://www.bi.go.id
Buttner, E.H., Rosen, B. (1988). Bank loan officers’ perceptions of the characteristics of men, women, and successful entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 3(3):249-258. doi : 0883-9026(88)90018-3
Carter, S., Shaw, E., Lam, W., Wilson, F. (2007). Gender, enterpreneurship, and bank lending : the criteria and processes used by bank loan officers in assessing applications. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 31(3): 427-444. doi : j.1540-6520.2007.00181.x
Chan, Y.S., Thakor, A.V. (1987). Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information. The Journal of Finance 42(2):345-363
Chiappori, P.A., Salanie, B. (2000). Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets. Journal of Political Economy. 108(1):56-78.
Cressy, R., Toivanen, O. (2001). Is there adverse selection in the credit market?. Venture Capital: International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 3(3):215-238.
DeVaney, S.A., Lytton, R.H. (1995). Household insolvency: a review of household debt repayment, delinquency, and bankruptcy. Financial Services Review. 42(2):137-156.
Edelberg, W. (2004). Testing for adverse selection and moral hazard in consumer loan markets. FEDS Working Paper No. 2004-09.
Firdaus, M., Harmini, Farid, M.A. (2011). Aplikasi Kuantitatif Untuk Manajemen dan Bisnis. Bogor (ID): IPB Press.
Ghatak, M., Guinnane, T. (1999). The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics. 60(1):195-228.
Hermes N, Lensink R, Mehrteab HT. 2005. Peer monitoring, social ties and moral hazard in group lending programs: evidence frim Eritrea. World Development 33(1):149-169. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.09.001
Hillier, B., Ibrahimo, M.V. (1993). Asymmetric information and model of credit rationing. Bulletin of Economic Research.45(4):277-304.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics,10(1):74-91.
Huda, A.N. 2012. The development of Islamic financing scheme for SMEs in a developing country: the Indonesian case. Procedia: Social and Behavioral Science 52:179-186
Igawa, K., Kanatas, G. (1990). Asymmetric information, collateral, and moral hazard. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 25(4):69-490.
Juanda, B. (2009). Ekonometrika: Pemodelan dan Pendugaan. Bogor (ID): IPB Press
Kasmir (2014). Bank dan Lembaga Keuangan Lainnya. Jakarta : RajaGrafindo
Leland, H.E., Pyle, D.H. (1976). Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. The Journal of Finance 32(2): 371-387
Li, S., Yang, Y., Zongfang, Z. (2014). Research on impact of moral hazard on individual credit risk. Procedia Computer Science 31(1): 577-586
McCaskie, P. (1999). Asymmetric information , adverse selection and moral hazard in the banking industry. Working Paper 1999(04).
Nuryakin, C., Warjiyo, P. (2006). Perilaku penawaran kredit bank di Indonesia: kasus pasar oligopoli periode Januari 2001-Juli 2005. Buletin Ekonoomi Moneter dan Perbankan
Paloma, C. (2013). Advese selection dan moral hazard pada skim kredit lembaga keuangan mikro agribisnis (LKM-A) PUAP di Kota Padang. [tesis]. Bogor (ID): IPB
Pauly, M.V. (1968). The economics of moral hazard: comment. The American Economic Review 58(3):531-537
Peterson, R.L. (1981). An investigation of sex discrimination in commercial banks’ direct consumer lending. The Bell Journal of Economics 12(2): 547-561. doi : 10.2307/3003571
Repullo, R., Suarez, J. (1999). Entrepreneurial moral hazard and banking monitoring: a model of credit channel. European Economic Review 44(10): 1931-1950. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00069-0
Simtowe, F., Zeller, M., Phiri, A. (2006). Determinants of moral hazard in microfinance: empirical evidence from joint liability lending programs in Malawi. African Review of Money Finance and Banking :5-38.
Stiglitz, J.E., Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, part II: constraints as incentive devices. The American Economic Review. 71(3):393-410.
Sumarwan, U. (1993). Socioeconomic and psycological variables influencing household debt. [disertasi]. Ames:Iowa
Taswan (2011). Konsekuensi informasi asimetrik dalam perkreditan dan penanganannya pada lembaga perbankan. Fokus Ekonomi. 10(3):226-234.
Trad, N., Trabelsi, M.A., Goux, J.F. (2016). Risk and profitability of Islamic banks: a religious deception or an alternative solution.
European Research on Management and Business Economics
Varian, H.R. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach . New York (US): W.W. Norton & Company
Wolfe, J.R, Goddeeris, J.H (1991). Adverse selection, moral hazard, andd wealth effects in the medigap insurance market. Journal of Health Economics. 10(4):433-459
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/iqtishadia.v12i2.3875
Copyright (c) 2019 IQTISHADIA
Iqtishadia Journal Indexed by :
Iqtishadia : Jurnal Kajian Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.