Tunisian Political Revolution: A Lesson Learned for Recent Indonesian Politics in Using Social Media

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Abstract

This research discusses about Tunisian Revolution and a lesson learned for recent Indonesian Politics. The fall of Ben Ali is a proof that social media can be a non-military weapon for society in ruining the ruling regime. Social media can create public sphere for Tunisian people in communicating each other, sharing information and even mobilizing the protest over Ben Ali's regime. This experience gives lesson learned for many country, including Indonesia. Recently, Indonesian people are active in internet, particularly social media, so that Tunisian Revolution experience alerts Indonesian people to always pay attention about that. This research uses qualitative method to gather data and describe the phenomenon by using Critical Theory. This research views that Tunisian experience influences to the government in managing protests in Indonesia, because the policy and regulation about internet and social media occur in Joko Widodo's administration in order to counter hoaxes, SARA and radicalism.

Keywords: Tunisian Revolution, Indonesian Politics, Social Media, Public Sphere

Introduction

This part describes about Tunisian political revolution or Jasmine Revolution and the recent development of Indonesian politics. As a part of Arab Spring, Tunisian Revolution becomes a lesson for many countries in the world, including Indonesian Politics. The utilization of social media in bloody demonstration and riot in Tunisia causes people rethinking about internet and social media management in many countries, including Indonesia as country with millions active social media users.

Under his authoritarian government 1987 to 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or Ben Ali contributed to the social and political life in Tunisia (Schäfer, 2015, p. 11). The social dissatisfaction, such as the high level of unemployment, poverty, the high price of daily needs and

regime corruption have contributed to the social movement in opposing their countries in Middle East, including Tunisia (Umar, Mardhatilah Rizky Ahmad, 2014). These problems encourage Tunisian people to protest and refuse, because there is no sphere for Tunisian people to get their welfare and freedom in their life.

The protest of Ben Ali's Regime was started after the self-immolation carried out by Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid. He committed suicide in front of the Tunisian police station in 2011 as a form of protest over regime (Marzouki, Yousri, 2011). This protest was shared in the internet and that received the attention and support from Tunisian people. In 2011, this individual protest became a collective protest movement in Tunisia. A self-immolation carried out by Bouazizi mobilized Tunisian people to conduct protest and demonstrations that killed a number of demonstrators in clashes with the military in early 2011. This self-immolation triggered Tunisian youth (including high school and university students, woman, lawyer, businessman and other under 30 years in Tunisia) to go on the street for a political revolution (Angrist, 2013).

According to Dubai School of Government research publication (2011), 33.06 percent of Tunisian people spread information about political movements through social media and this percentage is above Egypt (24. 05 Percent) (Dubai School of Government, 2011). This data shows that Tunisian people are more active in disseminating information in cyberspace than Egyptian society. In another research, social media influenced to the political revolution in Egypt 2011. It means that social media also plays more significant role for Tunisian political revolution, as compared to the Egyptian political revolution.

In the process of mass mobilization, Tunisian people who support democracy in Tunisia used slogans and groups on social media to mobilize people by using social media. The slogan "Syyeb Saleh" or "leave me alone" on Facebook was used by pro-democracy activists in leading people in Tunisia to gather society for demonstrations in Tunisia. Beside of that, the group called "Le" 404 Not Found "nuit gravement à l'image de Mon Pays" and "Aridha li 'ashar alaaf tonisi dhid al-riqaba al-Eliktroniyya wa al-hajb", contributed to tens of thousands of Tunisian people in supporting demonstrations and rebellions over Ben Ali's regime (Kuebler, 2011). They actively used Facebook as their tool to communicate each other, shared news or information and also mobilized the society. In addition, Cyber-activists were responsible in spreading news and information about Sidi Bouzid by creating groups in social media, such as Facebook group called "The Tunisian People Are Burning Themselves, Mr President" (Noueihed & Warren, 2012).

This bloody revolution causes death, suffering and the beginning of Arab Spring. Based on articles published by Human Rights Watch (2012), 132 people died and 1,452 were injured from December 2010 to January 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Despite there are many victims in this revolution, it has created the momentum for revolution in some countries in the Middle East or called Arab Spring. Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Syria are some countries which get impact from Tunisian Revolution in 2011 (Pollack, Kenneth, 2011).

Meanwhile, Indonesia faces the challenge in its domestic politics. First, the existence of anti-democratic or radical groups in society takes a part of barriers in political life in Indonesia (Freedman & Tiburzi, 2012). Even though most Indonesian Moslem are moderate in their ideologies, many Moslem are fanatic with their belief and ideology. As anti-democratic and radical groups, Jemaah Islamiyah or the Islamic Defender's Front (FPI) are willing to achieve their goal in changing Indonesian ideology (Pancasila) and creating Islamic state. According to Undang-undang Dasar 1945 or UUD 1945 (Indonesian Constitution), the article 28E guarantees every Indonesian people to profess their religion and to worship. In fact, there are radical groups that use religion as a

tool to claim their view and perspective about politics and country. It clearly breaks Indonesian constitution that regulates the freedom of religion. Recently, cyberspace strengthens religious intolerance in Indonesia. Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) shows the evidence that there are 15,000 extremist-run active websites which are affiliated with radical group such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Paterson, 2019).

Second, SARA (Indonesian abbreviation for ethnicity, religion, race, and other social divisions) has been a part of Indonesian politic. As a multicultural country, Indonesia face SARA as its threat, particularly in political competition (Maryani, Rahmawan, & Garnesia, 2019). The evidence of SARA in Indonesian politic is in 2017 Jakarta governor election (Pilkada DKI) which politicians and media played significant role in spreading SARA issues about Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok during political competition (Maryani et al., 2019). In Pilkada DKI, Cyber-activist effectively used social media as instrument in order to spread fake news and to create SARA issues (Tomsa & Setijadi, 2018). It means that SARA issues can be used to achieve political goal for certain actor. The development of technology, particularly social media, can be a strategic instrument to create SARA issues for any political motivation in Indonesia.

Third, Hoaxes or fakes information have become political problem in Indonesia. By the spread of hoax in internet, Indonesian people are hard to find the valid information if they do not confirm news or information by accessing credible sources. In the case of 2O17 Jakarta governor election, hoax contents were spread to attack candidate in political competition, so that it potentially created partisanship and avoided people in believing facts (Utami, 2018). The utilization of social media rapidly spread hoaxes to Indonesia people, particularly in getting valid information and facts about politics. Without seeking for facts, many Indonesian people are trapped in hoax issues by participating in anarchic protest or demonstration. It is an ironic phenomenon that many people believe in hoax.

In Indonesia, there are evidence that demonstration and protest are triggered by hoax or fake information. For 2017 Jakarta Governor Election (Pilkada DKI), experts viewed that the competition is between democratic and undemocratic forces by using social media for the dissemination of fake news, sectarian, racist, anti-Christian, and anti-Chinese. They used social media to attract people about their live demonstration and created hastags such as #aksibelaQuran (action to defend Quran), #tangkapAhok (arrest Ahok), #penjarakanAhok (jail Ahok), and so on. In Pilkada DKI, social media played significant role to spread negative information and fake news for political purpose. Beside of that, political hoaxes also occurred in 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election (Pilpres). Based on the Ministry Communications and Informatics, there are "…130 of 1,224 hoaxes and fake news spread from August 2018 to March 2019 which are related to the presidential candidates, political parties and election organizers" (The Jakarta Post, 2019b). In 2019 Indonesian presidential election, there were many people died and injured including protestors and citizens (The Strait Times, 2019).

During 2019 Election, Joko Widodo and his administration anticipated the spread of hoaxes content in social media by limiting social media and Short Message Service (SMS) access (The Ministry of Communications and Informatics, 2019). Indonesian government limited people in uploading and downloading photographs and videos on social media. As the Minister of Communications and Informatics, Rudiantara said that people emotionally response photograph and video on social media, so that this measure of limitation is needed (The Jakarta Post, 2019c). It shows us that the government paying attention to the role of social media in mobilizing people for protests and demonstrations in Indonesia.

In International Relations, the internet has become a contemporary discussion (Wenger, 2001). In the era of globalization, the world does not only face military and economy challenge as the mainstream issue, but also the use of the internet in making social-political changes. The globalization makes people easy to get information and then communicate it to others anywhere and anytime. Tunisian revolution is significant issue about the utilization of internet for political purpose. By using internet and social media, cyber-activists can easily spread the news and information about those problems. It alerts many countries about the management of internet, particularly social media. Beside of that, Indonesian politic has been a part of that progress. Even though Tunisian Revolution is not organically related to Indonesian politics, it becomes a lesson learned for Indonesia in managing social media amid national problems in Indonesian politic, such as SARA, radical group and hoax. That is why this research matters a lot for knowledge.

This research uses qualitative method and Critical Theory as a part of framework of theory. According to Catherine Dawson's book "A Practical Guide to Research Method", Qualitative method is a method in research used to explore "attitudes, behaviors and experiences" (Dawson, 2007, p. 24) . It aims to gather data about the attitude, behavior and experience of actors in both Jasmine Revolution and Indonesian Politics. By using library research technique, this research collects the data from secondary sources such as books, journals, newspapers, reports and articles. Eventually, Tunisian Revolution gives lesson learned for Indonesia about the impact of social media over domestic politics. To analyze these two cases, this research uses Critical Theory as a tool.

Discussion

The Framework of Theory

Critical theory becomes a relevant tool in this research, because it can describe how people use social media to open public spheres in Tunisia Revolution and also in Indonesian recent Politics. Critical Theory views politics as something impermanent. Historically, it was formally introduced in 1924 by the Institute of Social Research with the term "Frankfurt School Critical Theory" in Frankfurt, Germany (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007).

This theory has no simple limits in looking at the world problems, because it opens the study of International Relations (IR) for a very worldview (Griffith, 2007). The social research institute in Frankfurt has several important figures involved in the development of Critical Theory. Max Horkehimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas and Axel Honneth gave their thoughts to support the development of the theoretical theory. These greatly contribute to the building of Critical Theory, so that it becomes one of the important theories in International Relations.

The essence of Frankfurt School's Critical Theory is :

> "... a concern to comprehend the central features of contemporary society by understanding its historical and social development, and tracing contradictions in the present which may open up the possibility of transcending contemporary society and its built-in pathologies and forms of domination (Burchill, 2005, p. 138)."

Frankfurt School's Critical Theory has a concern in understanding the main features of contemporary society by understanding historical and social developments and tracing current contradictions that may open the possibility of transcending contemporary societies that build pathology or disease and the forms of domination.

In his book, Scott Burchill (2005) describes the contribution of Critical Theory to the study of IR. These two following contributions of critical theory to IR (Burchill, 2005):

a. Critical theory contributes to provide an understanding of the relation between knowledge and politics;
b. Critical theory provides broader thinking about the modern state and political community.

The focus of Critical Theory in IR is to understand how the society constructed and how the changes occurred in society. It describes the imbalanced conditions in the political situation which has been constructed in the society. The condition of inequality encourages people to make changes and even revolution.

Habermas is one of the important figures who contributed his thoughts to building Critical Theory through the Institute of Social Research in Germany. One important contribution of Habermas's thought in building Critical Theory is his thinking about the public sphere. He views "... public sphere is an indispensable resource" (Goode, 2005). He describes that public sphere is a necessary requirement. He views that public sphere is the seed of the emergence of autonomy and freedom for society.

Public space is an arena that can be used by individuals and groups to mobilize mobilization movements. According to Habermas's view in the journal "The Public Sphere in the Field of Power" by Craig Calhoun (2010), "... public sphere is thus an arena of rational-critical discourse between individuals and distinct from the invocations of superior entitlement on the basis of inherited status , enforced party loyalty, use of money to sway opinions, and social movement mobilization" (Colhoun, 2010, p. 2).

In a book entitled Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations by Martin Griffith (Griffiths, Martin, 2009, p. 195), et al., Habermas explained that public space can lead to "... awareness of public issues constituted the early seeds of the public autonomy of individual citizens" (p. 195). He understood that the public sphere is a space that can be used by the public to articulate interests and needs to the state. He also describe that "... the spheres of private people come together as public ..." (Habermas, 1991, p. 27). Public sphere is a consisting sphere of associations of individuals who makes up the public.

Public space is important for the community, because it "... made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state ..." (Colhoun, 2010, p. 5). It is a place used by individual, group, community or society to share information and articulate their aspiration to the state.

In Luke Goode's book (2005), Habermas described that the use of media is important in building interactions among citizens or the communities. He also describes that "The media play a crucial role not only in mediating between the citizenry and the various locations of decision-making power but also in constituting interactions between citizens themselves" (Goode, 2005, p. 9544).

Figure 1 shows a picture of critical factors and the relations between one and another. The traditional Habermas's public space model has evolved into a new public space, due to a paradigm shift influenced by the emergence of new technologies and trends, called Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), networking, social software, blog and globalization.

Figure 1. The New Model of Public Sphere

Source: (Khan, 2012, p. 48)

Muhammad Zubair Khan et al., in his journal entitled "From the Habermas Model to New Public Sphere: A Paradigm Shift", further describes that "... Habermas public sphere was anchored around traditional media primarily the national press. However, the modern technological communication along with the processes of globalization shapes the new public spheres (Khan, 2012, p. 48). The concept of Habermas's public sphere is in traditional media, especially the national press media. The new public sphere has been dynamically developed, because of the development of it.

The Analysis of Cases

There are two main cases will be analyzed in this part. First, this research begins with the analysis of Tunisian political revolution. Second, this research analyzes the lesson learned for Indonesian Politic in relation to Tunisian experience. These two cases will be analyzed by Critical Theory assumptions to find what Indonesia can learn about Tunisian revolution.

The Analysis of Tunisian Revolution

Social media took a role in the political revolution. The graph shows that Tunisian people use Facebook as a tool during revolution process. According to the Journal of the Dubai School of Government entitled, "Civil Movement: The impact of Facebook and Twitter, Arab Social Media Report", the population of Facebook users in Tunisia reaches high rank (Dubai School of Government, 2011). The Dubai School of Government is a research and teaching institution that focuses on public policy in Middle East. It shows the data to describe the use of social media in the Middle East.

Figure 2: The Growth Rate of Facebook Users During the 2011 Protests, as Compared to a Similar Time Period in 2010


Source: (Dubai School of Government, 2011, p. 6)

There is significant use of Facebook during the revolution in Tunisia. Based on Figure 2, the graph shows that Facebook use in Tunisia has increased 10 percent in 2010 to 17 percent in 2011 (Dubai School of Government, 2011). This data shows that the Tunisian people strategically use social media during the political revolution.

The percentage of the new Facebook user population in Tunisia is high and reaches third rank of the other countries. Figure 3 below shows that the percentage of the population of Facebook users in Tunisia reaches 5.1 percent. It is higher than other than Egypt. Although the percentage of New Facebook user population in the United Arab Emirate (UAE) and Kuwait countries is higher than Tunisia, they do not face the political revolution in their countries as what happened in Tunisia.

Figure 3: The New Facebook Users In the Arab Region and Globally (Jan. 5 to Apr. 5, 2011)

Source: (Dubai School of Government, 2011, p. 6)

Figure 4: Tunisian Facebook Penetration Rate

Source: (Müller & Hübner, 2014, p. 25)

Since January 12, a night curfew for Tunisian people has made the increase of Facebook users. It becomes an alternative way for Tunisian people to get updates about the protests over Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. The external social pressure to join the network becomes high, because of the lack of alternatives and the increase of shared information on Facebook. Figure 4 shows that the increase of Facebook penetration in the weeks of the revolution, started from 860 thousands to three millions.

Figure 5: The Primary Impact on the Civil Movements

Source: (Dubai School of Government, 2011, p. 6)

Figure 5 shows that Tunisian people become more active, decisive and creative to find the alternative way for their communication and movement.. It shows that 59.05 percent of Tunisian respondents think that it makes people more determined, pushes people more active, mobilizes people and communicates each other.

Figure 6: The Source of News or Information on the Events During the Civil Movements

Source: (Dubai School of Government, 2011, p. 8)

Beside of that, the survey also shows that Tunisian people get their news and information during revolution from social media (88.10 percent). It is higher than getting news or information from local, independent or private media, regional or international media and state-sponsored media. As shown on Figure 6, only 35.71 percent of Tunisian respondents access the state-sponsored media during revolution in Tunisia. They cannot freely access traditional media such as television, radio and newspaper, so that social media has become a strategic media to get the updates during revolution process in Tunisia.

Based on the descriptions of above, Critical Theory describes how the utilization of social media opens the new public sphere during the political revolution in Tunisia. The focus of Critical Theory in IR is to understand how the society constructed and how the changes occurred in society. Critical theory describes the imbalanced conditions in the political situation that have been constructed in the society. The condition of inequality encourages people to make changes and even revolution. In the case of Tunisia, the government control the society by using regulations make people seeking for a revolutionary change. In order to make a change, Tunisian people conduct the revolution to change their authoritarian leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

In the Critical Theory, the concept of Jurgen Habermas's public sphere can be used to describe the construction of Tunisian political revolution. In his research, Jurgen Habermas explained that "... the spheres of private people come together as public ..." (Habermas, 1991, p. 27). Public sphere or public space is a space consisting of associations of individuals who make up

the public. It means that people can come together to make a private sphere to be public sphere, so that anyone can know and understand shared news and information. Public sphere is a place used by individual, group, community or society to share information and articulate their aspiration to the state. In case of Tunisia, people use Facebook to be their public sphere to communicate each other, share news and information and then mobilized for protest and demonstration. On Figure 3, Tunisian Facebook user reaches third rank of other Middle East countries during the revolution.

Even though Habermas's public sphere concept describes the use of traditional media, it contributes to the development of the new concept public sphere. Based on Figure 1 above, the traditional Habermas's public sphere model has evolved into a new public space, because of the shift of paradigm. It has been influenced by the emergence of new technologies and trends, called Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), networking, social software, blog and globalization.

In Tunisia, Facebook is a revolutionary media used by society to make a new public sphere during political revolution in Tunisia. They cannot use traditional media, so that they use Facebook as media in creating new public sphere. The data above shows that there is the increase of Facebook use during the revolution. In October 2011 to April 2012, the Facebook penetration began from 860 thousands to 3 million. It means that they use Facebook as a useful tool to communicate each other, share updates about movement and then mobilize Tunisian people to participate in demonstrations on the street.

In mobilizing people in new public sphere, people use slogan and group of protest over Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia. It is how Tunisian people can mobilize each other to participate in the protest and demonstration on the street. Tunisian people use new media to participate or observe events for alerting the other about the situation and then upload videos and photographs to their social media (Wolover, 2016). Then, the updates of information have rapidly shared to their friends where they also can share to the others. The self-immolation carried out by Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 successfully triggered their protest and created the solidarity of Tunisian people.

Furthermore, this scheme below describes the utilization of Facebook in opening the new public sphere for Tunisian political revolution. First, Ben Ali's regime has made undemocratic social-political life for Tunisian people, so that it forces them to make changes for their state in Tunisia. Second, Tunisian people use social media to communicate each other and mobilize the demonstration. Third, Tunisian people successfully overthrew Ben Ali's regime in 2011.

The Analysis of Indonesian Politics

After the fall of Suharto's regime, the reformation of Indonesian politics opens the freedom of expression for people about politics. Post-Suharto, Indonesian people can actively involve in politics without the restriction from the government. In the era of technology, even though there are many benefits of Indonesian connectivity, Indonesian people face problematic cyberspace engagement, because the religious extremists contribute to religious intolerance (Paterson, 2019). The freedom of expression can be a reason for people to achieve their interest in politics by creating negative content (disinformation) and creating intolerant issues on social media. These problems can be worsened by the poor of cyber legislation and cyber security awareness (Paterson, 2019). Despite of the freedom of expression after Suharto, the regulations are needed in the reformation of Indonesian politics to protect the rights of people and to protect national stability.

The freedom of expression in Indonesian politics is in line with the development of Internet in Indonesia. Based on the data of Statista (Statista, 2020b) as seen on Figure 7, Indonesian internet

users increase from 84 million users in 2017 to 149.9 million users in 2023. This projection shows us that Indonesia people have become more active year by year. For the freedom, Indonesia is classified as "Partly Free" for freedom which is above of China, Thailand and Malaysia. It is caused by internet restriction and strong penalties from government with the law on Information and Electronic Transactions (UU ITE).

Figure 7: Number of internet users in Indonesia from 2017 to 2023

Source: (Statista, 2020b).

Social media is included in the development of internet in Indonesia and also used as an instrument to achieve certain interest. On Figure 8, this survey estimates that Indonesian social media users will grow year by year from 74.2 million users in 2017 to 103.1 million users in 2023 (Statista, 2020c). It means that the development of social media in Indonesia is inevitable. By using social media, people can easily share content, interact with people and create the perspective about issues. Indonesian people also use social media for many purposes such as politic, business, education and so on. To achieve their interest, Indonesian people do not mind to spend 3 hours and 26 minutes for social platforms such as YouTube, WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram (The Jakarta Post, 2019a). Nevertheless the social media is a useful tool for people in their activities, it opens the space for people to use it as a tool for breaking the law such as spreading hoaxes news, mobilizing intolerant actions and other destructive actions for their country. Recently, these issues have been some prominent problems for Indonesian politics.

Figure 8: Number of social network users in Indonesia from 2017 to 2023

Source: (Statista, 2020c).

To understand the preference of social media website used by Indonesian people, this paragraph collects the data. Based on Statcounter GlobalStats (web traffic analysis website) (2020), Indonesian people use Facebook 49.73 percent, Youtube 29.29 percent, Twitter 7.84 percent, Pinterest 7.29 percent, Instagram 5.48 percent, and 0.2 percent Tumblr. Compared to other social media, Indonesian people prefer using Facebook as their instrument for social interaction. In 2020, there were 130 million Indonesian Facebook users (Statista, 2020a). Even though it reaches the first position, other social media can also play significant role in influencing Indonesian politics.

On social media, Indonesian people often share hoax contents, because of their interest, particularly in politics. The ministry of Communications and Informatics (2017) estimated that there are 800 thousands websites sharing hoax contents. It aims to achieve their private interest or to create the anxiety and suspicion in society. For political purposes, Pilpres and Pilkada DKI became the practices of hoaxes or fakes contents (The Diplomat, 2019). Before Pilpres 2019, the increase of hoaxes or fakes contents around 61 percent was found in range of December 2018 to January 2019. In Pilkada DKI 2016, hoaxes or fakes news also existed and attacked Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok. On Figure 9, it shows that there are 15 hoax sample during Pilkada DKI campaign in 2017.

Figure 9: Hoax Samples During January to March 2017

No	Upload Date	Title
1	January 3, 2017	Ahok ziarah ke makam ibu angkatnya memakai sepatu (Ahok visited his Mother's gravesite wearing shoes)
2	January 8, 2017	Ahok kabur untuk menghindari amukan warga (Ahok fleed to avoid the people's fury)
3	January 17, 2017	"Teman Ahok": Kami semua siap bunuh diri jika Pak Ahok kalah dalam Pilkada 2017 (Friend of Ahok: We swear we would commit suicide if Ahok was lost in the 2017 Jakarta election")
4	January 25, 2017	Kalijodo dimiliki oleh Sinarmas Land (Kalijodo area is owned by Sinarmas Land)
5	January 26, 2017	Temuan money politic dari PASLON No. 2 (Money politic evidence from candidate no. 2)
6	January 26, 2017	Ahok & Djarot Terlibat Perselisihan (Ahok & Djarot involved in disputes)
7	February 6, 2017	Tangkapan Layar dari Video Metro TV Yang Berjudul '300 Juta Orang Hadiri Kampanye Ahok-Djarot Di Gue 2, Dimeriahkan Band Slank & Iwan Fals' (Screenshot of Metro TV Video Entitled '300 Million People Attends My Ahok-Djarot Campaign 2, Performance by Slank & Iwan Fals Band')
8	February 18, 2017	Mujahid Cyber Membela KPU Dari Serangan Hacker Ahok (Mujahid Cyber Defends Committee of Election from the Attack of Ahok's Hackers)
9	February 18, 2017	Istri Ahok: Pribumi Indonesia Jadi Rakyat Aja Ngerepotin, Apalagi Jadi Pemimpin! (Ahok's Wife: Indonesian natives are burdensome, let alone when they become leaders!)
10	February 19, 2017	Ahokers Organization Cyber Team/AOCT meretas dan mengganti data KPUD Pilkada 2017 (AOCT hacked and modified the results of Ahok's votes in the 2017 Jakarta election)
11	February 19, 2017	Uang Bayaran dari Tim Basuki-Djarot (Bribe money from Basuki-Djarot Team)
12	March 6, 2017	Prof. Taruna Ikrar: "Ahok dan Pendukungnya Alami Masalah di Otak" (Prof. Taruna Ikrar: "AHOK and its supporters have brain problem")
13	March 6, 2017	KPK jemput paksa Anies Baswedan di rumahnya, karena tersandung korupsi dana Frankfurt Book (Commision of Corruption Eradication fetched Anies Baswedan from his house due to the Frankfurt Book corruption case)
14	March 6, 2017	Ahok Resmi Dihukum Pancung (Ahok is Officially Beheaded)
15	March 15, 2017	Pendukung Ahok Tidak Paham Sholat Jenazah Tidak Pakai Ruku' (Supporters of Ahok did not know how to practice mortuary prayer)

Source: (Utami, 2018, p. 91).

Social media also contributes to the polarization of Indonesian politic caused by SARA issues. In Pilkada DKI, the construction of SARA issues involved radical group that share contents about the propriety of belief and ethnicity for a governor position (Arjon, 2018). Even though Pancasila and UU1945 guarantee the rights of Indonesian citizen in politics, Islamic radical groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Islamic Defender Front (FPI) use Qoran verses to claim their belief about the religion of leader in Indonesia. In the case of Ahok, they actively lifted up the issues of blasphemy in North Jakarta District. This case clearly shows that there are many people who do not stand on ideology and constitution as the basic of their view in politics. As a multicultural country, Indonesia is born with different races, religions and cultures.

The study published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) mentions Facebook and Twitter as instruments used by Indonesian radical groups. Driven by their ideological principle, these groups are still consistent seeking for alternative instruments to achieve their interest in Indonesia (UNESCO, 2017). The development of technology, particularly social media has given more opportunities for their actions. Pilpres 2019, Islamic radical groups tried to influence the political contestation by creating anti-Islam and secularism issues for beating one of two candidates (Reuters, 2019b). The government responded this issue by blocking radical contents on social media, such as Facebook and Instagram. The Ministry of Communication and Informatics released the article that there are 8,131 Facebook contents and 8,131 Twitter contents blocked by the government.

Eventually, the mobilization caused by SARA, radical group and hoaxes on social media contributes to the demonstration on the street and even riot in Indonesia. In Pilkada DKI, many people are mobilized to participate the action in Jakarta. They created "212 movement" to mobilize

hundreds of thousands people on the street for accusing Ahok's blasphemy (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018). In Pilkada DKI, the mobilization of people seemed like the politicization of religious issues, because 212 movement held came near to voting date (Kurniawan, 2018). This kind of action is also found in Pilpres. In Pilpres, Islamic 212 movement appeared in electoral contestation. They changed their name of movement to be 212 alumni and influenced people to go down on the street. Based on the article published by Reuters (Reuters, 2019a), social media such as Facebook and Twitter became buzzers in Pilpres 2019. Social media becomes a battleground between candidates. Mafindo (an Indonesian organization fighting fake news) reported that hoax contents related to politic in 2018 are produced by nearly 500 social media hoaxes (Reuters, 2019a).

Based on the description above, understanding social-historical development of Indonesian politics and tracing contradiction in present that open the possibility of transcending contemporary society and its built-in problems are the way to comprehend the central features of contemporary society (Burchill, 2005). Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has had a long journey of its experience in building political life. In the era of Suharto, Indonesian people could not have much sphere for their aspiration or voice in politic. The social-political reformation opens the opportunities for all Indonesian people to think, speak and act based on their interest. But, rethinking about Indonesian democracy after the reformation is a must, because sometimes some of people ignore values and break the law in their action in politics. The development of technology particularly social media in mobilizing people on the street worsens Indonesian political condition. On social media, intolerant action, SARA and hoax shape Indonesian politics and that is a contemporary characteristic of Indonesian society.

The development of internet particularly social media has opened the new challenges in Indonesian Politics. First, people can use it to share hoax content in Indonesia. Second, SARA is crucial issue in Indonesia because it weakens the unity of Indonesian people. Third, radical groups also play for political purpose and even use symbols of religion to claim their argumentation. The existence of social media can make people with hoax, radical view and SARA easier to achieve their interest. Not like traditional media, social media can share news or information in a second or less. In Tunisian revolution, Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation was rapidly shared by activist on social media, so that it became the gasoline for Tunisian people to go down on the street. Recently, many Indonesian people use social media for their protest over government or state and sometimes mobilize people to participate the demonstration and even riot. This action can be an alarm for the government to pay attention on the use of social media.

Like what happened in Tunisia Revolution, the development of recent Indonesian politics is related to the role of public sphere. Indonesian people use social media to open new public sphere for supporting their actions on the street. As a theorist who developed public sphere concept, Habermas views public sphere is "an indispensable resource" for people (Goode, 2005). He describes that public sphere is a necessary requirement. He views that public sphere is the seed of the emergence of autonomy and freedom for society. The modern technological communication along with the processes of globalization shape the new public spheres (Khan, 2012). For Indonesian politic, the new public sphere can be a need after the reformation, but the management of public sphere more important. To prevent the unconducive situation, Joko Widodo's administration set the regulations for the limit of social media access in 2019 election. This policy is the good way to prevent hoax news, radicalism and SARA issues by managing the new public

sphere on social media in Indonesia. Even though the new public sphere is good for Indonesian democracy, it has to be controlled by the law and regulations which guarantee the national interest.

In general, Tunisian Revolution alerts many countries in the world to pay attention on the social movement and to not take for granted the flow of information through social media, including Indonesia. With the large number of social media users, Indonesia has to manage all news and information shared on social media, so that the government initiates to set the regulations. The impact of social media in Tunisian Revolution and also Arab Spring makes stakeholders thinking more about the solution for managing uncontrolled social movement. As a strategic institution in managing the communication of Indonesian people through social media, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics effectively prevented the mobilization of people in 2019 election by temporarily limiting the utilization of social media access. Even though Tunisian Revolution is a the best way for democratization, this case teaches us that there is always price to pay such as injured and even dead victims.

Conclusion

The utilization of social media for political movement is undoubtable. In the case of Tunisia, people effectively use social media for their revolution. They also can mobilize the society to participate for protest and demonstration. They successfully create the new public sphere by using social media as a tool for their social interaction and even movement in Tunisian political revolution. By creating public sphere, people can easily register for new account, consume news or information and attract people to go down on the street for the protest and demonstration. As a result, this revolution not only ruins the government of Ben Ali, but also causes many victims who are dead and injured.

From Tunisian experience, Indonesia learns about the urgency of political participation management in the society. First, the management of the new public sphere is mainly needed to prevent the uncontrolled mobilization of mass over the state, such riot and anarchic protest. Tunisian bloody revolution is a valuable event that makes Indonesian people thinking more about political revolution. Second, Indonesia also has to pay attention on the flow of information on social media, because Tunisian self-immolation news was rapidly shared, received and that is the trigger for revolution. The policy and regulation is still needed to manage people in using social media for their political participation. Third, the intensity of radical group's activities clearly threatens political instability in Indonesia and need an enforcement of UU ITE. FPI, HTI and other radical groups are not with Pancasila and UUD 1945, so that most of their actions on social media are intolerant. Last but not least, Tunisian Revolution is very important case for Indonesia in learning the powerful impact of social media in changing domestic politics.

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