



COLDPLAY CONCERT REJECTION IN INDONESIA: AN ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY MOBILIZATION

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Abstract

Islam is not only a religion but also an identity for its believers. The fact that Islam is an identity made it subject to ongoing reinterpretation and reconstruction based on the context by certain actors. Therefore, through this article, the author aims to examine the mobilization of Islamic identity within the context of the Coldplay concert rejection by The 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA) and other Islamist groups with aligned ideologies. This qualitative study, based on library research from journals, books, and media reports, applies historical and political approaches to analyze Islamic identity mobilization in Indonesia, focusing on data surrounding the Coldplay concert rejection within recent political contexts. The author finds that the rejection phenomenon is the result of the contestation of Islamic identity that has been contested in Indonesia and the strengthening of political Islam identity. Indications of strengthening this identity can be seen from the rise of identity politics in the general elections in recent years. And finally, the author concludes that the rejection of the Coldplay concert is an effort to mobilize Islamic identity as the majority in Indonesia, which in turn has contributed to causing discriminatory actions against minority communities.

Keywords: *Coldplay; Islamic Identity; Mobilization; Identity Politic*

Abstrak

Islam bukan hanya agama, tetapi juga identitas bagi para pemeluknya. Fakta bahwa Islam adalah identitas menjadikannya terus mengalami reinterpretasi dan rekonstruksi berdasarkan konteks tertentu oleh para aktor tertentu. Oleh karena itu, melalui artikel ini, penulis bertujuan untuk mengkaji mobilisasi identitas Islam dalam konteks penolakan konser Coldplay oleh Persaudaraan Alumni 212 (PA) dan kelompok Islamis lain yang memiliki ideologi sejalan. Penelitian kualitatif ini, berdasarkan studi pustaka dari jurnal, buku, dan laporan media, menerapkan pendekatan historis dan politis untuk menganalisis mobilisasi identitas Islam di Indonesia, dengan fokus pada data terkait penolakan konser Coldplay dalam konteks politik terkini. Penulis menemukan bahwa fenomena penolakan ini merupakan hasil kontestasi identitas Islam yang terus diperebutkan di Indonesia serta penguatan identitas politik Islam. Indikasi penguatan identitas ini terlihat dari meningkatnya politik identitas dalam pemilu beberapa tahun terakhir. Akhirnya, penulis menyimpulkan bahwa penolakan konser Coldplay adalah upaya mobilisasi identitas Islam sebagai mayoritas di Indonesia, yang pada gilirannya turut berkontribusi terhadap tindakan diskriminatif terhadap kelompok minoritas.

Kata kunci: Coldplay; Identitas Islam; Mobilisasi; Politik Identitas

A. Introduction

The rejection of major events, or certain figures in Indonesia has happened repeatedly. And all of them always return to groups that monopolize Islamic identity, which mobilizes the masses to reject. Starting from Lady Gaga, in 2012, when thousands of tickets for her concert in Senayan had been sold, then FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) through its central leader, Rizieq Syihab threatened to bring thousands of its members to the streets to urge the police not to give permission, which through that pressure the police finally agreed not to issue a permit, finally the concert was canceled.

The rejection that is still on the spot also applies to the Israeli national football team that will play in the FIFA U-20 World Cup in Indonesia. Last March, a protest in Jakarta initiated by the Islamic Brother Hood Front (FPI) to reject the arrival of Israel broke out, the mass unfurled a giant banner labeling Israel as "the enemy of Islam".¹ So did the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which urged President Jokowi to follow in the steps of Soekarno who rejected Israeli colonization. Until controversy and criticism continued to emerge, not only Israel failed to attend, until finally Indonesia was canceled to host the world cup.

Furthermore, the successful Coldplay concert held on 15 November at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium not only sparked a war over tickets but also a war over ideologies, as the Islamist group 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA 212) launched a campaign to cancel the concert. The group which got its name from the large-scale protests against former Jakarta Governor Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama on December 2, 2016, threatened to obstruct Coldplay's plane arrival if the concert went on. They organized groups of persons carrying snakes and threatened to do so.² The 212 Alumni, on behalf of Muslims, reject Coldplay, which is considered to support the LGBTQ ideology that is contrary to Islamic values.

Based on these cases, it can be seen that the pattern of rejection of Islamic mass organizations is always by mobilizing the masses under the pretext that those rejected will threaten their identity as Muslims. Whether FPI, MUI and the 212 movement confirm Jillian Schwedler's argument about Islamic identity. Identity, according to her, is how individuals and groups define themselves and their relationships with others.³ When these organizations rejected the

¹ "Unsportsmanlike Behaviour: Protests in Indonesia Against Israeli U-20 Footballers," FULCRUM, March 29, 2023, <https://fulcrum.sg/unsportsmanlike-behaviour-protests-in-indonesia-against-israeli-u-20-footballers/>. Accessed 6 July 2023.

² "PA 212 Threatens To Surround Soetta Airport If Coldplay Concerts Are Held In Indonesia," VOI, accessed July 6, 2023, <https://voi.id/en/news/279873>.

³ Jillian Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 2 (2001): 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2001.0049>.

arrival of Lady Gaga, the Israeli national team, and Coldplay, they were defining their relationship with those who were considered "other". This also confirms Shwedler's other argument that every identity, including Islam, can be mobilized for certain interests.⁴

Hence, in this article, I will first discuss how the contestation over which Islam is most representative of Islam in Indonesia continues to evolve over time. Subsequently, I will also discuss the background of Coldplay's rejection which is related to the strengthening of identity politics in recent years, especially ahead of the 2024 elections. And finally, I will also analyze how these Islamist organizations, mobilizing Islamic identity behind the rejection of the Coldplay concert, to strengthen the narrative of majoritarianism. Therefore, these are some of the topics that will be discussed in this article.

Previous research by Nuraini and Hasan Sazali, which analyzed a collection of Tweets on Twitter (now X), highlighted diverse public responses to the Coldplay concert, ranging from indifference to fear.⁵ However, that study did not explore how Islamist actors mobilize Islamic identity to discriminate against minority groups, specifically LGBT communities. This research addresses this gap by examining how these actors strategically manipulate the Coldplay concert controversy to advance political pragmatism, particularly in the context of the 2024 elections. Therefore, this research is significant in highlighting the instrumentalization of religious identity to influence public discourse and electoral politics, shedding light on broader implications for minority rights and democratic values in Indonesia.

Eventually, this research is a qualitative study, based on library research, particularly by referring to scholarly research on the internet from journals to books, to media reports related to the topic. The author uses historical and political approaches in conducting the analysis within this paper. The historical approach is to discuss how

⁴ Schwedler. P. 7.

⁵ Hasan Sazali, "New Media: Twitter Netizen Criticism Of The Lgbt Coldplay Campaign In Indonesia," *Journal of Humanities and Social Studies* 07, no. 02 (2023).

the contestation of Islamic identity in Indonesia from its arrival until the reformation period. As for politics, to observe how Islamic identity is mobilized in political contestation in recent years in Indonesia, as well as the rejection of Coldplay which is no less formulated in order to mobilize Islamic identity for political interests.

B. Discussion

1. Islam in Indonesia: A Contested Identity

As primary identity that is ascriptive, meaning that it is innate from birth, in addition to blood: whether it is family, tribe, ethnicity, or place in the form of village, district, city, province, religion, according to Bernard Lewis, is the only bond that can transcend location and direct ties, such as blood. But even though religion is a primary identity, Lewis argues that the practice of religion is key to forming that identity.⁶ Therefore, Muslims themselves identify Islam differently as their identity.

Although Islam is one in substance, sourced from a corpus of scriptures, its expressions are remarkably diverse. And that is exactly what happened in Indonesia. As a region that was once dominated by Hinduism and Buddhism, the contact of Islamic teachings and practices with the culture that has been influenced by both religions has given birth to various new identities attached to Islam.⁷ Therefore, the identity of Islam in Indonesia has never been separated from culture; Muslims identify themselves as Muslims and Indonesians at the same time.

Therefore, the model of Islam in Indonesia that becomes the identity of its followers is more in line with what Marshall G. S Hodgson termed as "Islamicate", namely an expression of Islam that

⁶ Schwedler, "Islamic Identity." 3.

⁷ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Global and Local in Indonesian Islam," vol. 37 (Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Global-and-local-in-Indonesian-Islam-Bruinessen/b71db3fb2817c014cb11d8efb66360619a1c8fd6>. 158.

accommodates and dialogues with local cultures that already exist in society,⁸ open to diversity, not eliminating or eliminating existing ones. In a long process, the cultural and social space in society is maximally utilized by Muslims for mutual benefit in the socio-cultural-economic sphere.

This phenomenon has formed an Islamic identity that is then referred to as "Indonesian Islam"⁹ or more popularly known as "Islam Nusantara". However, there is also a model of Islamic expression that neglects the ties of local culture that have been rooted in the hearts and ways of reasoning of the Indonesian people. This model does not marry Islam with Indonesia, but is simply affixed, so that it often causes conflict with the practice of socio-cultural life of the society. This latter model creates the identity of "Islam in Indonesia" not "Indonesian Islam" which is often associated with "Islamists".

Yanwar Pribadi, in his article, notes the rise of this model of Islamic expression, the rise of Islamism in the context of its contestation and its threat to the resilient empowerment of local culture in Indonesia.¹⁰ According to him, since the collapse of the New Order in 1998, groups that identify themselves as Muslims who interpret Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion have contributed to creating Islamic fundamentalism in order to create an Islamic society¹¹ that they deem ideal.

There are at least two explanations for this rise in the Reformation Era. As Martin Van Bruinessen explains, this is due to the decline of liberal and progressive Islamic perspectives that support

⁸ Marshall G.S Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Iman Dan Sejarah Dalam Peradaban Islam, Buku Pertama Lahirnya Sebuah Tatanan Baru*, trans. Mulyadhi Kartanegara (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2022). 3- 11.

⁹ Bruinessen, "Global and Local in Indonesian Islam."

¹⁰ Yanwar Pribadi, "Identity Contested: Cultural Resilience in the Midst of Islamization of Politics," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 56, no. 2 (December 6, 2018): 255–80, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2018.562.255-280>.

¹¹ Yanwar Pribadi, *Islam, State and Society in Indonesia Local Politics in Madura* (London: Routledge, 2018), <https://www.routledge.com/Islam-State-and-Society-in-Indonesia-Local-Politics-in-Madura/Pribadi/p/book/9781138202542>. 7.

diversity, because their proponents are busy in practical politics.¹² The second, according to Noorhaidi Hasan, is due to the strengthening influence of the Middle East. Those who study there, when they return to Indonesia, spread a literal and textualist understanding of Islam to the community.¹³ It is no wonder that Indonesia, which was once home to a moderate Islamic identity, has shifted towards conservatism.

This Islamic Identity pattern continues to grow, until the peak may be when there was a phenomenon of mobilizing millions of people to reject Ahok as governor of Jakarta because of his religious identity in 2017 which led to his arrest, then elections that were colored by religious politicization in 2019, even though the candidates were both Muslim-identified, these phenomena finally identified the rise of Islamism.

From this explanation, it can be concluded that the Islamic identity that accommodates culture in its contestation is now in a threatened position, because the identity of Islam as an ideology, which does not accommodate local culture, is getting stronger. The author will further explore the phenomena of Islamic Identity mobilization in the political field in the next discussion, considering that the rejection of the Coldplay concert was actually initiated by the same actors who carried out identity politics recently.

2. Mobilization of Islamic Identity in Political Contestation

As discussed earlier, Islam is basically one in substance, but diverse in expression. However, the problem is when there is a group of people who represent Islam as a single identity, one style, one form, one symbol, one slogan and even one political choice. This is where the role of Islamic identity mobilization finds its role. Quoting Scott

¹² Martin van Bruinessen, *Contemporary Development in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 5.

¹³ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia* (New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006). 30.

Hunt, Schwedler said that Islamic identity mobilization is related to efforts to determine which ones are "in" and which ones are "out" which continue to shift in certain situations according to certain interests.¹⁴

And that is what can be identified in political contestation in Indonesia. Even though politics is not a fundamental part of Islam according to the majority of schools of thought in Islam,¹⁵ suddenly the fate of religion seems to depend on politics, elections become life and death situations, candidates for political leaders are categorized based on the most Islamic and un-Islamic, even though not infrequently those who compete are both Muslims, if not, behind non-Muslim candidates there are Muslims who consciously vote for them on the basis of benefit (*maslaha*), considering that politics in Islam is nothing but a means to realize the common good (*maslaha āma*).¹⁶

A clear case of this mobilization of Islamic identity was in the Jakarta elections in 2017. When the interpretation of the scriptures was essentialized as if it had a single meaning regarding the legal status of non-Muslim leaders. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) further emphasized this, by issuing a *fatwā* that Ahok committed blasphemy. Then in the name of defending "Islam", which not all Muslims in Indonesia felt the need to defend in the context of that event, thousands of people were mobilized to protest, from Action 411 (held on November 4, 2016), Action 212 (held on December 2, 2016), and Action 313 (held on March 31, 2017).¹⁷

From the demand for law enforcement against Ahok, it widened into a practical political field to convey the message that Islamists understand about the prohibition of non-Muslim leadership in Islam, which was rolled out in the action. By using the protests that

¹⁴ Schwedler, "Islamic Identity." 6.

¹⁵ Muhammad Imarah, *Al- Daulah al- Islāmiyyah baina al- Ilmāniyyah wa al- Sultbah al- Dimiyyah*, 1st ed. (Cairo: Dar al- Syuruq, 1988). P.183.

¹⁶ Imarah. 182.

¹⁷ Nanang Hasan Susanto, "Politicization of Religion and the Future of Democracy In Indonesia Populism Theory," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 18, no. 54 (2019). 145- 146.

were held close to the voting day of the Jakarta elections, it can indicate the mobilization of the masses in the context of certain political interests¹⁸ instead of purely for the sake of defending Islam. The blasphemy case that ensnared Ahok opened a political opportunity which, according to Schwedler, was a way to mobilize Islamic identity for certain political interests.¹⁹

The mobilization of Islamic identity is clearly emerging in the upcoming presidential election in 2019. The mobilization manifested itself in campaign slogans to attract Muslim voters. For example, Amien Rais, one of the actors of Islamism, made a controversial statement by categorizing political parties based on their support for the current presidential candidates, namely Jokowi and Prabowo. Rais called Jokowi's supporters the party of Satan (*Hizb al- Syaithān*) and Prabowo's supporters the party of Allah (*Hizb Allah*).²⁰

Rais used the religious phrases "Allah" and "Satan" for something that was not part of the religion itself, which is the party. Religious symbols are used to convey political messages to mobilize the masses to vote for his political choice. In Schwedler's perspective, identity can be reinterpreted and reconstructed continuously to oppose a certain target or enemy at a certain time,²¹ and that is what Rais did to the party with an Islamic identity, to get rid of his political opponents. And the last is the dichotomy between the Mecca and Beijing axis.²² This was expressed by Rizieq Syihab while in Makkah in front of members of Prabowo's supporting parties, which are the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), Prosperous Justice Party

¹⁸ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia" (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17684>.

¹⁹ Schwedler, "Islamic Identity." 9.

²⁰ "Amien Rais Dikotomikan Partai Setan Dan Partai Allah," accessed July 6, 2023, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180413144201-32-290626/amien-rajs-dikotomikan-partai-setan-dan-partai-allah>.

²¹ Schwedler, "Islamic Identity." 4.

²² "Poros Mekah Dan Beijing Dinilai Upaya Memancing Konflik," accessed July 7, 2023, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180617181334-32-306844/poros-mekah-dan-beijing-dinilai-upaya-memancing-konflik>.

(PKS), and National Mandate Party (PAN).²³ Moreover, the mobilization of identity here occurs in the perspective of political opportunities, where Ahok's Chinese identity is attached to him, the memory of his blasphemy case is raised again, to be confronted with the Islamic identity represented by the term "Makkah axis" for the sake of Islamist political interests.

From the exposition above, it can be concluded that basically the mobilization of Islamic identity always revolves around the categorization of who is "part of us" and who is "the other". From Ahok's case, to the intrigues of the campaign in the 2019 elections, are clear indications that efforts to politicize Islamic identity, by seeking a single picture of its expression at the political level, have contributed to the fragmentation of society. Furthermore, this article will specifically discuss the Coldplay rejection phenomenon, which according to the author is nothing but a residue of past identity politics.

3. Coldplay Concert Rejection: Motives and Mobilization of Islamic Identity as Majority

It is essential to analyze the motives behind The 212 Alumni Brotherhood's (PA) rejection of the Coldplay concert. Commonly known, after the 2019 general election, they have lost much of their political momentum due to the arrest of Rizieq Syihab as the initiator and figurehead of the movement in 2020, followed by the defeat of the president they supported, Prabowo, who subsequently welcomed into the Widodo government, and is now running the presidency with Jokowi's son as his vice presidential pick. He has effectively abandoned PA 212.

Therefore, this rejection can be interpreted as an attempt by The 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA) to seek attention to become a political actor again in the 2024 presidential election. Referring to Norbert Merkovity who examines how political actors use social

²³ "Poros Mekah Dan Beijing Dinilai Upaya Memancing Konflik."

media, as an effort to create controversy that can repeatedly be used as capital for certain political purposes.²⁴ He argues Donald Trump deployed a similar strategy to win the 2016 election in the United States.

Through the issue of the Coldplay concert, at least the 212 group can show its existence in Indonesia's socio-political dynamics. In addition, the rejection can also be seen in the way they utilize Coldplay's popularity. Rejecting something popular can raise popularity. Which popularity can reach an audience that is currently dominated by young people. Given the General Election Commission (KPU), said that as many as 60 percent of voters in the 2024 election were millennials.²⁵

Furthermore, from the rejection of Lady Gaga, protests against Ahok, the Israeli national team, to finally the rejection of the Coldplay Concert. A recurring pattern that continues to be shown by The 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA) and similar Islamist networks to mobilize identity is by mobilizing large masses with religious symbols. This emphasis on mass mobilization, according to the author, is closely related to the delivery of the message of majoritarianism, an implicit threat to minorities.

This can be confirmed through the General Secretary of 212 when asked the reason why his group rejected Coldplay's arrival, while threatening to surround the airport with snakes to intercept Coldplay's arrival, besides that Bakumin also has ideological objections, he said when asked the reason for his rejection:

²⁴ Norbert Merkovity, "Introduction to Attention-Based Politics," *University of Szeged Hungary* 2017 (December 31, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2017.22.4.5.>, 1.

²⁵ Petir Garda Bhwana, "Indonesia's Young Voters: Precarious and Sidelined by the System," *Tempo*, September 14, 2023, <https://en.tempo.co/read/1771904/indonesias-young-voters-precarious-and-sidelined-by-the-system>.

*"We from PA 212 reject Coldplay concerts that support LGBT. (Because) the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Also LGBT is very contrary to the value of Pancasila,"*²⁶ he said.

Bakumin's assertion of the dominance of Muslim identity as the majority is part of the accumulated consequences of the rise of Islamism since Soeharto's resignation in 1998 which, according to Sydney Jones, in parallel generated the sentiment of majoritarianism in Indonesia. Majoritarianism is a political approach that aims to prioritize and privilege majority groups over minorities, manifested in several ways, such as mobilizing majority groups, using religious rhetoric, and promoting discriminatory policies.²⁷

In the case of Coldplay's rejection, it is the LGBT community that has become the victim of this majority identity mobilization. The 212 group views homosexuality as immoral and against the values of the majority of Muslim Indonesians. It is this majority identity campaign that has contributed to marginalizing and stigmatizing LGBT individuals in society. Its origins can be traced back to 2015, when the 2015 Bill on the Elimination of Sexual Violence was rejected by Islamists as being Pro- LGBTQ.²⁸

It is no wonder that violence after violence continues to occur in this minority group. In 2016, the social organization Arus Pelangi presented the results of its research that since 2013, as many as 89.3 per cent of members of the LGBT community in Indonesia have experienced violence because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. The violence occurred in several forms, both physical

²⁶ "PA 212 Threatens To Surround Soetta Airport If Coldplay Concerts Are Held In Indonesia." Accessed 7 July 2023.

²⁷ Sydney Jones, "The Rise of Islamist Majoritarianism in Indonesia," in *Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: Threat and Opportunities for Democracy*, ed. Chiara Formichi (New York: Cornell University Press, 2021). 53.

²⁸ Jones. 48.

violence and economic violence, where some victims even attempted suicide due to the violence.²⁹

Discrimination against minority identities campaigned through the rejection of the previous Coldplay concert has indeed become a central issue towards the 2024 elections, especially in the mass media. It's just that the 212 group became the main spotlight because it took to the streets directly. Indeed, the Indonesian Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), the Union of Journalists for Diversity (Sejuk), and Arus Pelangi, these non-governmental organizations at the beginning of last year, found that the phenomenon of discriminatory coverage of LGBT groups was rampant ahead of the 2024 elections.³⁰

By taking a sample of 113 news articles in early January last year with the keyword "LGBT", it was found that leaders of community organizations and regional heads were often quoted by various online media using diction that contained stigma, including by repeating the affirmation of LGBT behaviour as deviant behaviour. This phenomenon indicates the rampant desire for identity politicization as the 2024 elections approach.³¹

Political parties encourage politicians to contest for voter support using the most straightforward issue, namely LGBT. Islamist networks also took the same strategy when mobilizing Islamic identity as the majority, to reject the Coldplay concert in Jakarta, which was considered to accommodate LGBT ideology that is against Islam. There is not necessarily a causal relationship between watching a Coldplay concert and support for LGBT, Some audience members

²⁹ "89.3 Percent of LGBT in Indonesia Have Experienced Violence," Tempo, January 27, 2016, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/739961/893-persen-lgbt-di-indonesia-pernah-alami-kekerasan>.

³⁰ "Pemberitaan Diskriminatif Terhadap LGBT Marak Jelang Pemilu 2024," accessed January 10, 2024, <https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2023/03/07/pemberitaan-diskriminatif-terhadap-lgbt-marak-jelang-pemilu-2024>.

³¹ "Pemberitaan Diskriminatif Terhadap LGBT Marak Jelang Pemilu 2024."

didn't even care about the controversy of the LGBT campaign, and just wanted to watch the concert.³²

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the influence of the mobilization of majority identity in rejecting the Coldplay concert is an effort to assert the identity of Islamism for its political interests in the future, resulting in discrimination against the LGBT community. And this rejection actually implies the challenges still faced by minority groups in Indonesia. It also indicates the importance of efforts to promote inclusiveness, equality and respect for minority rights, to get rid of the influence of majoritarianism narratives.

C. Conclusion

This article concludes that the rejection of Coldplay is actually part of the accumulation of unfinished contestation of Islamic identity. The inclusive Islamic identity, which is able to dialogue with culture, oriented towards the progress of the country through identity collaboration, began to be disrupted by a conservative, scripturalist, and anti-diversity Islamic identity that has strengthened since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. The last phenomenon of the strengthening of Islamic identity can be seen from the identity politics that occurred in the case of the Jakarta regional head election in 2017, until the 2019 election which mobilized many Islamic identities for political purposes. And finally, the rejection of the Coldplay concert is nothing but an attempt by the 212 group to represent its role for the 2024 election, as the rejection also has a hand in strengthening the majority identity narrative to discriminate against minority groups, in this case the LGBT community. It is not surprising that violence against these minority groups continues to occur. As discrimination against them becomes a stronger issue in the 2024 elections, it is due to political actors who populistically use it to attract public votes.

³² Sazali, "New Media: Twitter Netizen Criticism Of The Lgbt Coldplay Campaign In Indonesia."

This study contributes to the existing literature by exploring the specific dynamics of how the Coldplay concert rejection has been used as a political tool to strengthen the narrative of majority identity in Indonesia. While previous research has analyzed the role of identity politics in elections, this study adds a new perspective by focusing on how religious identity mobilization directly targets marginalized groups, particularly the LGBT community, as part of populist electoral strategies. It highlights the intersection of cultural, political, and religious forces in shaping discriminatory practices, offering deeper insights into the mechanisms of exclusionary politics.

The rejection also indicates the importance of inclusiveness and affirmation of the dangers of identity mobilization for political interests that have fragmented society. The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS RI) has included religious moderation in Indonesia's 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) by making the Ministry of Religious Affairs a key institution that conceptualizes its main ideas and implements it as a moderation program. This step is expected to prevent rampant religious identity politics, as well as discrimination against minority groups.³³ Therefore, I see that this research can be developed by discussing how to implement the discourse of religious moderation (*wasathiyya*) in responding to discrimination against minority groups. Not only religious minorities but also those with certain ideologies. In addition, when talking about identity politics, it is sometimes closely related only to religious identity, even though ideological identity is also prone to being politicized. This is where this research can be developed and expanded to find its relevance in Indonesia.

³³ Ismatu Ropi, "Whither Religious Moderation? The State and Management of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 26 (December 31, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v26i3.14055>.

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