



Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan
issn 2354-6174 eissn 2476-9649
Tersedia online di: journal.iainkudus.ac.id/index.php/fikrah
Volume 13 Nomor 2 2025, (153-172)
DOI: 10.21043/fikrah.v13i2.32123

When a Philosopher Refutes Philosophy: The Condition of Ambivalence in Ibn Khaldun's Refutation of Philosophy

Imam Iqbal

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Indonesia
imam.iqbal@uin-suka.ac.id

Irzum Farihah

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kudus, Indonesia
irzum@uinsuku.ac.id

Eliawati

Universitas Islam Negeri Raden Fatah, Indonesia
eliawati_uin@radenfatah.ac.id

Euis Faridah

Al-Azhar University, Egypt
nenkeuis91@gmail.com

Abstract

This article examines Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy. This refutation is confusing because of his position as a prominent Muslim philosopher. How can a philosopher refute philosophy? In a broader context, Ibn Khaldun's refutation warrants study because he represents the position of a philosopher-cum-religious figure amid a latent conflict between the rational-philosophical and scriptural-religious perspectives. This article aims to fill the gap in studies regarding Ibn Khaldun's attitude towards philosophy, which has thus far focused more on his refutation and neglected the relationship between his refutation and his acceptance. To

achieve this goal, qualitative research was conducted on Ibn Khaldun's works along with other writings from journal articles, books, and online literature discussing this topic. Data analysis was carried out using a productive hermeneutic approach to generate a new understanding of his refutation. The research indicates that Ibn Khaldun not only refuted but also accepted philosophy. His stance reveals a persistent condition of ambivalence toward several fundamental philosophical issues. In Ibn Khaldun's thought, this condition of ambivalence operates as both a discursive and an epistemological strategy, enabling the integration of a rational–philosophical worldview with a scriptural–religious one. Framing his position through this lens of ambivalence, which is advanced in this article as a distinctive analytical perspective, offers a fresh and nuanced understanding of his engagement with philosophy. In the broader context, this perspective of ambivalence serves as a fresh interpretive framework for understanding the refutation of philosophy in the Islamic world, particularly as articulated by a philosopher–cum–religious figure.

Keywords: Ambivalence, the philosophy, philosopher-cum-religious, Islamic philosophy

Abstrak

Artikel ini mengkaji penolakan Ibn Khaldun terhadap filsafat. Penolakan tokoh ini membingungkan karena ia dikenal sebagai salah seorang filosof Muslim terkemuka. Bagaimana mungkin seorang filosof justru menolak filsafat? Dalam konteks yang lebih luas, penolakan Ibn Khaldun penting dikaji karena ia merepresentasikan posisi seorang filsuf-cum-agamawan di hadapan konflik laten antara cara pandang rasional-filosofis dengan cara pandang skriptural-religius. Artikel ini ditujukan untuk mengisi kekurangan dalam studi terkait sikap Ibn Khaldun terhadap filsafat yang selama ini lebih memperhatikan aspek penolakannya dan mengabaikan keterkaitan penolakan tersebut dengan aspek penerimaannya. Untuk mencapai tujuan itu, dilakukan penelitian kualitatif terhadap karya Ibn Khaldun dan karya lain dari artikel jurnal, buku, dan literatur daring yang membahas topik ini. Lalu dilakukan analisa data dengan menggunakan pendekatan hermeneutika produktif untuk menghasilkan pemahaman baru tentang penolakannya itu. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Ibn Khaldun tidak hanya menolak filsafat, tetapi juga menerimanya. Sikapnya menunjukkan adanya kondisi ambivalensi yang melekat dalam penolakan dan penerimaannya terhadap beberapa persoalan filosofis yang mendasar. Dalam pemikiran Ibn Khaldun, kondisi ambivalensi ini berfungsi sekaligus sebagai strategi diskursif dan strategi epistemologis, yang memungkinkan integrasi antara cara pandang rasional-filosofis dan cara pandang skriptural-religius. Dalam pemikiran Ibn Khaldun, kondisi ambivalensi ini berfungsi sekaligus sebagai strategi diskursif dan epistemologis, yang memungkinkan integrasi antara cara pandang rasional-filosofis dengan cara pandang skriptural-religius. Dengan memposisikan pandangannya melalui lensa ambivalensi, yang dalam artikel ini diajukan sebagai

perspektif analitis yang khas, memberikan pemahaman baru tentang sikapnya terhadap filsafat. Dalam konteks yang lebih luas, perspektif ambivalensi ini berperan sebagai kerangka interpretatif baru untuk memahami penolakan terhadap filsafat di dunia Islam, terutama yang dilontarkan oleh seorang filsuf-cum-agamawan.

Katakunci: Ambivalensi, filsafat, filsuf-cum-agamawan, filsafat Islam

Introduction

Criticism, refutation, and prohibition of philosophy in the Islamic world have become a controversy that continues to this day. During the classical period, great scholars, such as asy-Syafi'i, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, asy-Syahrastani, Ibn ash-Shalah, an-Nawawi, Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, and Ibn Khaldun, considered that the rational way of thinking developed in philosophy deviated from religion, contradicted revelation, and posed a significant danger to faith (Evkuran, 2023; Huda, 2022). Some even issued fatwas deeming philosophy haram. Al-Ghazali judged philosophers to be infidels (Lubis, 2020). In recent times, the refutation of philosophy is still voiced by several groups, such as modern Salafi groups in Indonesia. They believed that philosophy has obscured pure Islamic doctrine and contradicted revelation (Arman, 2023).

In this broad spectrum of criticism and refutation, Ibn Khaldun occupies a unique position. This figure, known as a philosopher, historian, sociologist, economist, judge, and even a politician, also provided a negative assessment of philosophy. He explicitly refuted philosophy and declared that those who studied it were corrupt. He even asserted that philosophy is dangerous for religion (Khaldun, 2001). Due to his criticism and refutation, modern scholars such as Ali Wardi (1994) even questioned whether Ibn Khaldun could be considered a philosopher or not. How could a philosopher refute philosophy and consider it dangerous?

So far, only a few studies have discussed Ibn Khaldun's criticism and refutation of philosophy. More widely available studies are those of other aspects of his thought, such as history (Tauber, 2022), sociology (Alatas, 2022; Bucholc, 2022; Verza, 2021), politics (Azzuhri, 2022; Pramono et al., 2023), economy (Mujahidin, 2018), education (Amin et al., 2023; Farabi, 2023; Widyastuti et al., 2023), religion (Farihah, 2014; Senjaya, 2023), and others. Studies that have dealt with his refutation of philosophy can be classified into three main categories. First, studies that adopt a defensive attitude and argue that his refutation is not total but partial (Ahmad, 2003), which is only aimed at certain aspects of philosophy (Fakhry, 1997). Second, studies that discuss this topic as part of a

broader explanation of his theory of knowledge (epistemology) (Ahmad, 2003; Fakhry, 1997). According to Fakhry (1997), Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy is a logical consequence of his classification of sciences, where rational-philosophical sciences are positioned in opposition to religious-traditional sciences. Third, studies that discuss this topic in the context of conflict between the groups that support philosophy and those that refute it in the discourse on Islamic sciences (Lakhsassi, 2020).

The purpose of this article is to fill the gaps in studies related to Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy. So far, existing studies have not examined in depth his refutation in relation to his acceptance of philosophy. This aspect often goes unnoticed because he does not always show his acceptance explicitly. The separation between philosophy and religion and the dominance of religion over philosophy in the Islamic sciences have influenced scholars to pay more attention to the aspect of Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy. If we look closely, Ibn Khaldun not only refutes philosophy but also accepts it. The relationship between his refutation and acceptance of philosophy reflects his intellectual position as a philosopher-cum-religious figure in responding to the tension between the rational-philosophical and the scriptural-religious perspectives that he adheres to. There are three questions asked to explore the problem. First, what aspects of philosophy did Ibn Khaldun refute and accept? Second, what are the conditions of ambivalence in his attitude toward philosophy? Third, how did the condition of ambivalence become his strategy as a philosopher-cum-religious figure in integrating reason and revelation in the context of Islamic sciences? These three questions will navigate the discussion in this article and at the same time offer an ambivalence as a new perspective in understanding Ibn Khaldun's refutation and acceptance of philosophy.

This article argues that Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy was not merely partial and non-absolute but also marked by a fundamental ambivalence. He not only refuted but also accepted philosophy. There is a condition of ambivalence in his attitude towards philosophy. This ambivalence reflects the 'in-between space,' that is, between conflicting choices (Bhabha, 2012). As a philosopher-cum-religious figure, this ambivalent condition is inevitable. Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence appears in some fundamental philosophical issues. However, this ambivalence does not mean contradiction and negativity but rather has a positive meaning. This ambivalence becomes a discursive and epistemological strategy for integrating the rational-philosophical with the scriptural-religious perspective in unity and harmony.

This article is the result of qualitative research in the field of Islamic philosophy. Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy was chosen as the material of this research because this issue left a debate about his position in Islamic philosophy. The relevance of this topic lies in how Ibn Khaldun, as a philosopher-cum-religious figure, responded to the latent conflict between the rational-philosophical and the scriptural-religious perspectives. This latent conflict is a similar challenge that continues to be faced by philosopher-cum-religious figures in Islamic sciences to this day. This article analyzes and evaluates Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy in the context of such latent conflict so as to obtain a deeper understanding of the condition of ambivalence in it.

This article uses Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* as a primary source of data, especially the section that discusses his refutation and acceptance of philosophy. The rest of the sections are also inventoried as far as they are relevant to this topic. Primary data sources include the original Arabic manuscript of the *Muqaddimah* (Khaldun, 2001) as well as its translations in English (Khaldun, 2015) and Indonesian (Khaldun, 2000, 2011). All of these versions are used comparatively to ensure the accuracy of interpretation and meaning. Secondary data sources in the form of journal articles, books, and online literature are used to explore the historical and scientific context, as well as to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Ibn Khaldun's refutation and acceptance of philosophy and the condition of ambivalence in it.

The data collection process was carried out through inventory and documentation of Ibn Khaldun's statements that show his refutation and acceptance of philosophy, both explicitly and implicitly. The data that has been collected is then reduced, classified, and displayed according to the identified aspects of refutation and acceptance. Then the data is analyzed to reveal the conditions of ambivalence in such refutation and acceptance. The analysis stage is carried out using a productive hermeneutics approach, which allows for systematic exploration of meaning, in-depth interpretation of the structure, context, and dynamics of thought contained in the text, and to generate a new understanding of his refutation. This analysis obtained a new understanding about the conditions of ambivalence in Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy and how this ambivalence became a discursive and epistemological strategy for the development of philosophy in the Islamic sciences.

Ibn Khaldun's Ambivalence: Between Refuting and Accepting Philosophy

Ibn Khaldun not only refuted philosophy but also accepted it. His attitude towards philosophy was ambivalent. In certain parts of the *Muqaddimah*, he refutes philosophy and attacks philosophers fiercely, but in other parts, he accepts and supports it. He seems to be between conflicting choices. Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence is apparent in his response to four main issues: (1) the meaning of philosophy as a rational science and as metaphysics, (2) refutation and acceptance of reason as an instrument of knowledge, (3) refutation and acceptance of abstraction as a method of knowledge, and (4) refutation and acceptance of logic.

Philosophy as Rational Science or Philosophy as Metaphysics?

In one section of *Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun expresses an explicit refutation of philosophy. He titled that section *fi Ibtholi wa Fasadi muntahilliha* (Khaldun, 2001): "A Refutation of Philosophy and The Corruption of the Students of Philosophy" (Khaldun, 2015). As the title suggests, the section contains Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy and his assessment that the opinions of the philosophers were wrong in all aspects.

He begins this section by giving a general introduction to the philosophy he is referring to. He then explains the process of achieving knowledge in the Aristotelian model and the relationship between knowledge and happiness. After giving a general introduction, he outlined his arguments of refutation. He explains the role of reason in relation to the problems of physics and metaphysics, as well as the refutation of the Muslim philosopher's view on the relationship between knowledge and happiness. He also mentioned the benefits of studying philosophy, especially logic, as well as the prerequisites that a Muslim must meet before studying it in order to avoid the same damage and error (Khaldun, 2001).

If Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy is read carefully, it will be seen that the refutation is not directed at philosophy and all its branches, but only at the metaphysical aspect. As is known, metaphysics has been the most controversial branch in Islamic philosophy. Metaphysics studies ultimate reality or the ultimate truth about everything that exists. According to Ibn Khaldun, the object of metaphysics is existence (*wujud*) as such:

Metaphysics is a science that studies existence as such. First, it studies general matters affecting corporeal and spiritual things, such as the quiddities, oneness, plurality, necessity, possibility, and so on. Then, it studies the beginnings of existing things and (finds) that they are spiritual things. It goes on to study the way existing things issue from (spiritual things), and also studies their order. Then, it studies the conditions of the soul after its separation from the body and its return to its beginning (Khaldun, 2001; Ibn Khaldun, 2015).

More specifically, Ibn Khaldun's refutation in the above section is directed at the Islamic peripatetic metaphysical view. He does not mention the metaphysical views of other schools at all, such as Illuminism, Ikhwan as-Safa, or Isma'ili philosophy (Nasr, 2006). It is on this basis that some scholars state that Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy was not absolute but partial. He did not refute all aspects of philosophy, but only the metaphysical aspect (Ahmad, 2003; Leaman, 2020; Mukti, 2014).

There are two points of Ibn Khaldun's refutation of Islamic peripatetic metaphysics. First, he refutes al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's view of the relationship between God and the creation of the universe. According to him, the views of the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers are a form of limitation of God's creation. For him, the diversity of existence cannot be limited to the First Intellect, as outlined by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina in their theory of emanation. *Wujud* is too broad to be explained by such a narrow human perspective (Khaldun, 2001). Second, he doubted the validity of metaphysical knowledge. For him, the arguments built in metaphysics cannot be proven logically at all. Metaphysics does not produce convincing knowledge, but only assumptions.

Competent (philosophers) have clearly said so. They have expressed the opinion that whatever is immaterial cannot be proved by logical arguments, because it is a condition of logical arguments that their premises must be essential ones. The great philosopher Plato said that no certainty can be achieved with regard to the Divine, and one can state about the Divine only what is most suitable and proper –that is, conjectures (Khaldun, 2001; Khaldûn, 2015).

In contrast to philosophy which is understood as metaphysics in his refutation above, in another part of the *Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun defines philosophy as the rational sciences. He started by grouping the sciences that developed in the 14th century into two main areas, namely the rational sciences (*al-'ulum al-hikmiyyah al-falsafiyyah*) and the traditional sciences (*al-'ulum an-naqliyyah al-waq'iyyah*). Philosophy refers to the rational sciences. As previous Muslim

philosophers, he distinguished philosophy from the traditional sciences derived from the Qur'an and Hadith. Philosophy includes Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, which consists of Geometry, Arithmetic, Music, and Astronomy, while traditional sciences include the science of the Qur'an, Hadith, Jurisprudence, Theology, and Sufism. In each of these sciences there are specific sciences that are more specialized (Khaldun, 2001).

The intellectual sciences are natural to man, in as much as he is a thinking being. They are not restricted to any particular religious group. They are studied by the people of all religious groups who are all equally qualified to learn them and to do research in them. They have existed (and been known) to the human species since civilization had its beginning in the world. They are called the sciences of philosophy and wisdom. They comprise four different sciences (Khaldun, 2001; Khaldûn, 2015).

Based on this classification of sciences, Ibn Khaldun defines philosophy as a rational science that is developed naturally by humans in their capacity as rational beings (Khaldun, 2001). In this sense, philosophy is the highest scientific creation resulting from human excellence in thinking and understanding the world. With their ability to think, humans explore various phenomena, formulate theories, and expand scientific horizons to meet the needs of life and deepen their understanding of reality (Rizvi, 2019). As Ibn Khaldun noted, this philosophy rooted in rational thinking has been an integral part of the development of human civilization since the beginning of its history (Khaldun, 2001).

Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence is rooted in his use of these two definitions. The philosophy he meant in his refutation was philosophy in the sense of metaphysics. Meanwhile, the philosophy that he accepted was philosophy as a rational science. According to Muthahhari (2002), there is no single definition of philosophy in Islam. In the classical period, there were two definitions of philosophy that were commonly used. First, the general definition, where philosophy is understood as a generic term to refer to all rational sciences. To be a philosopher means to master all the rational sciences. Second, a special definition, where philosophy is understood as the first philosophy or metaphysics.

Ibn Khaldun's attitude towards philosophy was ambivalent because he defines philosophy in these two definitions. When he refuted philosophy, he meant philosophy in the special sense, that is, metaphysics. Meanwhile, when he accepted philosophy, he meant philosophy in the general sense, that is

philosophy as a rational science. Even though the definition of philosophy as metaphysics is clearly different from philosophy as a rational science. If he is consistent in one of the above definitions, then his attitude toward philosophy will not be ambivalent. A review of the history of Islamic philosophy shows that Muslim philosophers often engaged in conflict with religious scholars when discussing issues of divine metaphysics (Elhady, 2022).

Refutation and Acceptance of Reason as an Instrument of Knowledge

Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence is also evident in his stance on reason, as he both refutes and accepts it as a valid instrument for acquiring and producing knowledge. In this case, Ibn Khaldun's refutation of reason is closely tied to his refutation of peripatetic metaphysics. He refuted the extraordinary authority granted to reason by Muslim Peripatetic philosophers in generating metaphysical knowledge. He refuted the view that the essence and conditions of all existences, both material and immaterial, could be acquired solely through rational reasoning and mental speculation. He refuted their view that the basic principles of faith (*al-'aqidah al-imaniyyah*) are part of rational knowledge, so the process of justification must also be carried out rationally and not through religious postulates. According to him, this action has had a negative impact on religion (Khaldun, 2001).

Ibn Khaldun also refuted the ability of reason to establish moral values based on rational arguments. As believed by the Peripatetic Muslim philosophers, reason is able to lead humans to knowledge of good and noble moral values, although there is no sharia regulation about it (Tanriverdi, 2018). According to Ibn Khaldun, this view has ignored the position of the sharia. For him, the sharia is more authoritative than reason in determining what is right and wrong and what is good and bad regarding issues related to ethics and morality. He further points out that there are certain aspects of ethical knowledge that cannot be achieved by relying solely on reason but must involve corporeal and spiritual perception (Khaldun, 2001).

For Ibn Khaldun, the ability of human reason is limited. Reason can indeed be a precise scale and can lead humans to definite and reliable knowledge. But it is not appropriate if reason is used to think about problems that are beyond its limits. It is the same as using a scale designed to weigh gold but are misused to weigh mountains.

The intellect, indeed, is a correct scale. Its indications are completely certain and in no way wrong. However, the intellect should not be used to weigh such matters as the oneness of God, the other world, the truth of prophecy, the real character of the divine attributes, or anything else that lies beyond the level of the intellect. That would mean to desire the impossible. One might compare it with a man who sees a scale in which gold is being weighed, and wants to weigh mountains in it (Khaldun, 2001; Khaldun, 2015).

Although Ibn Khaldun affirmed the limitations of reason and refuted their use in metaphysical issues, this does not mean that his refutation was total. In another part of the *Muqaddimah*, he also stated that reason is a human privilege that distinguishes them from other creatures (Khaldun, 2001). Reason is the main instrument of thinking activity that can only be done by humans. He emphasized that the ability to think is part of human existence, without which humans are no different from other creatures. With this ability to think, humans are encouraged to understand the reality around them, meet their life needs, and establish social relationships that lead to the formation of society and human civilization (Khaldun, 2001).

Ibn Khaldun also recognized the importance of reason as the main instrument in acquiring and producing knowledge. He distinguishes between knowledge resulting from sensory observation and knowledge constructed through rational thinking. For him, reason plays an important role in bridging the two types of knowledge. Reason is useful for converting empirical data into complete and coherent theoretical concepts that are structured in science (Khaldun, 2001).

The above description shows Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence in viewing the ability of reason as the main instrument in acquiring and producing knowledge. On the one hand, he refutes the ability of reason to reveal metaphysical and ethical knowledge. For him, the ability of reason is limited. While on the other hand, he recognizes reason as a special privilege that only humans possess and as the main instrument in acquiring and producing knowledge. This ambivalence affirms the existence of epistemological boundaries that should not be violated. Ibn Khaldun considered reason important but also showed the limits of its abilities.

Refutation and Acceptance of Abstraction as a Method

Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence is also evident in his refutation and acceptance of abstraction as a method used in philosophy. He described the process of abstraction as follows:

The quintessence of it is that the mental speculation which makes it possible to distinguish between true and false, concentrates on ideas abstracted from the individual existentia. From these, one first abstracts pictures that conform to all the individual, just as a seal conforms to all the impressions it makes in clay or wax. The abstractions derived from the sensibilia are called 'primary intelligibilia'. These universal ideas may be associated with other ideas, from which, however, they are distinguished in the mind. Then, other ideas, namely those that are associated with, are abstracted from them. Then, if still other ideas are associated with them, a second and third abstraction is made, until the process of abstraction reaches the simple universal ideas, which conform to all ideas and individual. No further abstraction is possible. They are the highest generation (Khaldun, 2001; Khaldun, 2015).

The above quote shows that abstraction is a process taken by reason to arrive at a universal concept. The basis of human knowledge is what the five senses receive from perceived reality. All beings, whether they have the ability to think or not, have the same ability to acquire knowledge through this kind of perception. The difference between humans and other creatures lies in their ability to produce a universal conception that is independent of perceived reality. On the basis of this universal conception, the mind will compare individual objects that have compatibility with each other, thus producing a more universal conception. This process is known as abstraction (Allo, 2015). Ibn Khaldun refuted the validity of abstraction used by the Peripatetic Muslim philosophers to arrive at metaphysical knowledge. For him, they had made a mistake because they used their method for physical objects on metaphysical objects.

First, they conclude from observation and sensual perception that there is a lower substance. Then, their perception progresses a little. (The existence of) motion and sensual perception in animals makes them conscious of the existence of the soul. The powers of the soul, then, make them aware of the dominant position of the intellect. Here, their perception stops. They draw their conclusions with regard to the most high celestial body in the same way they drew their conclusions with regard to the human essence. They thus consider it necessary that the (celestial) sphere must have a soul and an intellect, like human beings (Khaldun, 2001).

Although Ibn Khaldun refuted the use of abstraction as a method in metaphysical knowledge, he still acknowledged that this method was effective for generating knowledge of physical objects and empirical realities, such as social and historical phenomena. In his scientific practice, as seen in his proposed *'ilm al-'umran*, Ibn Khaldun used the abstraction as a method to produce the theory of solidarity (*'aṣabiyyah*), the theory of the rise and fall of dynasties, and the theory of the accompanying social changes (Saumantri, 2020).

Ibn Khaldun used abstraction as a method of observing historical and social realities. He started from empirical observations by recording historical events about the rise and fall of dynasties, tribal migrations, and socio-economic changes. From these various events, he sought to identify cause-and-effect relationships to find essential properties and fundamental patterns and separate them from accidental properties. Then he formulated a general concept that could be used for other similar events. After the concept was tested through cross-event comparisons, he arrived at a theory that could be used to explain a wide variety of events (Alatas, 2022). In *'ilm al-'umran* it is very clear how Ibn Khaldun used abstraction as a method to produce various theories that are still widely used among the scholars of social humanities today. The above description shows Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence towards the method of abstraction. On one side, he refuted and accepted abstraction as a method of producing knowledge. He also refuted the philosophers' abstraction of immaterial objects as they practice in metaphysical knowledge. But on the other side, he used abstraction as a method to examine empirical realities, such as historical and social realities. On this side, he arrived at a general formulation of the basic characteristics of civilization, which are positioned as historical laws (Çaksu, 2017; Kaya, 2020).

Acceptance and Refutation of Logic

Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence is also evident in his criticism and acceptance of logic. On the one hand he mentioned the importance of logic, while on the other hand he considered that logic contains certain aspects that need to be taken into consideration. The logic is important because this science equips a person with the correct rules of reasoning to avoid errors in thinking. Although everyone is able to think with their reason, not everyone is able to think correctly. Logic is useful as a rule of argumentation to distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning, according to the ability and powers of thinking that humans possess (Khaldun, 2001).

Although recognizing the importance of logic, Ibn Khaldun mentioned certain aspects of logic that need to be taken into consideration. According to him, this science contains several things that are contrary to the syaria (Khaldun, 2001). The rules of thinking taught in logic are not always appropriate when applied to religious matters, because human knowledge is basically based on things that can be perceived by the five senses, while not all religious issues are empirical. The use of logic to think about non-empirical problems often results in inaccurate thinking. This is what was experienced by the previous theologian when they discussed non-empirical religious issues using logic. Therefore, according to him, people who use logic to discuss religious issues must also be equipped with religious knowledge, especially the interpretation of the Qur'an and jurisprudence, in order to avoid errors in thinking and violations of the basic principles of Islam (Khaldun, 2001).

Ibn Khaldun wanted logic not to be used only in the form of syllogisms and exaggerated analysis of propositions, which only produced speculative hypotheses and abstract conclusions. Logic also needs to be used in the study of historical and social realities based on observations of empirical facts. In his proposed *'ilm al-umran*, he utilized logical principles supported by empirical facts to produce theories about historical, social, political, economic and human civilization realities (Mukti, 2014).

Ibn Khaldun's Ambivalence as a Strategy for the Integration of Reason and Revelation within the Scientific Framework of Islamic Philosophy

This article shows that Ibn Khaldun not only refuted philosophy but also accepted it. His attitude towards philosophy was ambivalent. This ambivalence arises in response to the inevitable conflicting choices. In the case of Ibn Khaldun's, this ambivalence was not a contradiction but rather a deliberate strategy. It became a discursive and epistemological strategy in overcoming the latent conflict between the rational-philosophical and the scriptural-religious perspectives without having to get caught up in dichotomous choices that negate each other. For him, the two poles that are often opposed have an equally important position and must be integrated in harmony while maintaining their respective boundaries.

Ibn Khaldun's Ambivalence as a Discursive Strategy

The term refutation of philosophy that he uses in the *Muqaddimah* is not without a specific purpose. The use of this term shows the dominance of metaphysical aspects in Islamic philosophy, so that it seems as if Islamic philosophy is metaphysics. In this context, Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence becomes a discursive strategy to reconsider the face of Islamic philosophy, which is too dominated by metaphysics. Ibn Khaldun shows that the dominance of metaphysics in Islamic philosophy only produces speculative thinking that is not based on empirical reality.

The results of which often contradicted Islamic norms. For him, the dominance of speculative metaphysics provides no theoretical benefit and tends to be misleading. In contemporary times, Ibn Khaldun's concerns have been echoed by Muslim thinkers. Hassan Hanafi (1988), for example, said that the basic framework of the discussion of classical Islamic philosophy is limited to the topics of metaphysics, nature, and logic. Meanwhile, social humanities and historical issues are more often absent. The absence of these two scopes of issues has resulted in less adaptability and responsiveness of this discipline to the changes and developments of the time (Hanafi, 1981).

In the context of the conflict between the rational-philosophical and the scriptural-religious perspectives, Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence becomes a discursive strategy. It seeks to restore philosophical discourse in the Islamic world to its original substance, namely as a rational science. At the same time, it affirms the authority of revelation as a source of religious knowledge, particularly in matters concerning metaphysical reality. Philosophy as a rational science is needed as a fundamental means to understand the nature of reality and deepen human understanding of the world. However, the reality that needs to be studied philosophically is not immaterial and non-empirical reality but rather material and empirical reality.

The dominance of metaphysics in Islamic philosophy has resulted in this discipline overemphasizing immaterial and non-empirical reality, thereby ignoring material and empirical reality. In fact, this philosophical discourse that examines material and empirical reality is the main pillar of human knowledge and the main support for its civilization. Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence became a discursive strategy to restore philosophy in the Islamic world as a critical way of thinking within measurable scientific boundaries, which is based on observing empirical reality and not merely speculative philosophical thinking.

Ibn Khaldun's Ambivalence as an Epistemological Strategy

Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence also serves as an epistemological strategy that integrates a rational-philosophical with a scriptural-religious perspective. Within this epistemological framework, revelation remains as an authoritative source of knowledge. The position of revelation as a source of scriptural reality is enriched by other sources in the form of empirical reality (historical and social). Meanwhile, the reason is placed in a position as an instrument to understand both sources. This epistemological framework does not place reason and revelation in contradictory positions, but rather each is placed in a more appropriate position. Within this epistemological framework, rational-philosophical methods are adopted as a complement to empirical observation of historical and social reality.

The manifestation of this epistemological strategy is seen in the *'ilm al-'umrān* introduced by Ibn Khaldun. In this discipline he shows the importance of empirical observation reinforced by rational-philosophical analysis to understand historical and social realities integrated with scriptural reality (revelation). Through this strategy, Ibn Khaldun implicitly wanted to show a new direction for philosophical discourse in the Islamic world in the realm of epistemology, namely the integration of reason, revelation, empirical observation, and rational-philosophical analysis in one complementary epistemological unity. This new direction was not only relevant in Ibn Khaldun's time but is also important for the development of Islamic philosophy today.

Conclusion

This article shows that Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy was not merely partial and non-absolute as claimed by some scholars but also marked by a fundamental ambivalence. This condition of ambivalence arises because he not only refutes philosophy but also accepts it. There are certain aspects of philosophy that he refutes, and there are other aspects that he accepts and adopts further. Ibn Khaldun's refutation and acceptance of philosophy reflect his position when faced with the choice between the rational-philosophical and the scriptural-religious perspectives, which are often in conflict. As a philosopher-cum-religious figure, he seems unwilling to get caught in a dichotomous choice that negates one of the poles.

Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence becomes a discursive and epistemological strategy that integrates the two poles into a harmonious unity and can be a new direction for the development of contemporary Islamic philosophy. The research findings written in this article provide a new perspective, namely the perspective of ambivalence in understanding Ibn Khaldun's criticism and refutation of philosophy in the context of Islamic intellectual tradition.

This perspective can also be used to understand the same criticisms and refutations voiced by anyone who holds the position of a philosopher-cum-religious figure. In a broader scope, a contemporary philosopher-cum-religious figure can learn from Ibn Khaldun about how this condition of ambivalence becomes a discursive and epistemological strategy when facing the same problem. This is intended to avoid getting caught up in contradictory and mutually negating choices, which are often unproductive. In the context of Islamic philosophy, Ibn Khaldun's ambivalence provides an alternative direction for developing studies by integrating rational ability, principles of revelation, empirical observation, and rational-philosophical analysis in a philosophical study of the historical and social realities of contemporary Islamic society.

This article is limited to Ibn Khaldun's refutation of philosophy by taking advantage of his position as a philosopher-cum-religious figure in responding to the conflict between the rational-philosophical and the scriptural-religious perspectives. There are many other figures who have made the same criticism and refutation of philosophy. A more complete understanding of the refutation needs to be sought by examining their views. Likewise, the condition of ambivalence described in this article needs to be understood in a broader scope that involves research on other philosopher-cum-religious figures who have criticized and refuted philosophy, as Ibn Khaldun did. Only in this way can the condition of ambivalence can be understood in a more complete and comprehensive manner.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Z. (2003). *The Epistemology of Ibn Khaldūn*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203633892>
- Alatas, S. F. (2022). Reading Ibn Khaldun in the Formative Period of Sociology. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 35(3). <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12377>
- Al-Attas, S. N. (1995). *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.
- Al-Jābirī, M.A. (1994). *Fikr Ibn Khaldūn: al-‘Aṣabiyyah wa ad-Dawlah: Ma‘ālim Nazariyyah Khaldūniyyah fī at-Tārīkh al-Islāmī*. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥdah al-‘Arabiyyah.
- Al-Khuḍairī, Z. (1979). *Falsafah at-Tārīkh ‘Inda Ibn Khaldūn*. Kairo: Dār as-Ṣaqāfah li aṭ-Ṭibā‘ah wa an-Nasyr.
- Allo, P. (2015). Constructionism in Logic. *Conference: ISIS Summit Vienna 2015-The Information Society at the Crossroads*. <https://doi.org/10.3390/isis-summit-vienna-2015-s2004>
- Amin, H., Pratama, Y., & Amin, A. H. (2023). Revitalizing Ibn Khaldun’s Theory of Islamic Education for the Contemporary World. *Al-Ishlah: Jurnal Pendidikan*, 15(3), 4010-4020. <https://doi.org/10.35445/alishlah.v15i3.4523>
- Angels, P. A. (1988). *Dictionary of Philosophy*. New York: Barnes & Nobles Books.
- Arman, A. A. (2023). Narasi-narasi Pengharaman Filsafat Oleh Kelompok Salafi Modern Indonesia. *El-Fikr: Jurnal Aqidah Dan Filsafat Islam*, 4(1), 71-90.
<https://doi.org/10.19109/el-fikr.v4i1.17158>
- Azzuhri, A. (2022). Introducing Al-Farabi’s Political Philosophy to the Modern Politics. *Australian Journal of Islamic Studies*, 7(2), 22-35.
<https://doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v7i2.443>
- Badawī, A.R. (1962). *Muallafāt Ibn Khaldūn*. Kairo: Markaz al-Qawmī li al-Buḥūs al-Ijtimā‘iyyah wa al-Jinā‘iyyah.
- Bhabha, H. K. (2012). *The Location of Culture*. New York: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203820551>
- Bucholc, M. (2022). Ludwik Gumplowicz (1897–1898), Ibn Khaldun: An Arab Sociologist of the 14th Century. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 35(3), 45-62.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12378>
- Çaksu, A. (2017). Ibn Khaldun and Philosophy: Causality in History. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 30(1), 27-42. <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12149>
- Elhady, A. (2022). Dialectical Views on Metaphysics in Islam: Thoughts of Ibn Rushd and Theologians. *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies*, 78(4), a7531.
<https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v78i4.7531>
- Enan, M. A. (1979). *Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work*. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan.
- Evkuran, M., & Sayin, Y. (2023). What Does Salafism Promise to Us? -The Political Theology of Purification and Stability in a Chaotic World-. *Kader*, 21(3).

<https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.1385261>

- Fakhry, M. (1997). *Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism: A Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oneworld.
- Farabi, M. Al. (2022). Ibn Khaldun's Considerations Relating to Islamic Education and Their Perspective on the Future. *Ta Dīb Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 11(2), 205–214. <https://doi.org/10.29313/tjpi.v11i2.10531>
- Farihah, I. (2014). *Agama Menurut Ibn Khaldun*. *Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan*, 2(1), 187–205. <https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v2i1.554>
- Hanafi, H. (1981). *Dirāsāt Islāmiyyah*. Kairo: al-Anjilu al-Mishriyyah.
- Hanafi, H. (1988). *Dirāsāt Falsafīyyah*. Kairo: al-Anjilu al-Mishriyyah.
- Huda, A. (2022). Ibnu Taimiyah Serta Implikasinya Dalam Perkembangan Sains Modern. *Jurnal Kajian Ilmu Pendidikan (Tarbiyatul Misbah)*, 15(2), 127–138. <https://doi.org/10.70688/tarbiyatulmisbah.v15i2.257>
- Inwagen, P. V. (2009). *Metaphysics*. Philadelphia: Westview Press.
- Kaya, E. (2020). A Critical Approach to Causality and Rational Knowledge in Ibn Khaldūn. *Ulum*, 3(2). <https://doi.org/10.54659/ulum.798914>
- Khaldun, I. (1979). *at-Ta'rif bi Ibn Khaldūn wa Riḥlatihi Garban wa Syarqan*. Lebanon: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī.
- Khaldun, I. (1996a). *Lubāb al-Muḥaṣṣal fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*. Sulaimān, A. M. H., ed. Iskandariyyah: Dār al-Ma'rifah al-Jāmi'iyyah.
- Khaldun, I. (1996b). *Syifā' as-Sāil wa Tahzīb al-Masā'il*. al-Ḥāfiẓ, M.M., ed. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Mu'āṣir.
- Khaldun, I. (2000). *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun*. Thoha, A., trans. Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus.
- Khaldun, I. (2001). *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn*. Syaḥadah, K., ed. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr.
- Khaldun, I. (2011). *Mukaddimah*. Irham, M., Supar, M., & Zuhri, A., trans. Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar.
- Khaldun, I. (2015). *The Muqaddimah*. Rosenthal, F., trans. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400866090>
- Lakhsassi, A. (2020). Ibn Khaldūn. In Nasr, S.H. & Leaman, O. eds., *History of Islamic Philosophy*. London & New York: Routledge, 350–364. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003070733-30>
- Leaman, O. (2020). Islamic Philosophy: An Introduction. In *Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Philosophers Bibliographic Guides*. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350994980-002>
- Lubis, A., & Rozi, F. (2020). Rethinking the Book of Tahafut al-Falasifah: Examining Al-Ghazali's Argumentative Criticism Against the Thinking of Philosophers. *Indonesian Journal of Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies*, 4(1). <https://doi.org/10.20885/ijiis.vol4.iss1.art1>
- Madjid, N. (1994). *Khazanah Intelektual Islam*. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang.

- Mahdi, M. (2015). *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture*. London & New York: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315670188>
- Mujahidin, M. (2018). Ibn Khaldun's Economic Thought. *MPRA Paper*, No. 87192.
<https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87192/>
- Mukti, M. F. A. (2014). Philosophical Ideas in Islam: The Attitude of Ibn Khaldun. *Afkar: Jurnal Akidah & Pemikiran Islam*, Edisi Khas, 67-96.
- Muthahhari, M. (2002). *Filsafat Hikmah: Pengantar Pemikiran Ṣadrā*. Kartanegara, M., Bagir, Z. A., & Heriyanto, H., trans. Bandung: Mizan.
- Nasr, S. H. (1964). *Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna-Suhrawardi-Ibn Arabi*. New York: Caravan Books.
- Nasr, S. H. (1978). *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (Revised Edition). Great Britain: Thames and Hudson Ltd.
- Nasr, S. H. (2006). *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present*. New York: State University of New York Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780791481554>
- Pramono, M. F., Latief, M., & Putri, H. A. (2023). Crisis Studies of The Discourse of Identity Politics in Indonesia from The Perspective of Asabiyah Ibn Khaldun. *Potret Pemikiran*, 27(2). <https://doi.org/10.30984/pp.v27i2.2651>
- Rizvi, S. (2019). Philosophy in the Islamic World: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps Volume 3, by Peter Adamson. *Intellectual History of the Islamicate World*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.1163/2212943x-00701008>
- Saumantri, T. (2020). Teori Ashabiyah Ibnu Khaldun Sebagai Model Perkembangan Peradaban Manusia. *Jurnal Tamaddun : Jurnal Sejarah Dan Kebudayaan Islam*, 8(1). <https://doi.org/10.24235/tamaddun.v8i1.6326>
- Senjaya, T. (2023). Ibn Khaldun's Thoughts on Religion as A Personal Experience and A Social System. *Scientia*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.51773/sssh.v2i1.193>
- Simon, H. (1978). *Ibn Khaldun's Science of Human Culture*. Baali, F., trans. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf Publishers.
- Surajiyo, dkk. (2006). *Dasar-Dasar Logika*. Jakarta: PT Bumi Aksara.
- Tanriverdi, H. (2018). Problem of Possible Rational Metaphysic According to Ibn Khaldun. *Hitit Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 17(34). <https://doi.org/10.14395/hititilahiyat.466023>
- Tauber, E. (2022). Ibn Khaldun as a Modern Philosopher of History. *Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies*, 2. <https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/8-2/5>
- Verza, A. (2021). *Ibn Khaldun and the Arab Origins of the Sociology of Civilisation and Power*. Switzerland: Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70339-4>
- Wardi, A. (1994). *Manṭiq Ibn Khaldūn*. Beirut: Dār Kūfān.
- Widyastuti, W., Lubis, M. F., & Sabri, R. (2023). The Concept of Education According to Ibn Khaldun. *Almufida: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman*, 8(2). <https://doi.org/10.46576/almufida.v8i2.3564>

This page intentionally left blank