Hizbiyyah and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's New Member Recruitment Strategy After Disbandment

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Abstrak

Artikel ini membahas strategi perekrutan anggota baru Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia setelah mereka dibubarkan oleh pemerintah melalui Perppu Organisasi Masyarakat Nomor 2 tahun 2017. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah kualitatif melalui pengumpulan data observasi, wawancara, dan telaah dokumen. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia merubah strateginya dari rekrutmen terbuka menjadi menggunakan strategi melalui kelompok informal dan individual dalam merekrut anggotanya secara tertutup terutama setelah mereka dilarang oleh pemerintah sejak tahun 2017, yaitu melalui gerakan mahasiswa, melalui aktivitas tokoh di masjid, dan melalui kalangan perempuan. Menurut HTI, ketiga strategi ini memiliki kecenderungan yang aman karena dapat dikerjakan secara sembunyi-sembunyi dan lepas dari kontrol pemerintah dan ormas yang menentangnya. Menurut HTI, gerakan mahasiswa dianggap penting karena mereka adalah warga negara terdidik yang berpotensi menjadi agen perubahan di masyarakat. Sementara itu, masjid merupakan pusat aktivitas umat Islam, di mana perekrutan pengurus DKM, ustaz dan jemaahnya dapat mempercepat dakwah khilafah. Sementara, pemanfaatan perempuan sebagai agen rekrutmen HTI lainnya, dilakukan karena doktrin HTI meyakini pentingnya perempuan sebagai pilar peradaban. Artikel ini berargumentasi bahwa meskipun HTI telah dilarang pemerintah,

namun mereka masih melakukan perlawanan terutama melalui cara-cara yang tidak tampak dan sembunyi-sembunyi.

Katakunci: aktivisme keagamaan; kebangkitan Islam; gerakan revivalis; muslim Indonesia; kebijakan pemerintah.

Abstract

This article discusses Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's new member recruitment strategy after the government disbanded them through Perppu on Community Organization Number 2 of 2017. The research method used is qualitative through data collection, observation, interview, and document review. This research found that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia changed its strategy from open recruitment to using strategies through informal groups and individuals in recruiting members behind closed doors, especially after they were banned by the government in 2017, namely through the student movement, through the activities of figures in mosques, and women. According to HTI, these three strategies have a safe tendency because they can be done secretly and escape the control of the government and mass organizations that oppose them. According to HTI, the student movement is considered necessary because they are educated citizens who have the potential to become agents of change in society. Meanwhile, the mosque is the center of Muslim activity, where the recruitment of DKM administrators, preachers, and congregants can accelerate the preaching of the Khilafah. Meanwhile, the use of women as another HTI recruitment agent is done because the HTI doctrine believes in the importance of women as pillars of civilization. This article argues that although the government has banned HTI, they are still fighting back, mainly through invisible and covert means.

Keywords: religious activism; Islamic revival; revivalist movement; Indonesian Muslims; government policy.

Introduction

Since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a resurgence of Islamic revivalist activism calling for the implementation of Sharia and the establishment of a caliphate (Gueorguiev et al., 2018). Azra (2016) argues that political Islam after the fall of Soeharto was marked by what is known as the "formalization of Islam," which can be seen from the increasing demands for the implementation of Islamic law and the proliferation of Islamic revival movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and the Islamic Forum (FUI) in various regions in Indonesia (Hasan, 2019). Before the fall of the New Order, these movements operated underground to avoid regime repression. This can be seen, for example, in one of the movements, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) (Sirry, 2020).

Furthermore, in the reform era, HTI took advantage of Indonesia's spirit of new beginnings in all aspects, including freedom of speech and grouping. HTI, for example, obtained a permit from the government as a formal organization in 2000, two years after Indonesia's reformation. This is indirectly a consequence of the new era of democracy (Junaidi, 2021). As a result, their role in the public sphere is materialized, as are their efforts to influence policy in Indonesia. HTI was influential in controlling the masses in rejecting Ahmadiyah, rejecting the Pornography Law, and the Miss World contest. The culmination of this movement was to become a significant player in action imprisoning Basuki Tjahaya Purnama alias Ahok in 2016 due to the blasphemy case in Kepulauan Seribu, Jakarta. It is known that the action held by the Liberation Student Movement (GP) as a wing of HTI in Jakarta on January 10, 2016, caused public attention to Ahok's case to increase (Syailendra, 2017). This led to significant actions such as 212 and 411 in Jakarta and major cities in Indonesia (Chakim, 2018). Thanks to HTI, Ahok was imprisoned for blaspheming Islam.

However, the Indonesian government disbanded this transnational movement due to pressure from the public, public officials, and moderate organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (Burhani, 2017). HTI was dissolved by the government in 2017 through Perppu Ormas No. 2/2017 on Mass Organizations. Perppu No. 2/2017, on the amendment of Law No. 17/2013 on Mass Organizations, asserts that every mass organization established must participate in development to achieve the goals of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. One of the prohibitions in this Perppu is that CSOs are prohibited from carrying out separatist activities that threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as embracing, developing, and spreading teachings or ideologies that are contrary to Pancasila (Setia & Rahman, 2021). This prohibition then became the reason for the dissolution of HTI. HTI is considered to have an ideology contrary to Pancasila, which will establish an Islamic state (Islamic Caliphate) over the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Therefore, it is essential to see how far HTI has progressed after the government disbanded it in 2017 (Burhani, 2017). Unfortunately, research on HTI often focuses only on how the movement was active in Indonesia. In addition, observers only focus on the identity of radical activities because of their ideology that wants to restore the Islamic Caliphate in the world, an

ideology that is far from the spirit of Pancasila. It is also important to capture how the organization has developed organizationally and in terms of membership. Moreover, as an organization with a transnational character, HTI must have optimal and multinational resources (Gregory Fealy, 2007). Its presence in more than 40 countries is an achievement in which an organization can enter countries worldwide. An organization like this is like a global-multinational company that markets its products to various countries worldwide.

Some HT research always emphasizes the perspective of security and the threat of terrorism. Zeyno Baran (2015), Director of the Nixon Center's International Energy and Security Program, called HT a 'terrorist transport belt' and the 'Bolshevik Islam' initiator. Similarly, Whine (2016) of the Community Security Trust argues that HT members continue to be a recruiting ground for terrorists. Ehrenfeld and Lappen (2016) consider HT a terrorist group within the Al-Qaeda landscape and advocate for dissolving the party and freezing its status. Unfortunately, most of these experts do not have enough evidence to support their arguments. Despite the lack of evidence supporting these claims, especially regarding the relationship between Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and HT, Indonesia should be more cautious, given the rapid growth of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.

Moreover, HT research has always focused on the movement's identity by labeling it as radical such as studies by (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006; Lewis, 2003; Shestopalets, 2022). Therefore, the group has developed into a global phenomenon in recent years. In addition, observers also often examine HT in terms of its influence in some developed countries, especially in Western countries such as the UK (Hamid, 2014), Turkey, Uzbekistan (Yilmaz, 2010), and Australia (Ward, 2017). This is because, in Western countries, HT tries to influence minority Muslim groups. Mamouri (2015) explains that transnational movements such as HT will attract Muslim groups as minorities in Western countries because their actions always offer protection and an objective perspective on Islamic teachings. An offer that is rarely found in Muslim minority activities.

Meanwhile, HT studies in Southeast Asia are still rare. Although in recent years, many Indonesian and Western academics have shown interest in HT. Osman's (2018) study, for example, offers new insights into HTI's history, organizational structure, and ideology and specifically explains HTI's rapid growth in Indonesia. Collective identity play has driven HTI's growth in

attracting new members and retaining old ones. In addition, HTI has taken advantage of Indonesia's democracy to campaign for anti-liberal ideas that align with its mission, purifying Sharia. However, although HTI is considered extreme and radical, they are still given space and accepted in Indonesia's religious and political landscape. This research warns against oversimplifying our understanding of groups like HTI and political Islam in Indonesia. Meanwhile, among Indonesian Muslim academics, research on HTI has been conducted, for example, by Asep and Zulkifili (2016), by portraying HTI from the perspective of globalization and modernization. For both, Hizbut Tahrir is a global network organization (transnational) that is part of, a participant in, and an interpreter of globalization. This is characterized by their struggle to build an Islamic state (Khilafah Islamiyah) with global citizenship (global *ummah*).

Recently, studies on HTI increased when the Indonesian government dissolved the organization through Perppu No. 2/2017 on Community Organizations. For example, Burhani (2017) captures the response to the HTI dissolution process. Despite violating the applicable law by not going through the courts, the decision to dissolve HTI was widely supported by the moderate majority. On the other hand, this decision has tarnished the role of democratization, which is slowly declining. Aswar et al. (2020) see that HTI is a mass organization that the state has always repressed. Therefore, when the government disbanded it, the solution was to resist state policy through political and legal strategies.

The above studies provide important insights into understanding Hizbut Tahrir's religious movement. However, a general trend in the literature describes Hizbut Tahrir explicitly. In a sense, the previous literature describes the HT movement in the front-stage domain. Therefore, the literature that has been mentioned does not understand HT from backstage (Goffman & Best, 2017). In dramaturgy, the study of the revivalist movement from backstage is in-depth because it analyzes phenomena rarely known to the public. One of the studies of the revivalist campaign backstage is how they recruit new members because it is done secretly (Rosyidin & Solihah, 2020). In the context of HTI, covert efforts were made to avoid punishment from the government after its organizational permit was revoked.

Therefore, this article discusses Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's new member recruitment strategy after the government disbanded them through Perppu on Community Organization Number 2 of 2017. The reasoning is based

on the premise that from 2005-2013, HTI claimed to have hundreds of thousands of active members in 30 provinces in Indonesia. For example, HTI spokesperson Ismail Yusanto admitted in the February 14-24, 2017, edition of Tabloid Media Ummat that Muslims' response and high attendance at HTI events showed that the people longed for the Khilafah. "If this Khilafah does not exist in the teachings of Islam, why do we see people flocking to come from various regions for the revival of the Khilafah itself? This is a serious accusation against the teachings of Islam. The clear evidence that this Khilafah will rise is clear, with the choice of this path in the lives of the people today .... " (Wajdi, 2017), including large agendas carried out with many participants. In 2002, HTI held an International Khilafah Conference agenda in Sentul, Bogor, then the International Khilafah Conference (KKI) in 2007 and 2013 at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, Jakarta (Garematan, 2014). Furthermore, HTI's agenda on February 29, 2014, as Alles (2016) noted that more than 50,000 members, both men and women dressed in white and headscarves, marched on the main streets of Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar, and other major cities to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the abolition of the Khilafah system. From this, Indonesians are increasingly aware of HTI's massive agendas.

Grassroots Social Movements of Religious Organizations

In responding to a social movement, the state has two policy options, namely accommodating or prohibiting the movement (Melucci, 1980). The main goal of both strategies is basically to change the behavior of the movement so that it does not become a threat to the state. When a state chooses to 'ban' a movement, it can use many methods or tactics that include direct or indirect punishment of the movement, such as issuing dissolution policies, arresting, killing, intimidating, and stigmatizing.

In some cases, prohibition measures or policies succeed in causing the demobilization of a movement, but sometimes they fail. Prohibition or repression does not necessarily demobilize a movement; repression can even change the behavior of the movement to become more aggressive or militant, or conversely, the movement can change its strategy to become adaptive in repressive situations. Thus, the results of state repression do not necessarily demobilize social movements; on the contrary, repression can trigger increased mobilization of social movements. Another impact of repression is that social movements may change their strategies or means of resistance

instead of increasing or decreasing mobilization to adapt to repressive state policies. This can take the form of violent or nonviolent activities. This mode of resistance will continually adapt to changes, especially in the strategy of state repression.

Therefore, some strategies or tactics of resistance that can be chosen by social movements to respond to state bans can be: changes in the arena of resistance, changes in issues or demands, and changes in identity or two-faced groups (Johnston, 2011). The main idea against state repression is that social movements will adjust their tactics to continue their mobilization under the regime. On the other hand, changes in social movement strategies are a way to save themselves from state control. Whatever form of state repression is imposed on social movements, a social movement will adapt to new forms of resistance. Changing tactics means a movement conducts its political activities through other means, such as violence, nonviolence, or the underground. Or it could be that a social movement changes the arena or place of resistance through the internet, in court, prison, clandestine, exile, or in places that can be effective for the movement's political activities and difficult to control by the state.

Furthermore, the issues advocated by social movements can also change in response to state repression but still gain more comprehensive support from the public and continue their resistance to the state or regime. In addition, duplication strategies or duplicate organizing (de-identified groups) can be an alternative for oppressed social movements to survive. A movement can form many duplicate groups, such as churches, religious, social, intellectual, and cultural groups.

One of the theories related to changing social movement strategies is the informal network theory. This theory is a sociological perspective micro (agent) in which an informal network (a small group, individual, and figure) social movement will replace the role of the more significant social movement. McAdam et al. (1996) call this micro-mobilization. Micro-mobilization is movement activity using informal networks united by strong ties of collective identity as the fundamental basis of social movements.

In line with micro-moblization approach, Polletta and Jasper (2001) analyze Islamist social movements to a more micro level called the theory of collective identity change through informal networks of the movement. They ask why Islamist social movements, at certain phases, choose to use their

individual members' networks rather than maintaining their collective identity. The phase in question is mainly when they experience threats, bans, and repression from the state. The informal network strategy is chosen because it will diminish the focus of the threatening group on the existence of the leading social movement. The social movement will break its members into small groups, leaving even one individual to keep moving underground while hiding by not using their true identity. These informal networks are in charge of carrying out the function of mobilization and gradual frame alignment to restore their main movement.

Therefore, in responding to the dissolution action by the government, HTI uses a strategy of changing the arena of resistance, especially in recruiting new members by using their informal networks. The strategy through the utilization of small groups on campus and in the community is used to avoid the State's control. The strategy was chosen because their movement prioritizes nonviolent action.

Hizbut Tahrir: History and Founders

HTI is part of the international HT organization. HT was founded by an Islamic scholar, Sheikh Taqi al-Din An-Nabhani, in Jerusalem (Commins, 1991). An-Nabhani founded a political party with an ideology based on Islam in 1953 to revive the Islamic Caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir was formed to create a revival of the Muslim World from the downturn it is currently feeling, liberating Muslims from the domination of Western thought, systems, and laws of infidels and restoring the Khilafah Islamiyah. An-Nabhani believes that political parties should imitate the methods used by the Prophet Muhammad to take over the helm in Medina.

The party should divide its action method into three levels by imitating the Prophet's method. The first stage, the culture stage *(tasqif),* aims to produce people who believe in the party's ideas and techniques, forming small groups. In the second stage, known as the stage of interaction *(tafa'ul)* with Muslims, the party strives for Muslims to embrace and bring Islam so that they can raise its issues and thus work to uphold it in their life affairs. In the third level, known as the level of compromise with power and authority *(istilamu al-hukmi),* the party that intends to work to establish a government, apply Islam comprehensively, and bring it as preaching to the whole world (An-Nabhani, 2004). Nabhani argues that to speed up the third stage. Leaders

can seek *nusrah* (help to gain power) from essential entities of the country, such as military leaders, judges, and politicians (Khan, 2003).

An-Nabhani's call for establishing an Islamic Caliphate is not unique to other Muslim thinkers such as Abdul A'la Maududi and Hassan Al-Banna. However, Mawdudi and Al-Banna were more practical in reviving the Caliphate. Maududi believed that Muslims should first try to establish an Islamic state in their territory with territorial boundaries (Maududi, 1980). He saw the state as a temporary entity to be replaced by a caliphate. Maududi emphasized that implementing the political principles set out in the Qur'an requires a state structure. This Islamic State will be the precursor to the Khilafah. Like Maududi, Al-Banna also believes that a state can be formed for the first time before the rise of the Caliphate (Al-Banna, 1978).

On the one hand, An-Nabhani advocated for an immediate and radical change instead of the more gradual approach of most Muslim reformers in reviving the Caliphate. When establishing HT, An-Nabhani did not limit his activities to Palestine. He traveled to the Middle East and founded HT branches in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. Due to attempted coups by HT members in several Middle Eastern countries, HT members have become targets of many Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes. This led to the exodus of HT leaders to Western countries such as the UK, the US, Australia, and Germany (Hamid, 2007). After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, British party members traveled to Muslim republics in Central Asia and spread their ideology (Baran, 2004). HT leaders were then deployed to spread their mission to Southeast Asia (Fealy, 2007).

History of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)

Hizb ut-Tahrir's emergence in Indonesia has attracted many researchers and scientists. Greg Fealy notes that HTI is perhaps the only Islamic organization controlled by a foreign leader, which draws its ideology strictly from the Middle East, and whose agenda is essentially transnational (Greg Fealy, 2005). Interestingly, the origins of Indonesian HT can be traced back to Australia. Two religious figures, Abdullah Bin Nuh and Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, played an essential role in the growth and expansion of HT in Indonesia. Abdullah Bin Nuh was a prominent Islamic scholar with many followers. He has a pesantren in Bogor, where many of his students later become graduates at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB) located in Bogor (Salim, 2005).

In the late 1970s, Abdullah Bin Nuh met several HT members in Australia while visiting his son, who was studying in Sydney (al-Khaththath, 2007). Most HT members in Australia are immigrants from the Middle East who migrated to Australia to escape the persecution of the authoritarian Middle Eastern regime. Then Noah was very impressed with HT's methodology, which he said offered sustainable and practical solutions to the problems of the Muslim World. In 1982, he invited Baghdadi to teach at his school, Bogor's Al-Ghazali Islamic Boarding School. This marked the beginning of HT in Indonesia.

The history of HTI can be divided into two main periods. The first period was during Suharto's New Order regime when Indonesia was authoritarian. The second period was during the post-New Order era when Indonesia began transitioning towards democracy. During the New Order, HTI maintained a low profile and used informal networks to spread its influence. This is not entirely surprising because social movements often use informal networks to recruit and raise issues in countries with less open political systems (authoritarian). In explaining this informal network, Wiktorowicz argues that using informal networks in Islamic movements with controversial political identities has become a habit (Wiktorowicz, 2012). Because of this, these movements are often seen as less threatening to the regime. So it makes perfect sense for HTI to utilize various Muslim student organizations to expand its network and support. Even at this stage, the organizational structure is shadowy and operates behind the scenes of informal networks. One of the first informal networks was the Bogor Agricultural Institute's Student Islamic Spiritual Body (BKIM).

Many subsequent HTI figures did not even know they were part of HTI. Baghdadi only introduced HTI ideas through lectures held at several mosques in Bogor. It was only in 1987 that these figures were informed about the existence of HTI with their identities. Then, to expand HTI outside Bogor, HTI activists began to pioneer forming another informal network in the form of student groups known as Campus Dakwah Institutions (LDK) at various universities in Bandung, Surabaya, and Makassar (Salim, 2005). Many future HTI leaders are recruited through this network. However, for members of the general public, their involvement with HTI often begins through other informal networks (through friends and family members) (Snow et al., 1980).

After forming an informal network at the university, HTI leaders formed the Standard Chartered Islamic Study Group (KSICC). KSICC is an Islamic study group held at Wisma Standard Chartered (Standard Chartered Building) Jakarta. KSICC also started a training program *(daurah)* for critical participants, held about once a month (Abdurrahman, 2002). KSICC allows HTI to expose its ideas to participants from different backgrounds, such as employees and professionals. HTI also started organizing a training program for youth known as Dirasah Islam for Young People (Youth Training Program) (Al-Islam, 2004). Perhaps the most crucial contribution of KSICC was the production of the Al-Islam Bulletin. The first issue of this bulletin was produced in 1994 and distributed in mosques in Jakarta. Subsequently, HTI began organizing discussions known as Gathering for Al-Islam Readers. This session was used to expose Al-Islam readers to the KSICC group and, at the same time, was used as a recruitment mechanism for HTI (Salim, 2005).

An article by Muhammad al-Khaththath, one of HTI's key activists criticizing Bank Indonesia, caused HTI to come under pressure from the authorities to stop their activities at the Standard Chartered building (Al-Khaththath, 2006). As a result, HTI activists were forced to change their strategy. They began to utilize the As-Salam Waqf Agency (BWAS) for their activities. The formation of BWAS coincided with renaming the Al-Islam bulletin to the As-Salam bulletin. This waqf agency manages funds collected during recitation, zakat, and donations given to HTI. Through this BWAS, HTI began moving to mosques in Jakarta and its surroundings to conduct reading gatherings, deliver Friday sermons, and get involved in mosque activities. It was only in 2000 that HTI decided to use its official name.

The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 led to a period of democratization and a loosening of political control. However, it took about two years for HTI to react to these changes. HTI leaders are unsure how best to respond to these new dynamics. Baghdadi differed from other HTI leaders by agreeing to form a formal organization to express his ideas. In July 2000, HTI officially launched itself as a legal organization. This was mainly due to the belief of HTI leaders that the organization was strong enough to establish itself officially (Abdurrahman, 2002). As part of this renewal move, HTI relaunched the Al-Islam Bulletin in July 2000.

The name that was printed for the first time was Syabab Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia as the publisher of the bulletin. Before that, in August 2000, HTI organized its first international Khilafah conference to formally push the

organization into the public sphere. The meeting was held at the GBK Senayan Stadium. Five thousand HTI activists attended the event. The event received comprehensive media coverage and transformed HTI from a static, elite-based movement to a broad-based mass organization with a dynamic outlook. Speakers featured at the event included Sheikh Ismail al-Wahwah (Hizbut Tahrir Australia), Ustaz Syarifuddin Md Zain (Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia), and Muhammad al-Khaththath (Indonesia). Subsequently, HTI started organizing activities openly and campaigning earnestly for implementing Sharia law in Indonesia and the revival of the Khilafah (Osman, 2010).

HTI Member Recruitment Strategy after Disbandment

After being dissolved by the government, HTI's organizational status or legality disappeared. They were then named a banned organization so that they could not carry out any activities, and if they continued to do so, their actions would violate the law. In the policy concept, the state's banning HTI is repressive because it has oppressed the movement (Melucci, 1988). HTI then realized that when they carried out activities openly, the state's actions could be even more cruel. As a result, HTI changed its strategy from open to covert.

In the study of McAdam et al. (1996) and Polleta and Jasper (2001), one possible strategy social movements use to avoid repressive state actions and state control is to utilize closed informal networks. The informal network in question utilizes agents, members, wing organizations, and specific figures to become the new spearhead of the vision of the social movement. The social movement will avoid efforts to control the government by relying on micro-informal networks. This is also what HTI did after they were disbanded. Utilizing the strength of their informal networks, especially the available human resources, became a new method of recruiting new members. Sources of strength on campus, such as through campus da'wah institutions, utilizing the presence of mosques, and female cadres, are considered sufficient to continue to carry out political activities for HTI. These three sources of strategy have been quite successful because since they were disbanded in 2017 until now, state control has never detected the use of their strategy.

Recruitment Through the Student Movement

After being officially dissolved, the stretching of HTI's struggle to realize the Khilafah became invisible to the public. This is because after losing legal status, HTI is automatically a banned organization. However, even

though they have been disbanded, they still carry out recruitment strategies such as through their wing organizations on campus. HTI utilizes its wing organization, the Coordinating Body for Campus Da'wah Institutions (BKLDK). This extra-campus organization was initiated on 20-24 February 2004 in East Java and inaugurated on 28-29 August 2004 in Bogor, West Java. In December 2005, BKLDK members agreed on the vision, mission, program, and expansion to other regions (BKLDK, 2016).

The programs offered by BKLDK are coaching members of Campus Da'wah Institutions (LDK), socializing opinions, contacting institutions and figures, and internal studies. These programs are implemented in collaboration with BKLDK members on campuses and with HTI-affiliated Campus Da'wah Institutions (LDKs). BKLDK programs are implemented by LDKs so as not to arouse suspicion among students. As a result, the characteristics of BKLDK are closed and do not show HTI symbols in their activities. This differs from other HTI wing organizations, such as the Liberation Student Movement (GP), which is open and often uses HTI symbols.

Like the Liberation Student Movement (GP), which is affiliated with HTI, BKLDK is an HTI wing organization that provides a narrative of the importance of the Khilafah to students by carrying out peaceful actions. After their parent organization was disbanded, the role of wing movements in mobilizing the movement became crucial. Wing organizations are the new spearhead of HTI when they spread the idea of Khilafah and recruit new members.

In recruitment, BKLDK succeeded in attracting students. They usually attract students who do not want to be disturbed by their lecture activities, in contrast to student organizations such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI), the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII), and the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM), which are considered too focused on movement activities, thus forgetting their primary obligation, studying. While BKLDK is more oriented towards discussing ideas, their activism is only carried out when there are direct instructions from HTI, which is rare after the HTI organization was disbanded. As a result, BKLDK is an extra-campus organization that is friendly, does not like to spend free time (hanging out), and uses Islamic associations that do not lead to promiscuity.

This is done by BKLDK because there is a tendency to change the attitude of more pragmatic students, namely students who want to graduate as soon as possible and work. BKLDK looks at this by adapting and is likely to be accepted by this model student. At least the parameters of their success can be measured through the leadership relay in BKLDK. In the recruitment strategy, BKLDK uses a method similar to the opinion dissemination strategy, namely, through the vital role of the LDK on campus. Their recruitment is done simultaneously with the recruitment of LDK on campus; later, if students are interested in joining LDK, they will also be offered to join BKLDK. The difference is if LDK members only focus on movement activities on campus, BKLDK members will go on safaris to other campuses. For example, a UNIKOM Bandung student recognized this; since joining BKLDK in 2019, he prefers to be in BKLDK because he can be active and know the dynamics of the LDK movement on various campuses, such as UNPAD, UIN Bandung, ITB, POLTEKSOS Bandung, and UPI. Through BKLDK, he also got to know HTI administrators in Bandung and West Java faster because he did not only meet activists on one campus. However, the disadvantage is that he has to sacrifice his college time because he visits many campus LDKs (FA, BKLDK, Interview, July 2022).

BKLDK's strategy in utilizing this pragmatic student change is quite successful. They managed to attract students who did not want to be interrupted by their studies but still wanted to be active in the organization. BKLDK's strategy that does not emphasize HTI's Identity has also succeeded in deceiving students so that their identity is unknown. BKLDK members who behave Islamically also add to students' attractiveness to become BKLDK members.

Furthermore, like the recruitment process of HTI members, the BKLDK recruitment process will eventually be directed to become *Shabab* (HTI members). Initially, they are invited to attend Daurah Islamiyyah (Islamic study) activities three times a month. They are directed to the Weekly Routine Halaqah Group (HARUM), with 5-6 members guided by a *mushrif* (mentor). This lasts for about two months. After being passed by the *mushrif*, he will be inaugurated as an HTI member, although it can take years. After becoming a member, he is required to attend halaqah every week with a different *mushrif* forever. So, his activities on campus as a BKLDK administrator will stop when he graduates, but his activities in HTI will not stop as long as he is a member.

BKLDK's efforts in recruiting new members prove that HTI's strategy of utilizing their informal network is quite successful, especially on campus, after they were disbanded in 2017. It is known that the spread of HTI in the 1980s was also carried out through campuses when they were still moving secretly. The situation is back, and they are required to move secretly again. The dissolution of the organization by the government requires HTI to return to its original strategy. The activities carried out by BKLDK as their informal organization are very systematic, neat, and secretive so that the policy owner does not detect them. This must be done so that no one knows their existence and activities, especially if counter-narratives from similar moderate student movements are unavailable. This is also what is seen on campuses in Indonesia now; movements such as HMI, PMII, and IMM, under the auspices of moderate Islamic organizations, tend not to realize the guerrilla movement of the HTI wing on campuses so that their efforts in providing alternative discourse are non-existent. As a result, HTI's membership recruitment process is still ongoing today.

Recruitment Through Mosques

Mosques are one of the most critical communication channels used by HTI to spread its ideas and expand its membership base. HTI's use of mosques is an excellent example of using informal networks. Unlike larger Muslim organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which are involved in building and maintaining mosques, HTI focuses on infiltrating mosque boards to dominate their activities. HTI activists have used mosques near campus since the 1980s (Salim, 2005). Since 2000, HTI started using more prominent mosques for its needs. HTI activists are encouraged to pray at local mosques close to their homes and involve themselves in mosque activities. This is because mosques are a vital recruiting ground for HTI, as people from all walks of life go to mosques. This means that HTI can recruit outside their traditional membership of workers and students.

HTI leaders such as Hafidz Abdurrahman and Ismail Yusanto are often invited to deliver sermons in Friday prayers and conduct lectures in various mosques. Hafidz Abdurrahman teaches weekly studies every Sunday morning at Al-Hidayah Mosque near his home in Bogor, while Ismail Yusanto regularly lectures at the Islamic Center mosque, Bukit Cimanggu City, Bogor. In Bandung, several mosques are still often used by HTI to hold recitations and lectures, such as the Baitul Hikmah Cibiru Bandung mosque, the As-Said

Baiturahman Ujungberung Bandung mosque, and the Al-Hasan Panyileukan mosque, Bandung. HTI had previously controlled some of these mosques so that they could hold their activities.

HTI uses mosques as a means of worship as a means of recruiting new members. A series of activities, such as routine recitation involving all circles of society, are used by HTI to promote its ideas while inviting people to become HTI members. This is done because the mosque is safe from government control or mass organizations that reject their existence.

In addition, HTI also utilizes the mosque as a means of spreading its preaching bulletin, Bulletin Kaffah. The bulletin is one of HTI's media distributed every Friday before prayer is held. Before Friday prayers, HTI members will spread to various mosques in their city and then distribute to the congregation or keep the Kaffah bulletin in front of the mosque entrance. This strategy was chosen to maintain HTI's intellectual tradition after it was disbanded. A series of bans on HTI-owned media led them to adopt a new strategy of distributing reading materials for Muslims to read.

Image 1

The distribution of bulletins by HTI aims to disseminate their message regarding the importance of people returning to the Khilafah. However, distributing this bulletin is also helpful for HTI in recruiting new members, especially after the government has dissolved them. As a result of the frequent reading of the Kaffah bulletin, the congregation could have been led to someone who was sympathetic to the HTI movement and eventually joined it. For example, ABA (initials), a member of HTI Bandung, joined the movement because he was moved by the messages and opinions expressed in the bulletin. He told me that his journey to becoming an HTI member occurred because of his routine reading of the Kaffah bulletin distributed at the mosque near his house. After making up his mind, he decided to join HTI and has remained until now. According to him, the nation's problems, such as poverty and injustice, can only be resolved through changes in the state system, not temporarily as it is now. This means that he and other HTI members want to change the state system from the current system, democracy, to the Islamic system, the Khilafah (Interview, July 2022).

Therefore, using informal network strategies, primarily through HTI figures, is also quite successful. The availability of mosques as places of worship is utilized by figures to carry out HTI political activities, disseminate opinions, and recruit new members. In some instances, activities at the mosque succeeded in attracting the congregation's interest and becoming HTI members. Coupled with the use of the Kaffah bulletin media disseminated in mosques adds to the variety of strategies for recruiting new members.

Recruitment among Women

The importance of women in HTI's struggle is underlined by the existence of HTI's women's division called Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (MHTI). This division was formed due to a strong demand from HTI women members to establish an organ for women's active participation in activities devoted to women (Yusanto, 1998). This wing is currently led by Zulia Ilmawati, Ismail Yusanto's wife. Although the number of HTI women members cannot be ascertained, the number of women attending HTI activities reflects their essential position.

HTI's position on women is summarized in a book published by HTI in 2005 entitled Women and Politics in an Islamic Perspective. In this book, HTI clearly states that men and women have the same responsibility to revive the Khilafah (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2005). HTI in the book explains that

women have the right to offer allegiance to the Caliph and can also be elected to political positions, as long as these positions are not those of the Caliph, Provincial Governor, or Regent. In the book, HTI also discusses women-specific topics such as women and violence, equality, family, and women's rights issues. Another book entitled Islamic Sharia: Ensuring the Welfare of Mothers and Children in 2010, aimed at mothers, explains that the absence of the Khilafah causes current social ills. HTI continues to encourage mothers to preach to ensure the future welfare of their children.

The success of HTI's women's wing can be measured by its role in supporting the Anti-Pornography Law in Indonesia from 2005 to 2008. It can be said that HTI has won over some women to support their cause with a very original and practical approach. This was done through a women's magazine published by MHTI called Pembaca Perempuan, which has been popular since its launch in November 2006. Like other women's magazines, Pembaca Perempuan features fashion, women's health, child-rearing, cooking, and articles about women and Islam. The tagline used by the magazine is Be Smart with Sharia. At the same time, each magazine issue features several articles on HTI concepts and the idea of Khilafah. However, Hizbut Tahrir is not mentioned to ensure readers do not associate the magazine with HTI. The magazine targets urban and highly educated women interested in the magazine's new approach.

Meanwhile, HTI's strategy in recruiting women is unique for an Islamic group. The target of potential female members themselves is usually aimed at campuses through their wing organizations. They often utilize their relationship with Campus Da'wah Institutions (LDKs) formed on specific campuses. For example, at UNIKOM Bandung, LDK Ukhuwah Mahasiswa Muslim (UMMI) is a student movement that includes the Nisaa Division (Women's Division) tasked with recruiting new female members. Just like BKLDK, this LDK also uses the strategy of inviting students who are interested in Islamic studies. LDK UMMI does not display its status as an HTI campus movement, so its existence is not recognized as a movement that promotes the Khilafah. This effort was made mainly after the government disbanded HTI.

In addition to the campus, women's targets are usually met by assigning housewives who are *majlis taklim* (study group) members in their neighborhoods. The use of mosques as one of the focuses of recruitment strategies by HTI is also helpful in efforts to approach female congregations.

In addition to Islamic studies conducted for male congregants, HTI often holds recitations specifically for women. For example, a recitation was held at the Baitul Hikmah mosque in Bandung, led by the wife of an HTI figure there. This recitation is held every Saturday afternoon after the zuhr prayer and is attended by women from various backgrounds. Although the themes presented are related to general topics such as relationships in Islam, the speaker often inserts Khilafah messages in his lectures. In addition, the speaker's point of view is also based on HTI Mutabanat books, such as An-Nabhani's Nizamul Islam and Syaksyiah Islamiyyah.

Utilizing *majlis taklim* recitation activities is a way to keep HTI activities, especially in the recruitment process, unknown to the general public, such as the government and mass organizations that reject their movement. Such women's activities are considered normal activities. Everyone sees that women's recitation activities transfer knowledge that is usually specialized for mothers to be applied to their family life. As a result, no suspicion arises whatsoever, including being used as propaganda and recruitment for the movement. However, this does not apply to the activities of HTI women's *majlis taklim*. They utilize this activity to spread the idea of Khilafah and recruit new members.

This effort has been quite successful in some cases. For example, SZN (initials), a housewife, only a year ago, decided to join HTI. Initially, she was invited to attend a *majlis taklim* recitation at a mosque near her home in the Gedebage area of Bandung by a young *ustazah* who was also an HTI activist. Because she wanted to fill the void after taking care of her family and sending her children to school, so she joined the *majlis taklim* recitation. Fascinated by the material presented by the *ustazah*, especially on the theme of *Uqdatul Kubra*, she then asked about the intensive study offered by her *ustazah*. Since then, he began to intensely follow the halaqah and take an oath *(qasam)* to be a member of HTI. Her decision to become a member of HTI was based on SZN's family problems. She was very confident that the family system taught by HTI was the best, so she decided to join it (Interview with SZN, housewife, July 2022).

Thus, the role of women as an informal network is also quite successful in recruiting new members. Through women's activities such as *majlis taklim*, HTI women activists can mobilize and spread HTI messages. They also succeeded in recruiting new members through these activities. This strategy through women's informal networks also complements HTI's efforts to

remain active underground, after previously the campus-BKLDK network was used as an agent to recruit students and figures, and the presence of mosques was used as a means to recruit the general public.

For HTI activists, recruiting members is essential to building a successful Movement. Following are some of the significant steps that HTI activists have taken: clarity of vision and mission, using social media and online platforms, attending community events, reaching out to local organizations, offering training and support, and recognizing and rewarding new members. Clarity of vision, mission, and goals is essential so that new members understand the goals and movements of HTI to determine whether they are suitable for the HTI campaign (Newman & Ford, 2021). Likewise, with the use of social media and online platforms, they can reach a broad audience (Bhati & McDonnell, 2020). Attending community events is also essential because there will be interactive discussions between activists and recruits (Belotti et al., 2022). Regarding this strategy, HTI's recruitment targets are very selective and can become loyal prospective members because they target students, women, and converts. They are considered unusual in the socio-political movement, but actually, they have enthusiasm because they are still new to the world of the socio-political movement.

Conclution

This article finds that although the government issued a dissolution policy against HTI so that a ban on all forms of its activities was enforced, it did not cause this movement to demobilize or stop its movement activities. HTI continues to mobilize the movement, especially in recruiting new members, but through a closed strategy and with the informal networks they have. There are three informal networks used as agents by HTI: first, the student movement network; second, the network of figures and mosques; and third, the network among women. The three informal networks have proven successful in their respective spheres, such as the student movement on campus, the network of figures and mosques in the general public, and the women's network among women and mothers, in recruiting new members to maintain their regeneration. In addition, the three networks have also proven to be safe from the control of the state and mass organizations that are against this movement.

Thus, this research is expected to inspire other writers interested in similar themes to improve the existing shortcomings significantly. The authors realize that this research is still not comprehensive, especially in revealing how the response of the Indonesian moderate Islamic movement in knowing this HTI's new strategy of HTI. The authors also realize that HTI's recruitment strategy in social media (online) has not been studied. Research on HTI's online recruitment strategy is also worth doing in the future because HTI's identity as a transnational organization has successfully displayed its opinions on the internet recently, especially with the migration of the movement from offline to online. The lack of legality of the movement also requires the migration process to be carried out, especially in spreading its opinions.

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