



**Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan**  
issn 2354-6174 eissn 2476-9649  
Tersedia online di: [journal.iainkudus.ac.id/index.php/fikrah](http://journal.iainkudus.ac.id/index.php/fikrah)  
Volume 10 Nomor 2 2022, (315 – 328)  
DOI: 10.21043/fikrah.v10i2.16961

# The Misinterpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah's Mardin Fatwa by the Modern Jihadist

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## Abstract

This article discusses how the Modern Jihadists used the Mardin Fatwa of Ibn Taymiyyah as the basis of their ideology and actions. So this research presents its novelty with an explanation of how modern radicalism develops. Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas' were used as the radicals' theological foundations, and how Jihadists read Ibn Taymiyyah's Mardin Fatwa to legitimate their actions. The primary sources of data are Ibn Taymiyyah's works and secondary sources from his students and the Taymiyyan studies as well to enrich the argument of the researcher to result in the conclusion that several statements are quoted and used by the Jihadists to legitimate their radical actions; Anti-Mongol Fatwas I, II, and III, as well as Mardin fatwa with erroneous interpretations and not following the context behind the issuance of the fatwa. Like Mardin fatwa, for example, how radicals read peace and war zones by correlating Islamic government with dar al-silm and conventional government that is not based on Islamic law with dar al-ḥarb, it must consequently be fought as the extremists did against Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. It is where the importance of understanding Ibn Taymiyyah's text holistically, intertextually, not partially, is so that it will obtain an understanding that is by -at least approaching - the original substance of the author.

Keywords: Mardin Fatwa, Ibn Taymiyyah, Jihadist, Radicalism

## Abstrak

Artikel ini membahas bagaimana Jihadis Modern menggunakan Fatwa Mardin Ibnu Taimiyah sebagai dasar ideologi dan tindakan mereka. Maka penelitian ini menyajikan kebaruannya dengan penjelasan tentang bagaimana radikalisme modern berkembang, siapa Ibn Taymiyyah dan apa fatwanya yang menjadi landasan teologis kaum radikal, dan bagaimana para Jihadis membaca Fatwa Mardin karya Ibnu Taimiyah untuk melegitimasi tindakan mereka. Penelitian kualitatif ini menggunakan sumber-sumber primer karya-karya Ibnu Taimiyah dan sumber-sumber sekunder dari murid-muridnya dan kajian-kajian tentang Ibnu Taymiyyah (*Taymiyyan Studies*) serta untuk memperkaya argumentasi peneliti sehingga menghasilkan kesimpulan bahwa beberapa pernyataan dikutip dan digunakan oleh para Jihadis untuk melegitimasi tindakan radikal mereka; Fatwa Anti-Mongol I, II, dan III, serta fatwa Mardin dengan interpretasi yang keliru dan tidak sesuai dengan konteks dibalik dikeluarkannya fatwa tersebut. Seperti fatwa Mardin yang disalahpahami, misalnya bagaimana kaum radikal membaca zona damai dan perang dengan menyamakan pemerintahan Islam dengan *dar al-silm* dan pemerintahan yang tidak berdasarkan syariat Islam dengan *dar al-harb* sehingga harus diperangi seperti yang mereka lakukan terhadap Presiden Mesir Anwar. Di sinilah pentingnya memahami teks Ibnu Taimiyyah secara holistik, intertekstual bukan parsial sehingga akan diperoleh pemahaman yang sesuai dengan setidaknya mendekati substansi asli pengarang itu sendiri.

Kata Kunci: Fatwa Mardin, Ibnu Taymiyyah, Jihadis, Radikalisme

## Introduction

Radicalism is an ideology that has developed into a radical movement in political and social groups such as nationalism. (Khalil, 2017, pp. 18–32) Because radical itself means “fundamentally to the most principled thing, very hard in demanding a change, also interpreted as going forward in thinking or acting”. So it is not surprising that in the 18th century radical action in the political realm was echoed by Charles James Fox through his declaration of “Radical Reformers” related to the electoral system in England at that time. In addition to the political and social arenas such as what was done by C. James Fox, Hitler in Germany, Marxism, Communism, and others, radical actions also gradually spread to the religious realm. (See Cone, 2017)

The issue of radicalism in the name of religion has become increasingly sharpened, specifically after the 9/11 incident in the United States, the political turmoil that occurred in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and so on. (Bukay, 2008; El-Jaichi & Sabih, 2022, pp. 46–59; Hassan, 2015) In Indonesia, radical movements spread through terrors carried out by Jihadists with various forms and motivations such as the Bali Bombings, bombings in several churches, and others. The act of radicalism in the name of religion, which is then often

referred to Islamic radicalism as mentioned above, is nothing but the embodiment of an ideology they believe by using religious texts and the fatwas of leading figures as a source to legitimize these ideas and actions. It is closely related to the problem of understanding; starting from the incorrect interpretation of the arguments used as the theological basis of radicalism. (Hasan, 2006)

Similar literatures have done on the issue such as; "Ibn Taymiyyah's Mardin Fatwa and the Mongols: An Analysis" an article written by Mohd Farid Mohd Sharif and Mohd Firdaus Abdullah discussed two Fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah (Mardin and Anti Mongol Fatwas), the author emphasized the analysis upon Yahya Michot and Abd Allah Bayyah's reading through a close reading of the fatwa itself. The second piece of literature is entitled "Ibn Taymiyyah's New Mardin Fatwa. Is Generally Modified Islam (GMI) Carcinogenic?" by Yahya Michot. The article purposed to explore the origins of the Mardin conference held on 27-28 March 2010 which Ibn Taymiyyah's Fatwa of Mardin became the object of unprecedented international attention with a conference, then the author wants to review its main objectives and achievements, as well to appraise its impact. A dissertation by Jabir Sani Maihula at Nottingham University entitled "Ibn Taymiyyah's Concept of Jihad and its Appropriation by the Contemporary Jihadists" has explained descriptively the Fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah that have been used by the contemporary Jihadists but did not reach the real concept brought by Ibn Taymiyyah on those Fatwas. The next works are "Muslim under Non-Muslim Rule" and "Ibn Taymiyyah Against Extremism" by Yahya Michot where the author criticized the misused of Fatwas by the Jihadists as their ideological spirit, so both works are discussing some issues on radicalism, hijrah, non-Muslim rulers, then he translated and commented his translation.

Compared to several studies above, this article wants to analyze One of the theological errors of the radicals which is the focus of this research is the use of Ibn Taymiyyah's statement, especially on the Fatwa Mardin as the basis for the terror movement and radical actions carried out by the Jihadists. So this research presents its novelty with an explanation of how modern radicalism develops, what are Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas are used as the theological foundations of the radicals, and how Jihadists read Ibn Taymiyyah's Fatwa Mardin to legitimize their actions.

## The Development of Jihad in Modern Radicalism

Jihad is etymologically interpreted as an effort to achieve goodness, which in Islam means trying earnestly in the form of sacrificing property, soul, body, and can also be understood as a “holy war” against unbelievers to defend Islam under certain conditions. This is in line with its meaning in Arabic which comes from the verb jahada-yujahidu-jihadan, the word al-Juhd itself means strength, effort, and difficulty.(Afsaruddin, 2013, 2022) From that, it can be understood that jihad means a struggle that exerts all capabilities both on the battlefield and other than on the battlefield. the Messenger of Allah said that seeking knowledge and preaching in the way of Allah even though it is included in the category of jihad, and the perpetrator is called a mujahid.(Ma’afi, 2013, pp. 134–136) while terminologically, the word Jihad has various meanings, especially when it is added to the word fi Sabilillah, meaning to exert all abilities to fight the unbelievers and defend themselves from their attacks with life, property, and so on. This means that jihad can be carried out by spreading ‘Ulūm al-Diniyyah, spending his wealth in the way of Allah, and/or joining the Muslim army to fight the enemy if a Muslim leader has ordered jihad (war).(Asmara, 2016, pp. 65–66)

Thus, jihad is nothing but a firm effort that epistemologically relies on something that is believed to be true and sourced from the Holy Scriptures and the words of the Prophet.(Al-Qaraḍawi, n.d.; Ibn Taymiyyah, 1992) This is different from radicalism. Radicalism is taken from the Latin “radix” which means root, “maintaining or relating to a root or roots, thoroughgoing, extreme.”(Khalil, 2017; PISOIU, 2012) Radical in Indonesian is also interpreted as something basic, while radicalism in Cambridge Dictionary is understood as the belief that there should be great or extreme social or political change. Radical and radicalism also do not have the accurate equivalent in Arabic because the term came from the West. However, in several studies, radicals are often associated with other terms such as Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, Radical Islam, revivalism, and even Islamism (Abdullah, 2016, p. 1; Mufaizin, 2020, p. 116). So actually the terms Jihad and Radical are two terms with different meanings because jihad is an earnest effort in the name of Allah in the widest possible form. While radical is an extreme, violent, excessive action and attitude at one pole, to change certain situations that are believed to be true even though it is contrary to religion.

It is not surprising that radical attitudes and understandings can be identified through their characteristics, namely: Intolerant, fanatical, exclusive, and revolutionary (tends to use hard methods to achieve goals) (Lauzière, 2015; Wagemakers, 2016, 2020). The genealogy of radicalism in Islam can be divided into two periods; the first is the classical Islamic period and the second is the modern and contemporary period. (Mufaizin, 2020; Wagemakers, 2019; Weismann, 2021) In the classical period, even when the Prophet was still alive, there were stories about excessive people (ghuluw) in worship, so they felt their group was the most correct because their worship was very diligent and their reading of the Qur'an was very good. Until one of them protested to the Prophet to be fair in the distribution of the booty (ghanimah), until Umar ibn Khatab asked the Prophet's permission to cut off his neck and the Prophet prevented him by saying, "Indeed he has followers who pray and fast they make you (the Companions) feel inferior about your prayers and fasting, but they leave the religion as an arrow shoots out of its bow." (Al-Bukhari, 1999, p. 2:503) Radical events in Islamic history have started at least since the taḥkim issue that occurred during the time of 'Ali bin Abi Ṭalib with Mua'wiyah which resulted in the emergence of the Khawarij group who theologically believed that both 'Ali bin Abi Ṭalib and Mu'awiyah were the same as not using God's laws in making decisions, as a consequence of that, both can be fought and their blood is lawful.

In the modern and contemporary period, radicalism in the case of Muslims did not only stop at the appearance of the Khawarij during the time of 'Ali bin Abi Ṭalib, the Umayyad dynasty to The 'Abbasids. However, its characteristics have also been transformed in radical Islamic movements to the present day, although with different forms and names. In the modern period, radicalism can be grouped into two categories; first, radicalism in the understanding of religion, to call others disbelievers (kafir) or call others heretical and wrong. Second, radicalism is a political ideology that intends toward socio-political change although sometimes it cannot be separated from their religious understanding (Mufaizin, 2020) Meanwhile, in contemporary times, the emergence of radicalism is also stirred by Western colonialism such as the Ikhwan al-Muslaminin Egypt. (Jansen, 1986; Nasirah, 2015) Although some of its members laterly founded their own Front Jihad with various interests and desires, such as Jama'ah Jihad, Jama'ah Takfir wa al-Hijrah, and Hizbu al-Taḥrir (because of their disappointment with the Ikhwan al-Muslamin). (Mufaizin, 2020; Peters, 1996)

Al-Qaeda and ISIS also have no different background with Hizbu al-Tahrir which was indirectly born from the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, a political party with an Islamic ideology that seeks to revive Muslims by establishing the Islamic Khilafah. (Lauzière, 2015; see Weismann, 2021) While al-Qaeda, its founder, Osama bin Laden, was a student of Abdullah Azzam, a member of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Al-Qaeda collaborated with the 'Iraqi Jihadist movement Jama'ah al-Tauhid wa al-Jihad so that laterly its name changed into Tandzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Balad al-Rafiḍain (Al-Qaeda Jihad Organization in the Two Rivers Area or known as AQI). AQI later changed its name into ISI (Islamic State of Iraq), after joining Jabhat al-Nuṣra in Syria, ISI finally changed its name into ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). (Al-Yaqoubi, 2015; see Hassan, 2015; Ismail, 2019)

Through the development of the Islamic radicalism movement from classical to modern and contemporary times, at least it can be concluded that the actions of Jihad and radicalism in the body of Muslims are ideologically built on an extreme theological foundation in understanding God's verses through the understanding of their leaders. So that various groups emerged with their radicalism movements such as suicide bombings, massacres, bank robberies, destroying houses of worship, graves, and so on in the name of religion by calling the actions as "Jihad". Another point that the transformation of radicalism from the classical period to contemporary Jihadist are made through the interests and desires of the Jihadist leaders figures who brought the orientation of Jihad into the struggle of competing the established nation towards Islamic laws based nation 'Khilafah'.

### **Ibn Taymiyyah's Fatwas as Jihadist's Theological Foundation**

Some of Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas used by the Jihadists as the theological basis for their radical actions, include:

1. The book *al-Fariḍah al-Ghaibah* (Jansen, 1986) by 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, the person who initiated the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, cites at length the second and third anti-Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah explaining that the Muslim leaders at that time had apostatized and must be fought and replaced with an Islamic state. (Jad al-Ḥaqq, 1997; see Jad Al-Ḥaqq, 1993) according to him the Muslim leaders at that time were the same as the Mongols, so they were similar to the Khawarij and the people who refused zakat in the time of Abū Bakr. Both the Muslim leaders at that time and also the Mongols (in the time of Ibn Taymiyyah)

embraced Islam, but they were no different from apostates because the system and way of governing were not in accordance with Islamic law. In *Al-Faridah al-Ghaibah*, the Muslim leader at that time had adopted the law of the pagan Western invaders, so that according to him it was worse than the Mongols who carried out the *yasa* law of his time, and the Mongols were worse than the Khawarij and the *zakat* rejecters. For this reason, *al-Faridah* obliges every Muslim to fight the Muslim leaders at that time as it is the obligation to fight the Khawarij and Mongols (Jansen, 1986, pp. 171–173; see Sivan, 1983, pp. 41–50).

2. Dr. Faḍl published *al-'Umdah*, (Dr. Fadl, 2009) a manual on jihad that was widespread in the al-Qaeda group. Dr. Faḍl cites the first anti-Mongol fatwa, in which Ibn Taymiyyah discusses and weighs the pros and cons of jihad against the Mongols. According to him, jihadist fighters are still obliged to carry out jihad even though they do not have pure intentions, because for him protecting religion is more important because their reluctance to fight can actually pose a greater danger (Dr. Fadl, 2009; Fuchs, 2013, pp. 203–204, 2017–2019, 233, 237; Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28:506–8).

3. Osama bin Laden (d. 2011) The leader of al-Qaeda, quoting Ibn Taymiyyah in his anti-Mongol and utilitarian fatwa to declare jihad against the United States and its allies in 1996 (Mulcaire, 2013; Rapoport & Ahmed, 2010; Wagemakers, 2012). According to him, when a Muslim is faced with two kinds of danger, then he must put forward the potential for less danger, meaning that it is better to fight against the enemy of religion than not to fight at all (Gwynne, 2006, pp. 61–90).

4. Fatwa Mardin Ibn Taymiyyah, (Grigore, 2006, pp. 345–350; Ibn Bayyah, 2020; Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28:240–1; Michot, 2011) in a fragment of his sentence Ibn Taymiyyah describes the area of war (*dar al-ḥarb*) as a place of infidel population and the area of peace (*dar al-silm*) as an area where Islamic law is enforced. This definition is used reductively by jihadists as a justification for two arguments: labeling the non-Muslim countries as war zones (*dar al-ḥarb*) and requiring Muslim migration (*hijrah*) from war zones to peaceful/Islamic areas (*dar al-silm*) (Michot, 2006, see 2012).

5. Faraj and other jihadists such as 'Abd Allah Azzam (d. 1989) equate the Islamic institutions of Mardin's fatwa as 'a domain of Islam (peace)' with Islamic governments and modern institutions. In this case, the 'domain of

peace' is the place where Islamic law, is understood as the legal system enforced by the state and applied. In contrast, 'war zones' are places where the Islamic legal system is not applied, even though it is occupied by a Muslim majority.(Hoover, 2016, pp. 177–203) This interpretation was then used as a justification for the domain of the war against Egypt which was then led by Anwar Sadat, a Muslim leader whose leadership did not use the Islamic legal system.(see Maihula, 2021)

Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas are the theological basis used by modern radicals with interpretations and understandings of a different context from the fatwas issued by Ibn Taymiyyah.

### The Jihadist Construction of the Mardin

Fatwa Mardin is a fatwa issued by Ibn Taymiyyah which contains questions about the status of the Muslim population in a city called Mardin where it was under the rule of the Mongols (non-Muslim government). This fatwa is one of Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas that is often quoted and misinterpreted by jihadists and even Western researchers.(Delong-Bas, 2008; Long-Bas & Islam, 2004; see Michot, 2006, pp. 123–132)

The date of Mardin's fatwa is still unknown, but the city of Mardin was then under the rule of the Ilkhanid Mongols, and its position is now in southeastern Turkey.(Hoover, 2016, p. 186) There are four questions answered in this fatwa, the questions are:

*“About the land of Mardin, is it Dar al-Ḥarb or Dar al-Silm? Is it obligatory for the Muslim population to emigrate to an Islamic country or not? If it is obligatory for him to emigrate and he has not emigrated, then helping the enemy of Muslims with his soul or property, is it a sin? Is it sinful those who accuse them hypocritically and abuse them or are they innocent?”(Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, p. 28:240)*

Briefly and emphatically, Ibn Taimiyah answered the above questions in four paragraphs:

*“All praise is due to Allah. The soul and property of a Muslim must not (haram) be disturbed, whether those living in Mardin or elsewhere. Helping the enemies of Islam (the law) is haram, whether those who help are residents of Mardin or others. People who live there, if they cannot worship according to the Shari'a, then they are obliged to emigrate. Otherwise, it is better (mustahab) to move but they are not obliged to do so.”*



*"It is forbidden for them to help the enemies of the Muslims with their lives and property. They must resist it in whatever way they can; such as disappearing, avoiding or trying to flatter. If the only way is hijrah, then that is what they must do."*

*"It is forbidden to slander and accuse them of hypocrisy. Badmouthing and accusing hypocrites must be based on the evidence of the Qur'an and Sunnah and this applies specifically to a few people, be it residents of Mardn or anywhere else."*

*"Whether the area is a war zone or a peaceful one, this is a complicated situation (murakkabah). It was not a peaceful residence (dar al-silm) where Islamic law was enforced and guarded by Muslim troops. The area is also not to be fought (dar al-ḥarb) because its inhabitants are not infidels. The region is in the third group. The Muslims who live there should be treated according to their rights as Muslims, while the non-Muslims who live there and are outside the rule of Islamic law must be treated according to their rights."(Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28: 240-1)*

Reading this fatwa entirety, then in fact it rejects the understanding of the Jihadists who make this fatwa the basis for fighting fellow Muslims who are legitimate rulers and even infidels who live in peace with Muslims.(Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28:240-1; Michot, 2006, pp. 63-65) Ibn Taymiyyah's next answer is that hijrah is not obligatory if Muslims can still practice their religion and that Mardin is neither a war zone nor an Islamic territory, but the status of a combination (*murakkabah*) of the two. Ibn Taymiyyah further describes the area of war as a place of infidel population and the area of peace as an area where Islamic law is enforced because the army consists of Muslims.(Maihula, 2021, pp. 76-82) The Jihadists' mistake is to use this fatwa as a justification for two arguments: labeling Muslim countries as war zones (*dar al-ḥarb*) because they do not use an Islamic system of government and further requiring migration (*hijrah*) from war zones to peaceful/Islamic areas (*dar al-silm*). (Michot, 2006)

Ibn Taymiyyah's statement in the Fatwa Mardin did not lead to violence, in fact, his attitude was very moderate in creating the concept of the third region, namely the condition he called "*murakkabah*" (complicated) - neither *dar al-ḥarb* nor *dar al-silm*-, this opinion does not yet exist before, because the majority of scholars before and in his time only divided the territory into two conditions; *dar al-ḥarb* and *dar al-silm*, while Ibn Taymiyyah added a new group of 'regions', which he called "*murakkabah*". The consequence is that the Muslims who live there must be treated according to their rights as Muslims, while the non-Muslim residents there who are

outside the rule of Islamic law must also be treated according to their rights as non-Muslims. This is allegedly an attempt by Ibn Taymiyyah to reduce hostility and to remove the assumption that Muslims in the city of Mardin live in an Islamic area or vice versa, namely a war zone. (see Maihula, 2021)

The next Jihadist mistake in reading Mardin's fatwa was when Faraj and 'Abd Allah Azzam (d. 1989) equated an Islamic institution with a peaceful area (*dar al-Silm*), while a modern institution - not an Islamic government - a war zone (*dar al-ḥarb*). They understand that a peace area is a place where Islamic law is enforced by the state, while a war zone is a place where the Islamic legal system is not applied, even though the majority of the population is Muslim. This interpretation was then used as the justification for the war on Egypt which was then led by Anwar Sadat. In fact, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, the war area is actually determined by the absence of Muslims in it. (Jansen, 1986, pp. 158–159, 169–170; Michot, 2006, pp. 38–45)

Likewise with the concept of "Hijrah" Ibn Taymiyyah, if you read it holistically from his other works, it is explained that the true hijrah is escaping from sin, not just leaving the place. According to him, there are two types of migration, namely; *first*, fleeing from sin and bad associations, and *second*, avoiding evildoers so as not to punish them. In both cases, Ibn Taymiyyah gives a wise fatwa on hijra, i.e. hijrah is done only when the bad in it outweighs the good (Michot, 2006, pp. 11–17, 66–100).

The conclusions that can be drawn from Ibn Taymiyyah's text on hijrah are; *first*, in the present context, based on the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah. He did not give a definite answer for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries like the West today, whether they should move to a Muslim-majority country or not. On the other hand, a Muslim must make a judgment between the advantages and disadvantages of their situation. *Second*, Ibn Taymiyyah's approach to the concept of hijrah is an ethical, not a political approach; there is no mention of it regarding governance based on Islamic law. *Third*, Ibn Taymiyyah was a 'moderate theologian' with his utilitarianism in moral and religious matters and avoiding the risk of excessive intolerance so he then gave rise to the third category of territory (*murakkabah*) which was not popular in his time (Michot, 2006, pp. 17–20).

Regarding the attitude that must be taken in the context of the Mardin people in this fatwa, Ibn Taymiyyah explains that a Muslim must be treated (*yu'amal*) according to his rights, as well as a non-Muslim must also be

treated as his rights. This is in line with Ibn Taymiyyah's other fatwa which explains how to behave (*yu'amal*) to Muslims as they should, and conversely also 'fight' (*yuqatal*) those who deviate from the path of Allah as he deserves. (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28:240-1; Michot, 2006, p. 65) The form of this sentence did not escape the errors of the radicals in reading it, it was conveyed at an international conference entitled "Mardin Dar al-Salam (Mardin the city of peace)" which was held on 27-8 March 2010 which specifically discussed Mardin's fatwa. (see Michot, 2011) The conference revealed that there was a wording deviation from the original manuscript of the Mardin fatwa by radicals, namely the change of the word *yu'amal* (treated) to *yuqatal* (fighting) in the final paragraph when explaining how to behave towards Muslims and non-Muslims.




Image 1. The last sentence of Mardin Fatwa, MS. Damascus, Zahirriyyah 2757, f. 192r.

This is a very crucial error because the original sentence originally read:

*"... Muslims who live there must be treated (yu'amal) according to their rights (as Muslims), while (non-Muslims living there) and who are outside the jurisdiction of Islamic law must be treated (yu'amal) according to their rights." Changed to "... Muslims living there should be treated (yu'amal) according to their rights (as Muslims), whereas (non-Muslims living there) and outside the rule of Islamic law should be fought (yuqatal) as their rights."*

## Conclusion

Ibn Taymiyyah was a controversial scholar if he observed from various points of view; on the one hand, he was considered the father of radicalism in Islam, on the other hand, he is also an inspirational figure for Muslim reformers. So it is not surprising that many academics and researchers discuss him in various aspects and perspectives because he is also a 'polymath'. (Bazzano, 2015b, 2015a) Several statements are quoted and used by the Jihadists to legitimize their radical actions; Anti-Mongol Fatwas I, (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28:501-8) II, (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28: 509-543) and III, (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, pp. 28: 543-53) as well as Mardin's fatwas with erroneous interpretations and not with the context behind the issuance of the

fatwa. Like Mardin's misunderstood fatwa, for example how radicals read peace and war zones by equating Islamic government with *dar al-silm* and government that is not based on Islamic law with *dar al-ḥarb* so it must be fought as they did against Egyptian President Anwar. Sadat in 1981, as well as his concept of hijrah, and others. This is where the importance of understanding Ibn Taymiyyah's text holistically, intertextually not partially so that it will obtain an understanding that is with -at least approaching - the original substance of the author himself.

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