



Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan
issn 2354-6174 eissn 2476-9649
Tersedia online di: journal.iainkudus.ac.id/index.php/fikrah
Volume 8 Nomor 1 2020, (377 - 400)
DOI: 10.21043/fikrah.v10i2.16614

The Polemic of Veil Restriction at UIN Sunan Kalijaga (Identity, Discourse Contest, and Struggle for Authority)

Zuhri Humaidi

Institut Agama Islam Negeri, Kediri, Indonesia
zuhrihumaidi@iainkediri.ac.id

Agus Moh. Najib

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Agus.najib@uin-suka.ac.id

Shofiyullah Muzammil

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Shofiyullah.mz@uin-suka.ac.id

Abstract

The regulation of veil restriction at UIN Sunan Kalijaga, and its ensuing controversy, is a significant event. The symbolic significance of the veil reflects identity problems, power dynamics, and disparities in religious, social, and political perspectives. This article analyses the ongoing power relations and practices underlying narrative discourse by collecting data in the mass media from February to April 2018. The data were analyzed using discourse analysis and Michel Foucault's Genealogy theory. The result shows that the veil restriction at UIN Jogja is massive and phenomenal in that it reflects the context of PTKI and even contemporary Indonesian Islam. Second, the cadres' debate is replete with discourse contestation between opposing ideological factions, demonstrating the tight connection between knowledge and power. Third, it demonstrates the increasingly diversified form of contemporary Islam in

Indonesia. Finally, this article helps to understand the dynamics of current Islamic thought, notably in PTKI, and the challenges of democracy in Indonesia.

Keywords: discourse, Indonesian Islam, power relations, radicalism, veil

Abstrak

Regulasi pembatasan cadar di UIN Sunan Kalijaga, serta polemik yang kemudian muncul, merupakan peristiwa penting yang sarat dengan makna. Cadar memiliki nilai simbolik yang mencerminkan problem identitas, hubungan kekuasaan, serta perbedaan dalam pandangan religius, sosial dan politik. Artikel ini mengkaji relasi dan praktik kuasa berlangsung di balik narasi diskursif tersebut dengan mengumpulkan data-data di media massa sepanjang bulan Februari sampai dengan April 2018. Data-data tersebut dianalisis menggunakan metode discourse analysis dan teori Genealogi Michel Foucault. Hasilnya; Pertama, kasus pembatasan cadar di UIN Jogja bersifat massif dan fenomenal, sehingga kasus itu sedikit banyak menggambarkan konteks PTKI, bahkan Islam Indonesia kontemporer. Kedua, polemik tentang cadar sarat dengan kontestasi wacana antara berbagai faksi ideologis yang sedang bersaing, yang menunjukkan keterkaitan erat antara pengetahuan dan kekuasaan. Ketiga, hal tersebut menunjukkan semakin beragamnya wajah Islam Indonesia kontemporer. Urgensi dan manfaat dari artikel ini adalah membantu memahami dinamika pemikiran Islam kontemporer, khususnya di PTKI, dan tantangan demokrasi di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci; cadar, Islam Indonesia, radikalisme, relasi kuasa, wacana.

Introduction

The veil debate has lately gained popularity in Indonesia, both as a theoretical debate and as a sociological practice of Muslim life. Some academics believe this was part of the wave of Islamic populism that swept Indonesia after Suharto's collapse. Political Islam has had significant electoral failures, as evidenced by the results of 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections, the failure to enforce the Jakarta Charter, the increasing secularization of issues promoted by Islamic parties, and the failure in a number of regional elections. On the other hand, a growing desire among Muslims to be more Islamic in their everyday lives and to exhibit piety in public settings was increasing. As a result, *syar'i* trends are seen in various aspects of Muslim life, both in private and public spaces, such as halal certification on various products, new Muslim costumes resembling clothes claimed to have been taught by the Prophet, halal tourism, *syar'i* hotels, and a new trend among women to wear head and face coverings, namely the hijab (Rahman & Syafiq, 2017)

Since the 1980s, headscarves and veils have become the subject of an engaging dialogue. When the New Order dictatorship came to power, arguments regarding the headscarf dominated not only religious but also political and societal discourse. The New Order government itself took this matter seriously. It is thought that the widespread wearing of the hijab represents the strengthening of Islamic identity. After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the hijab became a symbol of resistance against secular and corrupt rulers. In response, the authoritarian New Order regime imposed a multitude of rules and political pressure (Matanasi, 2017). The suppression of the hijab ended when the New Order regime's political pendulum swung away from Islamist organizations and toward accommodation (Hefner, 2001; Prasetyo, 2007). After the reformation of 1998, the hijab trend has gained the attention of the fashion industry, leading to the establishment of well-known labels such as Rabbani, Zoya, Shafira, and Elzatta. This trend coincides with political liberty, the rise of the Muslim middle class, and the vulgar portrayal of religiosity in public settings. In other words, the hijab's significance has moved from a symbol of political resistance during the New Order era to the commodification of religious symbols after the reform era (Turmudi, 2016).

The veil is an upscale variation of the hijab. In Islamic law study, the laws that determine whether or not the veil is obligatory are now under discussion. The Qur'an and hadith provide numerous arguments that may lead to various legal conclusions, such as whether something is compulsory (wajib), permissible (mubah), or recommended (sunnah) (Shihab, 2014). But one thing is certain: wearing a veil has more negative consequences than the recent fashion trend of wearing a headscarf. In this case, there are several possible explanations. For instance, the veil is considered uncomfortable because it is technically constraints, especially those associated with public services. Vulnerability to identity theft, disruption of communication intensity and intimacy, restriction of women's mobility space (El-Guindi, 2005), and the stigma commonly associated with veil, especially their involvement with radical Islamic groups. Due to the extensive growth of the media and, on the other hand, society's essentialist tendency in interpreting and presenting specific facts, the veil is associated with terrorism (Goffman, 1963; Khoiroh & Chakim, 2016).

The establishment of veil restrictions at PTKI (Islamic Colleges) was influenced to some degree by the aforementioned causes. A few years ago, the UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta established a policy that prompted discussion

and opposition. UIN Yogyakarta issued letter No. B-1301/Un.02/R/AK.08.3/02/2018 on "Guidance for Veiled Students" to UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta students on February 20, 2018. To maintain a suitable academic environment, on March 10, 2018, letter No. B-1679/Un.02/R/AK.003/03/2018 titled "Revocation of Letter on Guidance of Veiled Students" was published in response to criticism and pressure from numerous groups regarding the Rector's decision. Notwithstanding, the news about it and the subsequent debate have become a huge national topic. National print and electronic media, as well as conversations on numerous social media platforms (Facebook, WhatsApp, telegraph, Twitter, and YouTube), explored the case and successfully positioned the veil as a central topic in Indonesian Islamic discourse (Rasyid & Bukido, 2018).

Those who support the policy say it is essential to maintain the campus as a place where moderate Islam may thrive. The university is a key defence line against radical and transnational Islamic infiltration, which threatens the country's four pillars of nationality: Pancasila, the UUD 1945, Kebinekaan, and the NKRI. One aspect of this latter group—associated with the wearing of veils by female students—is already large and rapidly expanding on campus. The campus's defence of the veil law draws on theological considerations as well as societal and legal ones (Kalijaga, 2018).

Various groups opposed UIN Jogja's stance, including FUI, FPI, and ex-HTI, which have all been characterized as proponents of scripturalist Islam. Human rights advocates, academics, community leaders, and state officials voiced their support for and opposition to the rule. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the veil debate that emerged at UIN Jogja after the 1998 reform was the most passionate and attention-grabbing discussion. In this milieu, the veil is more than a piece of fabric or a declaration of faith; it has become a symbol of identity, social standing, religious convictions, political viewpoints, and even, as Mark Twain described, a reflection of conflicts and debates. In particular discourses and power relations, the veil is utilized to represent the interests of dominant authority and knowledge. Surprisingly, there have been no restrictions over the veil throughout the history of reform, notably at PTKI institutions like UIN Jogja, which is renowned for its academic independence and autonomy for decades. Although this is not the first time that PTKI has imposed restrictions on the veil. Previously, it was claimed that UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, IAIN Bukit Tinggi, IAIN Jember, and UIN Sunan Ampel had forbidden teachers and

students from wearing the veil. However, the case at UIN Jogja was more extensive and phenomenal in terms of the subject matter being disputed, the parties involved, public enthusiasm, and the parties' arguments, therefore it is deemed to be representative of the PTKI context as a whole.

Numerous studies on the veil issue have been conducted, both in the context of the veil ban on campus and in larger contexts, such as polemics on veil interpretation from the perspectives of Islamic law, political philosophy, and mass culture. Budi Kurniawan's investigation discovered examples of the veil being prohibited at a number of Indonesian universities, including UIN Jogja (Budi, 2018). He asserts, this arose as the stigmatization of the veil and favouritism for some theological ideas that are perceived to be able to combat radicalism. This policy, however, risks violating human rights and Pancasila, as well as disturbing the democratic climate that has been built since the reform of 1998. Unfortunately, this research is brief and lacks field evidence to support its claims.

Meanwhile, articles by Rasyid and Bukido (2018), Andiko (2018), (Mubakkirah, 2020), and (Kudhori, 2018) analyse the veil from a theological perspective. Those studies raise the case that occurred at UIN Jogja, then draw the context in the discussion of Islamic law. The focus of the articles is more on the debates of the scholars regarding the veil; its status in Islamic law, as well as the benefits and harms it causes, both in the classical and contemporary eras.

The veil as identity, mass culture and ideological contestation is the focus of the study by (Juwariyah, 2019), (Rahman & Syafiq, 2017), (Ratri, 2011), and (Hanafiah et al., 2019). Juwairiyah (2019) questioned the western perspective on the veil as a faulty self-projection, arguing that it was a flawed self-projection. In various contexts, the veil functions as a signifier of identity, spirituality, modesty, and dress preference, serving as a form of existential self-affirmation. Rahman and Syafiq (2017) discussed the experiences of veiled women, including why they wear the veil, the stigmas they face, and how they cope with it. Ratri (2011) stated that the veil is more well-known among the general public as a result of media creation, which is not always unbiased, resulting in an unbalanced and skewed reputation. After doing extensive field investigation, she discovered that veiled women are identical to other women. They have no trouble conversing with their neighbors, including non-Muslims and unveiled women. This finding was confirmed by Hanafiah's et al. (2019) study of 100 students from three

universities in South Kalimantan. According to him, the majority of responders who wore veils socialized openly and had no difficulty doing so. Except for face-to-face occasions in class, some parties requested that they temporarily remove their masks.

Despite the fact that numerous academics have studied the veil, they have failed to address the ways in which the continuous power-knowledge relation is reflected in the debate around it. When it comes to the PTKI incident and the construction of post-New Order democracy more generally, this power relation is activated by the ongoing contestation of rhetoric and Islamic ideology. As a result, this article delved deeper into the case of veil limitations at UIN Jogja, exploring its context, the people involved, the arguments made by both sides, and the fallout from the ensuing debate. The media coverage of the case from February to April 2018 was used as a data source, along with relevant sources like books and journals. Discourse analysis and Michel Foucault's genealogy were employed to decipher the data. The goal is to provide a comprehensive description of the communication process, including both text and context, in order to trace the development of the discourse. Michel Foucault argues that, discourse is not neutral but rather reveals the process of relations and power practices running underneath apparently impartial and scholarly narratives. It is possible that the deep and delicate web of language underlying this occurrence is itself a disciplinary tactic employed by an established power structure. Considerable attention is paid to the problems of what the veil is, how it is defined, what its meaning is challenged, what regime of truth prevails, what discursive practices and forms of power emerge, and what effects result. This veil debate is set in the context of the dynamics of the struggle for Islamic discourse in Indonesia. This controversy is a social phenomenon which emergence can be studied to reveal insights into the nature of modern Indonesian Islam and the obstacles it faces.

Polemic of Veil Restriction at UIN Sunan Kalijaga

The news from the Indonesian Muslim community, both print and electronic, mentions the Chancellor of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Prof. Yudian Wahyudi, issuing policy No. B-1301/Un.02/R/AK.08.3/02/2018 on February 20, 2018, regarding the "Guidance of Veiled Students" for students at the UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, shocked the Indonesian Muslim community. The Rector's decision drew much attention and pressure from a variety of sources. On March 10, 2018, letter No. B-

1679/Un.02/R/AK.003/03/2018 on "Revocation of Letter on the Guidance of Veiled Students" was issued to preserve a suitable academic climate. The news of UIN Suka's Rector's Policy resurrected the "Cadar" (veil) as a topic of debate in different media (print, electronic, and online), as well as social media. The announcement elicited a wide range of reactions from diverse circles; the UIN Suka Yogyakarta academics, ordinary people, and intellectuals from various areas. It reflects that the veil is a significant issue in Indonesian Islamic discourse (Rasyid & Bukido, 2018).

According to public and informal statements made by UIN SuKa's Rector and other officials, the policy's basis is to maintain and expand the campus as a center for moderate Islam. When it comes to countering extremist and transnational Islamic infiltration, the campus is on the front lines of protecting the Republic of Indonesia's four pillars of nationality: Pancasila, the UUD 1945, Kebinekaan, and NKRI. The latter group has been around for a while and has gained a lot of members, some of whom may be distinguished by their use of veils by female students. Keeping the campus's reputation as a center for moderate Islamic teaching is at stake, and the growth of this group concern for both of these reasons. The campus also uses theological justifications, claiming that the veil is not *qat'i* (absolute) under Islamic law. Although it is not forbidden in Islam, doing so without considering the social and political climate would be unfair. However, the link between the veil and radical Islamic groups is the most crucial part of the discussion surrounding veil limitations, and it should be treated very seriously (Kalijaga, 2018).

Yudian Wahyudi claims that the growing number of students who cover their faces in public is evidence of increasing radicalism. Veiling's recent surge in popularity and a general increase in religious fervor among students are two variables contributing to this increase. Further, this evidence explains that radical groups at UIN Sunan Kalijaga are increasingly influential and can compete with more mainstream and long-standing student organizations. He claims the veil prohibition is designed to counter UIN radical reputation, which has turned the university into a liberal hotbed (Redaktur CNN Indonesia, 2018). In an interview with BBC Indonesia, Yudian explained;

"We recognize these indications and strive to help these people, since they are victims of the political education. Perhaps there is no issue with the aqidah issue. However, if they are brainwashed in this manner, they will become victims of these extremist groups, as has been the case in several

other countries. The students are assembled. A number has been identified. Then, they are classified according to their program etc. I must also build a therapeutic team after a meeting. Up to nine times, if they persist in their position, we have urged them not to attend college.” (Redaktur BBC Indonesia, 2018a)

An intense debate about the issue erupted within the academics of UIN Jogja. Some backed the rector's stance wholeheartedly, while others objected to it for various reasons. When meeting with representatives from FUI, Mualaf Center, Mosque Activist Communication Forum, Harokah Islamiyah, Da'I Medina, Mujahideen Council, Halaqah Tarbiyah Muawahidin, and Mosque Youth Gathering Forum, Vice-Rector III, Waryono Abdul Ghofur argued that the policy aims to collect data and coaching. This regulation was made since the university's mission is to develop and educate students following national and state goals, with no discriminatory elements (Liputan6.com, 2018). This reasoning is consistent with the Rector's remarks in several media interviews.

Another justification advanced by the supporter of the policy is the administrative requirement that a person's face be revealed in public settings. Student interactions with professors, administrative services, assurances of openness, and exam honesty must be conducted for administrative ease. In addition to the case, certain parties already raised the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia flag (HTI). This prohibited organisation opposes the NKRI. A previous non-permanent lecturer at UIN was also accused of having connections to the Muslim Cyber Army. Former English instructor arrested for spreading false information regarding the murder of converts.

On a separate occasion, the Rector explained;

"We are trying to provide safety not only for campuses and the public at large, but also for female students who choose to wear the veil out of ignorance rather than conviction. These women are often subjected to external indoctrination, leaving them socially isolated. As a result, in administrative serving, If they are wearing veil, we cannot verify if they are A or not.” (Redaktur BBC Indonesia, 2018b).

Sahiron Syamsuddin, Deputy Chancellor II, stated that the restrictions was intrinsically tied to pedagogical considerations. Suppose the student chooses to continue wearing the veil in class. In such a scenario, he believes, the lecturers will be unable to support her effectively, and they will be unable to recognize the student. According to Sahiron, scholars continue to debate whether the veil is an Islamic doctrine or an Arab custom. Unfortunately,

veiled students on campus do not routinely interact with other students. The veil prohibition has resulted in all UIN Suka lecturers' agreement. Students who refuse to be fostered will be required to transfer to another universities (Republika.id, 2018).

The number of individuals outside of the campus who participated in debates and supported the policy was comparable to the number who condemned it. The national coordinator of the Indonesian Education Monitoring Network (JPPI), Abdullah Ubaid, endorses UIN Jogja's actions. According to him, this is a campus regulation. The student's identification must be evident, as engagement will be difficult if only two eyes are visible. In Indonesia, the act of a woman wearing a veil becomes even more peculiar when it attracts public attention. In contrast, it is not a prevalent concern in Islam that a woman not become a source of slander. Given that wearing a veil does not contravene Indonesian law, there is a rise in radicalization indicators. Is this fundamentalism incompatible with academic principles and the NKRI? He underlined that the government does not need to impose regulations as UIN did. It is sufficient to revert to the rules and values that the institution itself develops (Redaktur BBC Indonesia, 2018c).

According to the Ministry of Religion (*Kemenag*), UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta has the authority to prohibit female students from wearing veils. The Ministry of Religion also completely transferred the case to the Chancellor of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. According to Mastuki, Head of the Ministry of Religion's Public Relations and Information Bureau, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta formulated this guideline after considerable thought. Since their first day at UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, students have been informed of the restrictions prohibiting the wearing of the veil. Each university has its own set of senate-approved rules that serve as guiding principles, including student rules, lecturers' code of ethics, staff regulations, etc. He remarked that each university has its own set of dress codes for students. The regulation prohibiting the veil at UIN Sunan Kalijaga does not need to be connected to a broader issue because it is only a dress code for students (Redaktur Detik.com, 2018).

Mahfud MD, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Court and well-known scholar, supports the policy upon human rights concerns. He emphasized that nobody has the authority to prohibit anyone from covering themselves with any dress. Nonetheless, it is unacceptable to disparage persons who dress casually as a violation of their religion. According to him,

the situation at UIN Jogja was within the rector's jurisdiction and did not infringe human rights. People who commit themselves, such as by working or studying in an institution, must consent if their human rights, such as sleeping hours and attire, are governed by the institution's head (Jateng.com, 2018).

The group protesting the decision at UIN Sunan Kalijaga also presented convincing arguments and received support from both on-campus and off-campus organisations. Tri Mulyani, a Sociology student at UIN Sunan Kalijaga, disputed emphatically that the niqab is associated with extremist groups. She asserts that anyone can accept radicalism and that it has nothing to do with their attire. She claims that:

"When I observe that the veil is an element of radicalism and anti-Pancasila, I believe it should be reexamined. That is an oversimplification. Secondly, when we discuss radicalism, women are not the only target. Men and women who do not wear the veil have the potential for radicalism for radical causes. If coaching is the cause, then all pupils must receive coaching. The radicalism of the 41 UIN students who wear the veil has not yet been confirmed. Some muslims are confident that wearing the veil is God's order that must be obeyed. Consequently, the restriction on wearing a veil was inappropriate at that time. I concur with a coach's recommendation to investigate the motives behind each participant's veiling. However, they have a right to education, even if they do not wish to remove their veils during the coaching process." (Indonesia, 2018).

As indicated previously, the spread of photographs depicting dozens of veiled female students waving the flag of one of the banned Islamic organizations is one of the reasons for the veil prohibition. A few days following the event, the Rector of UIN decided to offer counselling. If, after following the procedure, female students continue to wear veils, they would be expelled.

Moh. Romli, President of the students association of UIN Sunan Kalijaga 2018, claimed that the veil and extremism are two distinct things. "I agree with the identification of extreme views that are contrary to Pancasila and the UUD 1945, but it does not imply I agree with the banning of veiled female students," he said. Prof. Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, Postgraduate Director of UIN Sunan Kalijaga and political Islam observer, presented a moderate viewpoint. Although he did not openly endorse or oppose the policy, he presented a UNDP-supported study on Islamic literature in high schools and universities throughout 16 provinces, most students disliked jihadist material.

Those who promote the notion of jihadism is particularly those who promote the Hizbut Tahrir doctrine. *Salafis* and the Muslim Brotherhood, he claims, make up a sizable portion of the population. However, popular Islamism is what students read the most and what influences their ambitions. Islamic applicability is extensive, yet modernization and globalization may jeopardize this tendency. As a result, the UIN Sunan Kalijaga is known as the most progressive campus compared to students from the University of Gajah Mada, IPB, and ITB. These campuses do not need to be concerned about rising extremism among (Redaktur BBC Indonesia, 2018c).

External parties who reject the policy include MUI, FUI, several Islamic organizations, and human rights activists. MUI Secretary-General, Anwar Abbas, assessed that the use of the veil is not the main problem of faith. Therefore, the use of the veil does not need to be regulated as a prohibition. MUI urges the public to accept different opinion on the veil issue. Do not forbid people to wear the veil, including the campus (Redaktur CNN Indonesia, 2018).

Together with a number of other groups, the Ukhuwah Islamiyah Forum (FUI) visited campus to seek clarification. Fadlun Amin, FUI spokesman, declared that his party was vehemently opposed to UIN Jogja's stance prohibiting veiled female students. Especially if the veil is prohibited in an effort to prevent radicalism. According to Amin, the subject of veiled women is fraught with divergent expert opinions. UIN Jogja should embrace this divergence of opinion instead of prohibiting students from wearing the veil. He disagreed with the notion that veiled students are more prone to use jockeys to cheat on college exams. This argument is incorrect because some universities may anticipate jockeys in disguise by hiring female academics and employees (Detik.com, 2018).

Najib Azca, a sociology instructor at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) Yogyakarta, believes the reason behind the regulation's promulgation is flawed. It is erroneous to associate the veil with radicalism, extremism, and anti-Pancasila Islam because the veil has no apparent connection to radicalism. The veil is conservative if it is a way of life that interprets religion in a conservative, rigorous, scripturalist manner. Azca said that the veil's user does not have to be an extreme adherent. The veil-restricting policy has continued to transgress the borders of UIN Yogya as an educational institution. Academic debates should respond to the emergence of different

schools of thought on campus because the university's challenge is to provide research and instruction that allows anybody to get a different perspective (Tirto.id, 2018).

Yogi Zul Fadhli, head of LBH Yogyakarta's Advocacy Department, concluded that the Chancellor of UIN Sunan Kalijaga was negligent in his policymaking, lacked respect for human being rights, and tended to be discriminating. According to him, Article 28 E, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the UUD 1945 specifies that everyone has the freedom to embrace and worship according to his religion. Everyone has the right to believe and express thoughts and attitudes in accordance with their conscience. He recalled Indonesia's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In his explanations, he states that freedom of religion and belief in worship, obedience, practice, and teaching encompasses a variety of activities, including wearing particular clothing or head coverings (Indonesia, 2018).

Masruchah, a Komnas Perempuan Commissioner, believes that the rules addressing the veil prohibition and the eradication of radicalism on campus are two distinct issues. Indeed, given the exceptional phenomena of radicalism and extremism, institutions must be concerned when a large number of students wear the veil, as this is a fundamentalist community. In contrast, the pluralist community, such as the Bahai community, occasionally also conceals clothing with a veil (Redaktur BBC Indonesia, 2018a).

After a series of controversies dating back to the issuance of circular letter No. B-1301/Un.02/R/AK.08.3/02/2018 on February 20, 2018, regarding "Guidance of Veiled Students" for female students at UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, on March 10, 2018, letter No. B-1679/Un.02/R/AK.003/03/2018, regarding "Revocation of Letter on Guidance of Veiled Students" for female students at officially, this is to preserve a conducive academic environment. UIN Deputy Chancellor III Sunan Kalijaga denied that the revocation was linked to pressure from numerous parties. The issue of rule and its revocation is exclusively for the educational benefit of the institution.

In addition to the numerous issues that developed following the publication of the letter and the multiple analyses connected to its revocation, numerous groups, both on and off campus, reacted to the UIN Sunan Kalijaga policy. The group which support the policy of veil prohibitions rely on a variety of justifications. First, there are anti-radicalization campaigns. While

there is no direct link between the veil and radicalism, there is a strong link between the veil and radical movements. Therefore, restricting the veil on campus is also an effort to suppress student radicalism. In addition, to preserve UIN Sunan Kalijaga's reputation as a moderate Islamic education institution. Second, be impartial. While the veil is one of the permitted pieces of clothing in Islam, the religion also teaches that it should be worn in a respectful manner. The veil is appropriate for Middle Eastern culture but incompatible with Indonesian culture, particularly in public places. The veil represents isolation and disengagement from social interaction. The third is educational and administrative effectiveness. Openness is required for interactions between professors and students, students and administrative personnel, and students among themselves. It promotes an environment of connection, honesty, and equality. Human rights and administrative law must also be reconciled. Everyone has the right to wear whatever they choose so long as they do not disturb others, but when he binds himself, such as by working or studying at an institution, he must comply if his rights, such as sleeping hours and attire, are restricted by the institution's head.

Opponents of the policy restricting the veil have equally persuasive arguments. They come from a variety of backgrounds, hold differing views, and may be at odds on other matters. In brief, their arguments consist of the following: First, religious assumptions must be considered. The veil is a mandatory component of Islamic teachings, which is supported by the opinions of scholars. No scholar prevents the veil-wearer from wearing it; therefore, as an Islamic university, UIN Sunan Kalijaga must acknowledge this and permit the veil-wearer to do so. Second, the mandate of the Constitution and human rights. Contrary to the state constitution and the protection of human rights, veil restrictions are prohibited. The policies of UIN directly oppose this spirit. The third is discrimination and intellectual freedom, respectively. Because campus is a place where no one is discriminated against and intellectual freedom is safeguarded, it is unproductive to regulate how students dress based on their religious views. If radicalism on campus rise, they should be addressed intellectually through open discussion and debate, rather than with ineffective sanctions. Stigmatization is the fourth point. Because there is no clear connection between the two occurrences, equating the veil with radicalism is a fallacy that may result from the stigmatization of veil-wearers. Even if there is a connection between veil-wearing students and

radical organizations, the college should protect their right to free expression as long as they do not violate the law.

Identity Problems and Discourse Contests

In Islamic law study, the laws governing the veiling of women differ according to the contours of women's private parts. At least three scholarly approaches exist on this topic. First, Hanafi and Maliki scholars believe that women are not required to wear veils since the face is not a private place that must be covered. Second, according to the Shafi'i and Hanbali schools, the veil is obligatory; nevertheless, some scholars from both schools believe that it is merely a *sunnah* or *mubah*. Third, the belief of contemporary academicians such as Muhammad Syahrur that the veil is prohibited for women because a woman's only private parts are her face and hands (Khoiri, 2015; Syahrur, 2000).

The wearing of the veil has a firm foundation in Islamic law, as previously stated. In this situation, different schools of fiqh have different legal positions; some demand, suggest, allow, and ban. Even though, the last viewpoint is not widely held. Wearing the veil is a human right guaranteed by the country's constitution and human rights law as part of freedom of religion. Although, in subsequent debates, these human rights are divided into two parts: first, forum internum, protection of one's spiritual existence, which includes the freedom to choose, change, adopt, and embrace religion and belief; and second, forum externum, protection of one's spiritual existence, which includes the freedom to choose, change, adopt, and embrace religion and belief. Second, forum externum, safeguarding one's spiritual existence to disclose and defend it in public. The forum internum is unrestricted and cannot be limited, but the forum externum can be restricted if the foundation and method of the limitation are rigorously regulated so that the right to freedom of religion is not harmed. This discussion is frequently a point of contention for religious and belief expression in public spaces, such as the veil (Rizki et al., 2008).

Some participants in the debate over the rector's policy supported the fiqh opinion mandating the veil, while others eschewed the fiqh argument in favor of providing more light on the matter from a constitutional and human rights standpoint. The supporters, on the other hand, have opted for the interpretation of fiqh that permits it, but who, cognizant of its societal repercussions, have decided to ban the veil in institution. Others choose to

contest the first group's arguments with human rights and administrative law. The practice of discourse, as described by Michel Foucault, develops from these facts. A discourse is a system of thought, comprehension, and self-expression. Regarding the comprehension of the universe, Foucault says that everything is anchored in power hierarchies. Thus, every time we talk, we are not having a casual conversation but rather an important speaking act. Indicative of the gravity of the current conversation is the extent to which components of power relations are linked with the knowledge that sparked it. Therefore, discourse is viewed as a system that organizes and regulates how one might make sense of the world and the human experience and communicate about them. Michel Foucault refers to these realities as discourse, counter-discourse, and technicalization (governmentality) as a method for operationalizing authority (power) and knowledge (Foucault, 1982, 2000).

The pros and cons of the policy recognize the diversity of fiqh fatwas and the ability to pick the fatwa that best suits their views. Wearers of the veil symbolize particular ideas and ideologies and a desire to have an equal, if not dominant, role in the public realm as a form of religious expression. They are motivated by a conservative and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, which prefers to read Islam textually. They desire a *kaffah* (full) implementation of Islam, with the prophet's and his companions' lives as an ideal example of living (Ichwan, Burhani, Mujiburrahman, Wildan, & Bruinessen, 2014). As a result, they wish to implement what they see as an ideal model of life in contemporary living, in both the individual and societal realms and the private and public spheres. Wearing a veil is part of the ideal model in this situation.

On the other hand, pro-policy group consider the increase in the number of veiled female students on campus as a sign of a larger group with orthodox Islamic views. They are concerned about this issue due to their belief that there is a substantial connection between this cloaked group and radicalism. Recent terrorist acts in Indonesia demonstrate that extremism thrives within the veiled community. This information dominates public discourse, not only UIN campus but also the broader social realm. The knowledge appears definitive and widely recognized, prompting policymakers at UIN Jogja to take particular actions.

During the dispute, a lawsuit was brought that cast doubt on this reality, indicating that no respectable academic study could demonstrate a

strong connection between veiling and radicalism. Michel Foucault theory of genealogy explains this phenomenon. Genealogy attempts to depict the practical force that lies underneath discursive narratives. Genealogy tries to depict a wide range of dominant behaviors, some of which are relatively subtle. The study of genealogy revolves around the concept of power. Knowledge and power are inextricably linked; there is no knowledge without power, and there is no power without knowledge. Knowledge of the veil; how it is defined and understood, and then connected with particular religious concepts is a power exercise that occurs in a subtle and seemingly objective manner in the veil. The power of discourse is followed by other discourses, such as clothing ethics, what is good and evil that students may utilize, what can rescue them from religious groups' traps, and what can sink them. Its knowledge creation wields power and dominance (Afandi, 2011).

As a result, the opposing group challenging the relationship between the veil and radicalism may be regarded as a counter-discourse to the prevailing discourse. So, in the polemic, there was a speech contestation. Who is in charge of and operating the discourse? Which of the discourses will emerge as the most powerful? Furthermore, Foucault argues that power originates from all levels, that it spreads in a complicated way to all persons as a tiny subject, and that it leads power to be practiced everywhere. At the same time, the state is seen as something that establishes a system of inter-individual relationships in order for the political system to function correctly. While the individual is not just a target for power, he is also the site of power and resistance.

This, knowledge of the veil is not controlled by a single man or a centralized authority, but rather by forces spread across the globe. Nonetheless, certain parties can use conversation to advance their aims. Foucault analyzes this through the concept of governmentality, which is the strategy of power employed to exert control over the mind, body, and behavior. Governmentality regulates the thoughts and conduct through disciplining and monitoring the body. Rules concerning veil limitations or dress code restrictions for students are a kind of government that maintains continual control and supervision over students. The notion that the veil is a religious requirement as an implementation of kaffah (plural) Islamic principles and the human rights argument to reject laws on how to dress in public spaces through a neutral authority are both governmentality practices.

Veil advocates, human rights activists, and opponents are not on equal ground here. They hold a specific ideological viewpoint. The ideology of the veil's proponents is a conservative Islamic philosophy whose ultimate goal is the dominance of Islam in public life rather than merely the protection of beliefs. Human rights activists are influenced by the global human rights movement. An opportunity to show that human rights apply everywhere and to everyone is presented by this forum for discussion. Those who oppose the veil, on the other hand, are ideologically aligned with moderate Muslims.

Regarding the state authorities represented by UIN Jogja and the Ministry of Religion, they have an interest in promoting particular Islamic perspectives, specifically moderate Islam. Under the direction of Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, the Ministry of Religion's efforts to mainstream moderate Islam have been resolute. Religious moderation, or moderate Islam, is a religious approach that emphasizes the process of understanding and obeying religious teachings in a fair and balanced manner so as to avoid extreme or excessive behavior (RI, 2019b). In his view, moderate Islam represents a middle ground between the two extreme extremes, namely the extreme left and the extreme right. The extreme left is a religious approach that seeks to prioritize human reason over the text itself when interpreting it. The radical left is affiliated with liberal organizations that have engaged in the desacralization of religion. The extreme right, meantime, is an ultraconservative organization that is absolutely convinced of the veracity of its religious interpretation and considers the existence of alternative religious interpretations to be false (RI, 2019).

Clearly, these definitions and taxonomies are flawed from an academic standpoint. Liberal Islam, as employed by Martin van Bruinessen, has a number of faults, including the fact that it is already negative and pigeonholes it, as well as its tendency to generalize the diversity of the historic origins of Indonesian Islamic reformers. The phrases conservative and radical are other instances. Importantly, academics are still arguing and developing their understanding of what it means to practice a moderate form of Islam. To produce a profound resonance of meaning, moderate Islamic speech is usually frequently compared with other extreme viewpoints, such as radical Islam and liberal Islam.

Consequently, it is simple to associate the emergence of some veiled UIN Jogja students with Islamic radicalism and a threat to moderate Islam, which also poses a challenge to Pancasila and Diversity. As part of a

deradicalization drive focusing on moderate Islamic discourse, Pancasila, and Diversity, regulations restricting the wearing of the veil were finally enacted. Although, as stated previously, its adversaries view the veil's association with radicalism as a simple jump of logic and laws that may violate human rights and the state constitution. However, as Foucault explains, any discourse can continue to survive by continuously recreating its sustaining narratives, even if they are not necessarily coherent.

The emergence of fundamentalist Islam following the breakdown of the New Order, in its most severe form of terrorism, has alarmed many people. Academics like Martin van Bruinessen and Carol Kersten and state and civil society groups like NU and Muhammadiyah are among those who have spoken out. Bruinessen referred to the phenomena of Indonesian Islam following the New Order as a conservative turn or a reversal or change in the face of Indonesian Islam in a traditional direction. Various indicators characterize this phenomenon, including major conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities in several locations; bombings in Jakarta and Bali that killed hundreds of people; and the effort to reinstate the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution's amendments, which was followed by the emergence of sharia regulations in several areas, and the emergence of new movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Salafis (Ichwan et al., 2014). Meanwhile, Kersten believes that the controversial MUI fatwa of 2005, particularly the ban of Pluralism, Liberalism, and Secularism, was a watershed moment in Indonesia's conservative movement. The explanatory spectrum based on traditionalist and modernist Islam is no longer enough to describe the phenomena of post-reform Islam. Actors, streams, and a scope of discussions on many topics have arisen, each with its own goals and discourses, one of which is distinguished by the conservative party's strengthening (Kersten, 2018).

Baqir (2014) has more intriguing and relevant thesis to the incident at UIN Jogja. Baqir opted to be cautious and avoid labeling Indonesian Islam's conservative shift following the New Order. According to him, the growth of orthodox Islamic organizations indicates Indonesian Islam's more varied face. The drastic shift in the political atmosphere toward democracy has given conservative organizations a place to express themselves publicly. It is recognized that, for stability and prosperity, the New Order promoted a tolerant and moderate Islamic discourse, which became popular under the leadership of key personalities such as Nurcholis Madjid, Abdurrahman

Wahid, Syafi'i Ma'arif, Dawam Rahardjo, and others. Because of the current atmosphere of political openness, both moderates and conservatives have a similar range of mobility (Bagir, 2014).

Naturally, this new 'arena' did not always favor moderate Islamic groups, who, according to William Liddle, benefitted from Suharto's anti-Islamist measures (Fauzi, 2008). With all of its benefits and drawbacks, democracy offers conservatives and moderates the same level of freedom. As a result, what transpired following the reform, particularly in the veil, is not a conservative turn phenomenon but demonstrates the variety of Indonesian Islam's face. At least two things may be deduced from the preceding debate. First, there is the growing competition between Islamic variations for the right to represent modern Indonesian Islam. Second, essentialism becomes insufficient in explaining the phenomena of religiosity (Islam) in Indonesia. Essentialism holds that a human possesses intrinsic, inherent, consistent, intact, and essentially unchanging qualities, allowing it to be classified into one definite group. For example, whether a person is classified as moderate or conservative. On the other hand, the veil demonstrates that people resist any tight categorization that places them in a single group. A moderate-minded lecturer and human rights activist may oppose the veil's limitation for female students, or he and his family may even wear the veil regularly. The essentialist stance on human diversity can only lead to logical fallacies and ineffective stigmatization (Wahyudi, 2007).

So, which of these discourses will emerge as the most powerful? The primary discourse may continue to exist by constantly creating narratives that may contradict one another. Indeed, in this manner power and knowledge function. In the continuous contestation, the primary discourse and counter-discourse deliberately or subconsciously reinforce the other primary discourse, namely the threat of radicalism. The scholarly community is currently debating the meaning and boundaries of radicalism. However, no matter how broad and imprecise a definition of radicalism might be offered, the parties above refuse to be linked with it. As a result, the dominant discourse, which is full of power interests, is about the threat of radicalism. Because the discourse is the truth that is accepted as it is, power may easily discriminate, threaten, and excommunicate under the guise of the danger of radicalism.

As a last point, it can be emphasized that the polemic about the veil at UIN Sunan Kalijaga was not only about the sociological context of the veil.

More than that, the phenomenon is a stage of discourse contestation where knowledge and power are reciprocally related. The polemic shows the complex and non-monolithic diversity of the Indonesian Islam. According to the author, the most important thing is to keep each competing group from going beyond and damaging the democracy. There will always be a temptation to take advantage of certain powers to win the contest in undemocratic ways, utilizing state power or the authority of the campus to suppress certain groups will only restore the authoritarianism of the New Order and stop the dynamic Islamic discourse that is taking place.

Conclusion

The case that happened at UIN Jogja demonstrates that the veil evolved beyond what has been understood in theological and normative discussions. At the very least, several fundamental themes are confirmed by the diverse sociological responses to it, the parties involved, and the arguments utilized. To begin, the veil restriction case was vast and phenomenal in terms of the subject being disputed, the parties engaged, the public passion, and the arguments from the parties, such that the case more or less fits the context of PTKI, even contemporary Indonesian Islam. Second, the debate over the veil is replete with contestation in the discourse used by opposing ideological groups, highlighting the intense relationship between education and leadership. The conflict revolved around a struggle over meanings and connotations associated with the dominant discourse, which was radicalism. Moderate Islamic ideology, conservative Islamic ideology, and human rights supporting ideology are at least the three main ideological camps at play here. Third, it demonstrates how Indonesian Islam is becoming more multifaceted, making absolute, conservative, and moderate interpretations of the religion obsolete. To avoid falling into the essentialism trap when analyzing modern Islamic events, the academic community must take progressive steps forward. As the democratic setting that emerged after the reformation has allowed conservative groups greater access, as moderate groups have done up to this point, the spectrum of arguments on Islamic doctrine has broadened to the point where it can no longer be explained in terms of the two categories above. In this context, it is increasingly important and urgent to keep the democratic climate runs well so that contestation can take place in civilized manner.

References

- Afandi, A. K. (2011). Konsep Kekuasaan Michel Foucault. *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam*, 1(2).
- Andiko, T. (2018). Larangan Bercadar di Perguruan Tinggi Perspektif Sadd Al-Dzari'ah. *Madania*, Vol. 22 No. 1, (Juni, 2018), p. 113-130, 22(1), 113-130.
- Bagir, Z. A. (2014). Membaca beragam wajah Islam Indonesia. In M. van Bruinessen (Ed.), *Conservative Turn; Islam Indonesia dalam Ancaman Fundamentalisme* (1st ed., pp. 11-23). Bandung: Mizan.
- Budi, K. (2018). Rethinking Cadar Banning in Indonesia 's Higher Education : Questioning Freedom of Religion and Positioning Fear of Radicalism. In A. Raharjo (Ed.), *ICoL GaS* (Vol. 02004, pp. 1-7). Purwokerto: Curran Associates, Inc.
- Detik.com, R. (2018). Datangi UIN Yogya, Ormas: Radikalisme Tak Bisa Dikaitkan dengan Cadar. Retrieved February 4, 2021, from Detik.com website: <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-3903177/datangi-uin-yogya-ormas-radikalisme-tak-bisa-dikaitkan-dengan-cadar>
- El-Guindi, F. (2005). *Jilbab; Antara kesalehan, kesopanan dan perlawanan*. Jakarta: Serambi.
- Fauzi, I. A. (2008). Artikulasi Pembaharuan Nurcholish Madjid; kekuatan dan batas-batasnya. Retrieved April 15, 2021, from Pusad Paramadina website: <https://www.paramadina-pusad.or.id/artikulasi-pembaharuan-nurcholish-madjid-kekuatan-dan-batas-batasnya/>
- Foucault, M. (1982). *Discipline and Punish; The Birth oh the Prison*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M. (2000). *Seks dan Kekuasaan; Sejarah seksualitas*. Jakarta: Gramedia.
- Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. London: Penguin.
- Hanafiah, M., Nadhiroh, W., Assyauqi, M. I., Abidin, M. Z., Kurdi, M. S., & Andini, Y. (2019). Islamic Perspective on Students Wearing a Burqa at Universities in Indonesia : Results from a Survey at Three Universities. *Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research*, 7(4), 251-260.
- Hefner, R. (2001). *Civil Islam; Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia* (1st ed.). Jakarta: ISAI.
- Ichwan, M. N., Burhani, A. N., Mujiburrahman, Wildan, M., & Bruinessen, M. van. (2014). *Conservative Turn; Islam Indonesia dalam ancaman fundamentalisme* (1st ed.; M. van Bruinessen, Ed.). Bandung: Mizan.
- Indonesia, R. V. (2018). Banyak Pihak Menentang Larangan Pemakaian Cadar di UIN Sunan Kalijaga. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from VOA Indonesia website: <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/banyak-pihak-tentang-larangan-pemakaian-cadar-di-uni-sunan-kalijaga-/4288811.html>
- Jateng.com, R. T. (2018). Larangan Bercadar di UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Begini Kata Mahfud MD. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from Tribun Jateng.com website:

- <https://jateng.tribunnews.com/2018/03/07/larangan-bercadar-di-uin-sunan-kalijaga-yogyakarta-begini-kata-mahfud-md>
- Juwariyah, S. (2019). MUSLIM WOMEN AND VEILING : What Does It Signify? *MIQOT*, 43(1), 79–94.
- Kalijaga, U. S. (2018). Konferensi Pers Rektor UIN Sunan Kalijaga Tentang Pembinaan Mahasiswi Bercadar. Retrieved August 2, 2021, from Youtube website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uOh5DVout4>
- Kersten, C. (2018). *Berebut Wacana; Pergulatan wacana umat Islam Indonesia era reformasi* (1st ed.). Bandung: Mizan.
- Khoiri, M. A. (2015). Rekonstruksi Konsep Aurat; Analisis pemikiran Syahrur. *Universum*, 9(2), 155.
- Khoiroh, L., & Chakim, S. (2016). Kuasa Perempuan Bercadar dalam Novel 'Akulah Istri Teroris' written by Abidah el Khalieqy (Analisis Wacana Teun A. Van Dijk). *Komunika*, 10(2).
- Kudhori, M. (2018). Kontroversi hukum cadar dalam perspektif dialektika syariat dan adat. *Ijtihad, Jurnal Wacana Hukum Islam Dan Kemanusiaan*, 18(1), 33–56. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijtihad.v18i1.33-56>
- Liputan6.com, R. (2018). Larangan Mahasiswi Bercadar, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Didatangi Ormas. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from Liputan6.com website: <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3351524/larangan-mahasiswi-bercadar-uin-sunan-kalijaga-didatangi-ormas>
- Matanasi, P. (2017). Lika-Liku Jilbab Sebelum Tren di Tanah Air. Retrieved August 12, 2021, from tirto.id website: <https://tirto.id/lika-liku-jilbab-sebelum-tren-di-tanah-air-cfzP>
- Mubakkirah, F. (2020). MENYOROT FENOMENA CADAR DI INDONESIA. *Musawa*, 12(1), 30–48.
- Prasetyo, E. (2007). *Astagfirullah: Islam jangan dijual*. Yogyakarta: Resist Book.
- Rahman, A. F., & Syafiq, M. (2017). Motivasi, Stigma dan Coping Stigma pada Perempuan Bercadar. *Jurnal Psikologi Teori Dan Terapan*, 7(2), 103–115.
- Rasyid, L. A., & Bukido, R. (2018). Problematika Hukum Cadar dalam Islam; sebuah tinjauan Normatif-Historis. *Jurnal Ilmiah Al-Syir'ah*, 16(1), 74–92.
- Ratri, L. (2011). CADAR , MEDIA , DAN IDENTITAS PEREMPUAN MUSLIM. *Jurnal Forum Universitas Diponegoro*, 39(2), 29–37.
- Redaktur BBC Indonesia. (2018a). Larangan memakai cadar di UIN: Antara kebebasan memilih dan ancaman radikalisme. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from BBC News Indonesia website: <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-43298214>
- Redaktur BBC Indonesia. (2018b). Rektor UIN: Larangan bercadar untuk cegah radikalisme, fundamentalisme. Retrieved February 2, 2021, from BBC News Indonesia website: <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-43288075>
- Redaktur BBC Indonesia. (2018c). Rektor UIN: Larangan bercadar untuk cegah radikalisme, fundamentalisme. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from BBC News

- Indonesia website: <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-43288075>
- Redaktur CNN Indonesia. (2018). UIN Sunan Ampel Juga Larang Mahasiswi Kenakan Cadar. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from CNN Indonesia website: <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180306215851-20-280979/uin-sunan-ampel-juga-larang-mahasiswi-kenakan-cadar>
- Redaktur Detik.com. (2018). Polemik Cadar di UIN Yogya, Kemenag: Diserahkan kepada Rektor. Retrieved from Detik.com website: <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3900425/polemik-cadar-di-uin-yogya-kemenag-diserahkan-kepada-rektor>
- Republika.id, R. (2018). Pedagogis Jadi Alasan UIN Larang Mahasiswa Bercadar. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from Republika.id website: <https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/daerah/18/03/06/p55q2f330-penjelasan-uin-kalijaga-soal-larangan-cadar-di-kampusnya>
- RI, K. A. (2019). *Moderasi Beragama* (1st ed.). Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI.
- Rizki, R. K. M. S., Høstmælingen, N., Ranheim, C., Arinanto, S., Falaakh, F., Soeprapto, E., ... Riyadi, E. (2008). *Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia* (1st ed.; K. D. Asplund, S. Marzuki, & E. Riyadi, Eds.). Yogyakarta: PUSHAM UII.
- Shihab, M. Q. (2014). *Jilbab; Pakaian wanita muslimah*. Jakarta: Lentera Hati.
- Syahrur, M. (2000). *Nahwa Ushūl al-Jadīdah li al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*. Damaskus: al-Ahaliy.
- Tirto.id, R. (2018). Argumen Lemah Rektor UIN Yogya Soal Larangan Cadar. Retrieved February 4, 2021, from tirto.id website: <https://tirto.id/argumen-lemah-rektor-uin-yogya-soal-larangan-cadar-cFMy>
- Turmudi, E. (2016). The Passion of Jilbab: Socio-Cultural Transformation of Indonesian Muslim Women. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publikations*, 6(5).
- Wahyudi, Y. (2007). *Maqashid Syari'ah dalam Pergumulan Politik; Berfilsafat hukum Islam dari Harvard ke Sunan Kalijaga* (1st ed.). Yogyakarta: Nawesea Press.

Halaman ini bukan sengaja untuk dikosongkan