

Being Tolerant and Nationalist Sufi: A Social Movement Study of *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqot al-Mu'tabarrah an-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN) and *Habib Luthfi*

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Abstrak

Tasawuf telah lama diasosiasikan dengan toleransi karena sifat teologisnya yang menitikberatkan pada kedamaian jiwa. Namun, pandangan ini cenderung mengabaikan fakta bahwa gerakan sufi sering terlibat dalam politik dan wacana nasionalis. Kajian ini menjelaskan logika gerakan sosial sebuah gerakan Tarekat di Indonesia dalam mengedepankan toleransi dan nasionalisme. Gerakan *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqot al-Mu'tabarrah an-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN), dikenal sebagai kelompok sufi yang saat ini dipimpin oleh Habib Luthfi. Gerakan ini menyerukan 'Bela Negara' dengan jargon 'NKRI Harga Mati' (doktrin cinta tanah air) dan *Handarbeni* (bangga pada lokalitas). Penelitian ini menggunakan beberapa metode analisis untuk mengkaji faktor-faktor yang melatarbelakangi munculnya gerakan ini. Penulis menganalisis ceramah Habib Luthfi bin Yahya (Rais 'Amm JATMAN) dari tahun 2020-2021 yang tersebar di beberapa media *online* seperti YouTube dan Instagram. Selain itu, penulis melakukan wawancara dengan beberapa Kiai di Idarah 'Aliyah (pengurus pusat JATMAN) dan menganalisis puluhan acara yang diselenggarakan oleh JATMAN di media *online*. Mengambil pendekatan dari teori gerakan sosial, terlihat bahwa berbagai motivasi membayangi munculnya JATMAN dalam nasionalisme. Gerakan ini mungkin tidak hanya didorong oleh kesalehan dan doktrin teologis (sufisme) tetapi juga oleh logika gerakan sosial seperti struktur peluang politik, mobilisasi sumber daya, dan proses pembedahan (*framing process*).

Kata kunci: Bela Negara, Habib Luthfi, *Handarbeni*, Nasionalisme, *Tarekat*.

Abstract

Sufism has long been associated with tolerance because of its theological nature that focuses on inner peace. However, this view tends to overlook that Sufi movements are often involved in politics and nationalist discourse. This study explains the social movement logic of a *Tarekat* movement in Indonesia in promoting tolerance and nationalism. *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqot al-Mu'tabarah an-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN) is well-known as a Sufi group currently led by *Habib* Luthfi. This movement calls to *Bela Negara* (defending Indonesia) by the jargon '*NKRI Harga Mati*' (the doctrine of love for the homeland) and *Handarbeni* (being proud to locality). This research employs multiple analysis methods to examine the factors that underpin the emergence of this movement. The author analyzed *Habib* Luthfi bin Yahya's lectures (Rais 'Amm JATMAN) from 2020-2021, scattered on several online media such as YouTube and Instagram. In addition, author conducted interviews with several *Kiai* in *Idarah 'Aliyah* (the central administrator of JATMAN) and analyzed dozens of events organized by JATMAN in online media. It appears that various motivations were overshadowed by the emergence of JATMAN in nationalism. This movement may not only be driven by piety and theological doctrine (Sufism) but also by social movement logics such as political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and cultural framing.

Keywords: *Bela Negara*, *Habib* Luthfi, *Handarbeni*, Nationalism, *Tarekat*.

Introduction

Sufism is a religious expression in Islam that focuses on the spiritual dimension and peace of the soul (Ahmad et al., 2021). Because of this nature of Sufism, some studies look at Sufism as a way to counterbalance political and radical religious expression (Brookings, 2018; Sedgwick, 2015). However, some scholars saw that the *Tarekat* is also a conservative and passive group of Islam (Geertz, 1971; Hoffman, 2009). Moreover, Gellner predicted that *Tarekat* would be replaced by a reformist and more puritanical form of Islam because of the traditionalist-mystical and stagnant pattern of *Tarekat* (Gellner, 1981).

Nonetheless, the history of Sufism shows that the spiritual path of Sufism often demands to take a position in the political contests that surround it, either as a supporting force of the ruling regime or as a side opposition (Bruinessen, 1992, 2008b, 2009; Howell, 2008). *Tarekat* was incarnate as a political movement and a resistance movement in the colonial era (Bruinessen, 2012; Jamil, 2005; Kartodirjo, 1966; Meuleman, 1994; Ni'am, 2016; Thohir, 2015). According to Ni'am (2016) and Pakar (2016), some Islamic countries have proven it. In Morocco, the Tijaniyyah fought against the French invaders. In Egypt, the Ahmadiyya or Badawiyyah congregations

fought the Crusaders who wanted to enter Egypt. In Libya, the Sanusiyyah ruled against the Italian invaders until Libya became independent. In Central Asia, the Naqshbandiyah took up arms and fought the Soviet Union. Even in Indonesia as the most prominent Islamic country in the world, the *Kiai* (whose were Sufis) rebelled against the Dutch colonialists, and this rebelled spreading to all regions in Indonesia such as in Pekalongan, Jombang, Brebes, Indramayu, and several other areas (Bizawie, 2014). Based on these historical facts, it can be concluded that *Tarekat* was against colonialism. However, today the *Tarekat* no longer opposed the established government because colonialism was over. The *Tarekat* has become an Islamic movement that supports government opposition (Bruinessen, 1992, 2008b, 2009; Howell, 2008). In Indonesia, *Tarekat* movements that support the government formed have emerged since the New Orde era, such as *Partai Persatuan Tharikhah Islam/Islamic Tarekat Political Party* (PPTI), PERTI, and JATM, which supported Golkar (Bruinessen, 2008a). Meanwhile, *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqat al-Mu'tabara al-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN) chose to oppose Golkar by supporting PPP (Turmudi, 2004).

In 1998, Soeharto (the second president of Indonesia) has been overthrown, and the Reform era started. This era is supported by the openness of information systems and freedom of expression, thus encouraging several international Islamic movements to enter Indonesia, such as Salafi-Wahabi, *Indonesian Hizb al-Tahrir* (HTI), and *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (with his party MCC: Prosperous Justice Party). They carry the same mission, namely the formalization of Shariah in the democratic system in Indonesia (Fealy & Bubalo, 2007; Qodir, 2014). At the same time, the year 2000 was the year of JATMAN's change, in which *Habib Luthfi* was elected rais 'Amm JATMAN. After becoming Rais Amm, *Habib Luthfi* brought JATMAN into the nationalist Sufi movement to counter radicalism (Hadi, 2018). *Habib Luthfi's* idea of nationalism departed from the teachings of two figures who influenced him. First, his father, *Habib Ali bin Hasyim bin Yahya*. His father punished *Habib Luthfi* because he put the red-white flag on the ground directly after it was removed from the bamboo. His father then punished him and said that the red-white flag contained the lives of hundreds of people who had fought for him from the Netherlands (Inayah, 2017). Second, his teacher, *Kiai Abdul Malik*, taught *Habib Luthfi* to remember the spirits of the heroes who had died liberating Indonesia from the Netherlands by reading *Fatihah* and burning frankincense (Anshor, 2020). Nonetheless, the narrative at JATMAN has its ups and downs. This nationalism rhetoric began to strengthen during the time of President Soesilo Bambang

Yudhoyono (SBY), where the bomb terror case increasingly threatened Indonesia's existence. In the time of SBY, *Habib* Luthfi increasingly established closeness with the TNI-Polri. The *maulid* ceremony is purposely to build spiritual dimensions and build an identity of nationalism. In 2005, *Habib* Luthfi in collaboration with the TNI held a red-white *Gebyar Maulid*. During President Jokowi Widodo, the narrative of nationalism by *Habib* Luthfi experienced very significant development. This was marked by the election of *Habib* Luthfi to be *Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden* (*wantimpres* council or the president advisor). Thus, *Habib* Luthfi's legitimacy for the promotion of nationalism was also strong. I see that Jokowi's choice to make *Habib* Luthfi as *wantimpres* because of his football in promoting the idea of nationalism since the era of SBY until now. For Jokowi, *Habib* Luthfi's nationalism commitment is compelling (Wantimpres, 2020) to help the government affirm nationalism and counter radicalism.

Thus, *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Tariqat al-Mu'tabarrah an-Nahadliyah* (JATMAN) changed its position from opposing the established government to supporting it. The way JATMAN's support the government is manifested in two ways. The first way, Nationalism movement, by proposing national unity and harmony of the ummah. The second way, Anti-terrorism and anti-radicalism movements, by raising the doctrine of morality and exemplifying the behavior of the prophet Muhammad, called for '*Bela Negara*' (Khanafi, 2014). The movement invites them to fight radical movements that threaten the existence of the state and to encourage pride in their locality, for instance, pride in their predecessors, local economic products, the red and white flag (Indonesia's National flag), and expanding historical knowledge (Yahya et al., 2020). To succeed in the dissemination of ideology and propaganda of nationalism and tolerance, JATMAN, through *Habib* Luthfi, conducted various approaches such as *Jumat Kliwon forum*, *Haul*, and *Maulid* in collaborating with the TNI-Polri, the government, and the student level through *Mahasiswa Ahl al-Thariqoh al-Mu'tabarrah al-Nahdliyah* (MATAN) (Hadi, 2018; Inayah, 2017).

Habib Luthfi always frames the nation's social problems faced with the spirit of national unity and nationalism. For instance, according to my interview in the study of *Jumat Kliwon* on 11th September 2020, *Habib* Luthfi said that the source of physical strength comes from the strength of faith. Eventually, the body will also vehemently reject all diseases. *Habib* continued that as follower of *Tarekat*, they do not need to be afraid of Coronavirus because it also includes God's creatures like us who will fear God.

Precisely, things that must be focused on are the two main problems are two big problems, such as economic deficit and the decline of nationalism (MT Darul Hasyimi Jogja, 2020). Under the leadership of *Habib Luthfi*, JATMAN has had 30 *Idara Wustho* (JATMAN's branches at the provincial level) from 33 provinces in Indonesia, 402 *Syu'biyyah* (JATMAN's branches at the provincial or city level) from 412 districts in Indonesia (Hadi, 2018).

Based on that explanation, it can be concluded that the emergence of the JATMAN movement is quite complex. The *Tarekat's* impartiality towards tolerance and counter-radical nationalism does not only come from theological teachings that emphasize spiritual aspects and peace of mind so that they tend to be non-political but also there are other factors. Referring to the social movement theory approach, the researcher finds that the emergence of the JATMAN movement should be understood not only as a result of religious interpretations but also the logic of social movements, including cultural framing, resource mobilization, and political opportunity structures. Therefore, this study aims to explain the logic of social movements in JATMAN activism which puts forward nationalism, tolerance, and national unity.

Theory

This study uses the Social Movements theory as an analytical tool. A social movement is briefly defined as an attempt to change society and culture. The difference lies in the operation strategy of a social movement and the formation of a movement, such as institutional arrangements and social arrangements to achieve specific short term or long term goals (Tridirco, 2012, hal. 1). Social movements are also understood to be an attempt to establish a New Order of life in society (Vander Zanden, 1959, hal. 313).

Social movements have always been associated with why a social movement arises and what factors make it up and then discuss its formation to organize the social movement. Based on studies conducted by Mc Adam et al. (McAdam et al., 1996, hal. 7), there are three critical factors in studying social movements, namely political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and framing processes factors. According to Davis et al. (2005, p. 3), the urgency of a framing technique in the study of social movements determines a movement's success. This study is based on mapping social movements to develop and disseminate programs and strategies through activist

networks. The conditions in which a social movement exists will determine whether a movement is centralized or decentralized.

A study conducted by Mark Lavine (Lavine, 2009, hal. 603) on a social movement led to an understanding that social movements align common interests in society to pursue social change. This argument is in line with a study conducted by Chomsky and Goldthorpe, who stated that the middle class was not a significant factor in a revolt against the dominant class, even more, conservative in strengthening existing elite societies. Furthermore, Chomsky explained that the social movements of oppressed lower classes would only choose to mobilize the same class like him because the similarity of fate would make it easier for a group to be organized (Rose, 1997, hal. 461–462).

Cultural change in society requires a social movement organization to engage directly with politics to realize their aspirations at the national level. Although in some circumstances, they must fight and devote much energy to influencing national policy. Eduardo Silva (2015) presented this argument, showing variations in how social movements realized their goals by engaging movements directly in national politics and entering the structure of the national political institutions to change the system from within, for instance, members of the religious, social movement who entered the political party subsequently embodied their religious aspirations in government.

The political opportunity structures

Some studies on religious movements focused on the role of ideology (Bayat, 2005; Mc Cright & Dunlap, 2008). The role of ideology is vital as framing in social movement theory, but this is highly dependent on political opportunities and resources availability. Social movement theorists believe that social movement is a group's efforts to achieve its political interests. That political interest may include combating the oppression of the established government or supporting it (Sukmana, 2016, hal. 191). In other words, social movements are highly motivated by a political situation where the movement actors interpret the political situation as an opportunity or a threat, as Kitschelt (1986) and Berman (2003). Henceforth, Political Opportunity Structure (POS) explains the political situation in which a robust political system (democracy, for instance) will weaken the revolutionary movement, and the pattern of social movements

will tend to be gradual, non-violent, and open. However, if a political system is weak, social movements will tend to be radical, oppositional, and closed.

According to (Berman, 2003), he explains that the countries with weak democracy are vulnerable to democratic revolutions because a weak political system is only beneficial for certain political elites, and it will give the impression that the state is indeed weedy so that there are no other ways instead of revolution. Along with the political system that influences the emergence of social movements, Davis et al. (Davis et al., 2005) argue that 'Specific opportunities policy' is a factor that supports a revolutionary movement. This concept means that declining state legitimacy in public where the state cannot implement public policies will lead to protests.

In addition, a robust state system will make social movements methods more open and more supportive to the established government, as research conducted by Kitschelt (Kitschelt, 1986). According to his perspective, combining a country's political input structure and political outcome structure will impact the freedom of social movements to formulate strategies and take action. He compared the nuclear protest movement in Sweden, the United States, France, and West Germany. I divided the four concepts from him. Firstly, the political input structure is open and responsive to the protest mobilization, as in Sweden, and to a lesser extent, in the United States, a search for new policies has been unleashed. Secondly, the political input and output structure are closed, such as in France and West Germany. The government has more firmly adhered to a predetermined policy process. Thirdly, in West Germany and the United States, the legitimacy of implementing public policies in both countries is weak, so it allowed the nuclear protest movement to interfere with public policies. Lastly, In Sweden and France, the state has strong legitimacy to protect its policies from protests. Therefore, he concluded that an open political system and high state capacity would open up innovation movements.

Method

This is qualitative-interpretative research. The main feature of qualitative research is the intensive description of the social-environmental phenomena under investigation. Furthermore, Blaikie (2000) cautioned that qualitative researchers commit to viewing the social world or social behaviors and events from the researcher's

perspective. In this sense, researchers must be sensitive when reading what social actors want or think.


This research using a combination method to obtain the data. Data collection methods include interviews, in-depth online observation of some activities, and file content analysis. Since October 2020 observations have been made on *Habib* Luthfi's speech in *Jumat Kliwon* forum from the YouTube channel. Visitation was also made to JATMAN figures to capture unpublished information. Since some agendas are restricted during the coronavirus disease pandemic, it is necessary to conduct online observation through profile tracking on YouTube and social media. This process is helpful to determine what kind of collective identity they belong to.

This movement's core daily activities produce notion to their jama'a delivered on the *Jumat Kliwon* forum and ceremonial such as *maulid*, *haul*, National Memorial Day, including National Hero's Day, Independence, Pancasila Sanctity Day. Sampling was carried out to seek an understanding of the emergence and development of this movement. Speech and narration are essential, mainly to understand and observe the contention resolved by this movement and how this movement frames the contention into mobilization.

Result

Sufism has long been associated with tolerance because of its theological nature that focuses on inner peace. However, this view tends to overlook that Sufi movements are often involved in politics and nationalist discourse. This study explains the social movement logic of a *Tarekat* movement in Indonesia in promoting tolerance and nationalism. *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqot al-Mu'tabarah an-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN) is well-known as the Sufi group currently led by *Habib* Luthfi. As a social movement, the choice of JATMAN movement can be explained by referring to the following aspects of social movement as follows:

Figure 1. The Social Movement Logics of JATMAN



Firstly is the framing process utilized by JATMAN to construct nationalism through its three central doctrines; first, building awareness of *Birrul walidain* (family fidelity). This concept means that everyone must observe his parents. Respect for parents will foster nationalism. In other words, *birrul walidain* means establishing nationalism. Second, the *shukr* (thanksgiving) concept means to show gratitude for all god-given such as foods, Indonesian produce, seafood, and national security, which with this, freedom of worship can be applied. Third, emphasize the need for historical knowledge. Historical knowledge is needed to create a historical awareness of the struggle of the heroes who have liberated Indonesia from colonialism. JATMAN provides efforts to boost historical knowledge through *maulid*, *haul*, *manakib* (the hagiography), and *ziyara* (visiting the saint's tomb). The three central doctrines above are the basic construction of nationalism. Thus, nationalism means *birrul walidain*, *the shukr*, and *rich* historical knowledge. With this, nationalism can be transformed to all parties from sharing religious and cultural backgrounds.

Secondly is resource mobilization. To bind the followers and convince them with nationalism, *Habib* Luthfi devised four basic strategies. First, hold a routine forum every Friday *Kliwon*, once a month. In this forum, *Habib* Luthfi disseminated the idea of nationalism and framed the action. Secondly, purposely builds closeness and collaboration with the government, such as the Indonesian army, POLRI (the Indonesian police), and some regional leaders from the Regent to the President. In addition, through Sufis ceremonies. Third, to legitimize the idea of religious tolerance, *Habib* Luthfi visited or invited interreligious figures and conducted some interreligious dialogues. Fourth, establish cells in universities.

Third, in terms of the structure of political opportunities, it can be said that the choice of the JATMAN police to support government policies is based on two main things. First, the emergence of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia after the Bali Bombings in the 2000s. In addition, the democratic system characterized by information disclosure also encourages radical Islamist groups to grow. Their freedom of speech serves as a base for framing actions and launching attacks. Second, the choice of NU political positions after the 1984 conference in Situbondo. NU decided to accept the Pancasila as the basis of the state (previously, NU made a firm demarcation line with the New Order). These consequences lead NU to always frame its actions in the form of moderatism by recurrently supporting the status quo of leaders and socializing the

country's missions, such as counterterrorism. Last but not least, as a large organization in Indonesia, JATMAN is also a social movement. Like other social movements, JATMAN frames action, mobilizes resources, and exploits structures of political opportunity.

Discussion

JATMAN: The Origin and Political Opportunity Structure

The JATMAN's emergence was attached to the political contest at the time. The context that JATMAN wanted to change socially and culturally was very much related to the political contest. *Kiai* Muslikh Mranggen and several other *Kiai* left JATM and founded JATMAN. The test that appears here is that the composition of JATM comes from NU's *Kiai*, where NU fully supports PPP, but besides, *Kiai* Musta'in, who is the chairman of JATM, supports Golkar. At the same time, Golkar is a rival to PPP. This situation then prompted the *Kiai* to establish JATMAN and leave JATM.

JATM was founded in 1957, and its founders are (*KIAI* Muslikh Mranggen, *KIAI* Masruhan Mranggen, *KIAI* Nawawi Berjan, Andi Patopoy (a Grobogan Regent at the time), *KIAI* Khudlori Tegalrejo. The description was literally cited from *Kiai* Mirza, an assistant *KIAI* Muslich Mranggen, while other information from *KIAI* Chalwani Nawawi, the founder of JATM only four people, namely *Kiai* Mandzur Temanggung, *Kiai* Nwawi Berjan, *KIAI* Masruhan Mranggen, and Andi Patopoy. The four men face *KIAI* Muslih Mranggen, Demak and delivered a discourse to establish a social organization with the reason to stem the flow of communism, liberalism, Christianization, and puritanism (anti-*Tarekat* group) (Hadi, 2018, p. 109; Musthofa, 2013).

The first meeting of JATM was held the following year, in 1958 at *Pesantren* API Tegalrejo, Magelang. As the *pesantren* leader, *Kiai* Khudlori successfully held a *muktamar* (conference) even though initially, this *muktamar* almost failed because of lack of support (Hadi, 2018, p. 110). The first JATM *muktamar* in 1958 decided *KIAI* Baidlowi Abd. Al-Aziz, Mursyid of the *Syattariyah Tarekat* as well as the leader of *Pesantren* Al-Wahdah Lasem, Rembang as 'Rais 'Amm (supreme leader) JATMAN. In 1963, the post of Rais' Amm was replaced by *Kiai* Hafidz Rembang and in the next

muktamar, in 1968, the position was filled by KH Muhammad Arwani Kudus (Hadi, 2018, p. 110–111).

In the last *Muktamar* JATM in 1973 (before the establishment of JATMAN in 1979), *Muktamar's* decision appointed *Kiai* Musta'in Romly as JATM's Rais' Amm. During his reign, he brought the organization into the political realm in the 1977 elections to join the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar) (Bruinessen, 2012; Hadi, 2018; Turmudi, 2004). The *Kiai* judged *Kiai* Musta'in's decision to join the Golkar Party as *Kiai* Musta'in's treasonous attitude towards NU. At the same time, NU has agreed to support the Islamic party, Persatuan Pembangunan Party (PPP) (Turmudi, 2004, p. 71). Even among Muslim people at that time came the assumption that those who support non-Islamic parties were to have apostatized (out of Islam) (Hadi, 2018, p. 113). It is said that *Kiai* Musta'in's decision to join the Golkar Party was based on the *Tarekat's* of his teacher, *Kiai* Ustman al-Ishaqy (one of his father's caliphs, *Kiai* Romli Tamim). However, NU *Kiai* still considers that *Kiai* Musta'in attitude has impacted JATM and troubling his followers. Therefore, the *Kiai* decided to leave JATM and create a new organization *Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqat al-Mu'tabarah al-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN) (Hadi, 2018; Turmudi, 2004).

The discussion to form JATMAN was then taken to '*Muktamar* NU' (the big NU's conference) in 1979 in Semarang, and it was decided that the organization of the *Tarekat* "JATMAN" is part of NU and officially approved by NU (Hadi, 2018, pp. 113–114). The addition of the word "*al-Nahdliyyah*" is intended to affirm the organization's attitude in line with NU principles. This decision is also at once an expectation that no NU leader will bring NU into practical politics or out of NU.

At that time, NU was the prominent supporter of PPP while *Kiai* Musta'in instead supported the 'Golkar Party'. The political orientation in the New Orde was always associated with religion so that someone who supported a secular (non-Islamic) party was considered to have apostatized. However, this condition changed when NU supported the concept of return to '*khittah* 1926" which is a neutral NU attitude and not affiliated with any party where the political orientation of NU people is considered as the personal attitude of NU people unrelated to NU (Hadi, 2018; Wahid, 1985, hal. 55).

The transformation *Tarekat* movement in JATMAN from opposes the established government to support the government is influenced by the transformation of the movement of its parent organization, NU, which conducts de-politicization efforts. The idea of de-politicization is a strategy of NU not to side with any political party. This idea came to be known as “*khittah*,” while the movement was known as “going back to ‘*khittah*’ 1926” (Bruinessen, 2008a). For the first time, the idea of ‘returning to ‘*khittah*’ 1926’ was approved and discussed in *Muktamar* NU, Semarang, in 1979. The decision came hoping that religious, educational, and socio-economic activities would be given greater priority. The cleric would return to his main duties as leader and community protector (Martin van Bruinessen, 2008a, p. 115). This idea of NU has also indicated that NU has reconciled with the New *Tarekat* government. The climax occurred in the national assembly (*Musyawahar Nasional*) 1983 in Situbondo and General Assembly (*Muktamar*) NU 1984 in the same place. The decision return to ‘*khittah*’ 1926 that has been agreed at Munas 1983 in Situbondo it is claimed that PBNU (Executive Board of *Nahdlatul Ulama*) prohibits all members of NU management at all levels concurrently in political organizations (PBNU, 1985, hal. 57–58). Stating that NU was founded solely as a religious organization and its political participation was merely an intercession that ended in 1973.

Although the original “*khittah*” was never formulated, the *Kiai* has agreed that its activities include social-religious, Education (*ma’arif*), social welfare (*mabarrat*), the spread of religion (*da’wah*), and the economy (*mu’amalah*). In addition, the decision of Munas 1983 in Situbondo also ushered in NU’s attitude to accept the single principle of Pancasila, which before Munas, no major organizations had accepted the single principle (Martin van Bruinessen, 2008a, p. 121). The decision of Munas 1983 in Situbondo stated that Pancasila as the basis of the Republic of Indonesia is not a religion and cannot replace religion and religious position (PBNU, 1985). NU’s attitude to accept Pancasila as the basis of the state and the 1945 Constitution as the Indonesian constitution brought JATMAN into The Nationalist *Tarekat* with nationalism, patriotism, and religious tolerance. The peak, in the post-2000 reformation era where *Habib Luthfi* was elected Rais’ Amm JATMAN. As Larana (1995, p. 5) has explained, the role of actors in the social movement is a very significant role in which a social movement can be formed because of the presence of an actor.

The movement actors formulated their opinions to encourage people to join the movement (Salem Press, 2011, hal. 3). With *Habib Luthfi*, JATMAN experienced many changes in role, especially the political role of JATMAN in supporting government policy with nationalism and patriotism. *Habib Luthfi*, with various strategies of the new JATMAN movement, brought JATMAN into a religious group that accommodated the government's interests and experienced very significant development. *Habib Luthfi* was able to invite the crowd to join and sympathize with JATMAN. Here, I see that framing is very decisive in the success of a social movement (Davis et al., 2005, p. 3).

Thus, the evolution of JATMAN's political stance from political opposition to support of the establishment is influenced by the choice of a political strategy of its parent organization, namely NU, with a strategy of "returning to *khittah 1926*". This means that the transformation of JATMAN's strategy to support the established government is not only influenced by theological doctrine (Sufism) but also influenced by NU's political opportunity they choose. Currently, JATMAN is the Sufi organization most supportive to the government by supporting national policies such as counterterrorism and radicalism through the ideology of nationalism and tolerance that *Habib Luthfi* now conveys in each forum. Before examining further, the movement of the logic of JATMAN nationalist rhetoric, it is necessary to look at the framing reference in the doctrine of JATMAN.


The Framing Process of JATMAN

To strengthen the legitimacy of the JATMAN movement, *Habib Luthfi* as Rais 'Amm carried out framing by doing collective framing. Through religious rituals such as *haul*, *maulid*, *manakib* (hagiography), and *ziyara* JATMAN produces and interprets these rituals within the framework of nationalism. *Ziyara*, *haul*, and *manakib* are Sufi rituals related to nationalism. These rituals make people know the nation's ancestors, namely the ulama and *habaib*, who have participated in building Indonesia. Nationalism here is interpreted as the loss of people's love for the ulama and *habaib*. Therefore, such rituals motivate people's love for the heroes and the *habaib* scholars. Scholars argue that movement actors are significant agents who actively produce and maintain the meaning of constituents, antagonists, and bystanders. The actors then involve themselves deeply with the media, local government, and state, with the politics of signification (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Drawing on the framing process (Benford & Snow, 2000), the movement's initiators created framing as an effort to negotiate attitudes and views on an issue that should need to be changed. In this case, there are three prominent roles in the framing process. First, determine what or who is responsible for a problem (diagnostic framing). Second, presents alternative actions to be taken (prognostic framing) and strategies to implement them. Finally, encourage people to work together to create change. The last task frame (motivational framing) includes creating suitable vocabulary and jargon to motivate.

Four frames were constructed through the following process. First, this movement shows the problem that the Indonesian people are experiencing defeat. Second, after the problem is determined, identify the problem or designate who or what is to blame. This movement shows that the fragility of national unity caused Indonesia's defeat. Third, after the problem is determined, the next step is to offer solutions and strategies to deal with the problem. JATMAN offers an alternative through *Handarbeni*. It inspires unity and a spirit of nationalism, such as love for the country and pride in its products. The last, the call for 'NKRI Harga Mati and 'Cinta Indonesia'. All the above frameworks are designed to provide potential participants with reasons for their willingness to participate in this movement. Scholars often use these framework tasks to study social movements since they help understand how rational actors convey ideology to individuals with different interests. Thereby, they can express their commitment to the movement (Robinson, 2004; Wickham, 2004).

Figure 2. The JATMAN's framework



First, The diagnostic framing. In several forums, both JATMAN forums and non-JATMAN forums, *Habib* Luthfi diagnoses Indonesia's problems. Indonesia is experiencing a setback from various sectors and starting from the economy, agriculture, and education. For Rais 'Aam JATMAN, the resignation of various sectors of the Indonesian state is not caused by the president or his government. Yes, the president is indeed the country's leader, but the decline of the nation's power is due to people's attitudes (Abadi TV, 2020). It should be understood why JATMAN through *Habib* Luthfi diagnosed that this nation was in a slump. The reasons behind this can be found in *Habib* Luthfi's lecture. It is because the decline in the strength of the nation is divided. Indonesian people are still busy with trivial and unimportant things. They slander each other and blame each other. *Kiai* and other *Kiai* blame each other. *Habaib* and *habaib* are divided. Differences in the number of *rak'ah* in tarawih prayers create debate, differences in political affiliation create divisions (Abadi TV, 2020). According to *Habib* Luthfi, awareness of one's weaknesses is the principal capital to stop blaming others. When we realize that we have many shortcomings, then we will not insult the shortcomings of others. Instead, appreciate the shortcomings or even praise the advantages (Wardini, 2020).

I find that evading division and prioritizing unity is influenced by the style of NU thinking, considering that JATMAN is part of NU. The concept of NU thought is based on the thoughts of the scholars who follow the theological method of Abu al-Hasan al-Asy'ary (Asy'ariyah) as the basis for JATMAN in its memorandum of association (JATMAN, 2018). One of the reasons why NU and JATMAN strongly avoid division. First, a division is interpreted as a command from God. This opinion is based on God's command to hold fast to *hablullah*, interpreted as *jamaah* (Al-Baghawi, 1997, p. 103). Second, NU, including JATMAN, takes the attitude of avoiding division because of the door to destruction (Al-Qurthubi, n.d., hal. 159), including the destruction of the nation (Al-Andalusi, 2002, p. 499) with the destruction of government sectors both from the economy, agriculture, education, these are the national defense. Third, the advice of the founder of NU, Muhammad Hasyim Asy'ari, stated that national unity is a powerful tool for creating prosperity and strengthening national defense (Asy'ari, n.d., p. 22). *Habib* Luthfi strongly emphasized the hazards of dissection within the Muslim community or ummah.

This danger, according to him, is seen in the labeling "Shia". This label is used to break the unity between *ahlul bait* and other Muslims to be hostile to each other. The labeling of *Shia* also has implications for the destruction of historical sites. Because the figures who spread Islam to Indonesia are descendants of the Prophet who is often referred to as "*wali songo*" (nine guardians). Later came the statement "it's a *Shia* grave, destroy it". Later, when *Wali Songo* is successfully labeled as *Shia*, the next target will be NU, including JATMAN. Thus, all JATMAN rituals such as *maulid*, *haul*, and *manakib* will be labeled *Shia*. When all that labeling has been successful, the Indonesian nation will be destroyed because of this fight (Assegaf, 2020, hal. 416; Yahya et al., 2020).

Second, The prognostic framing. *Habib* Luthfi often frames its narrative using the Javanese term *handarbeni*, which means feeling and acting like an owner so that someone feels they have an obligation and responsibility for their property. *Habib* Luthfi affirmed this attitude in each of his lectures by stating that pride in Indonesia is not arrogance but gratitude to Allah SWT. Respecting red and white is not an evasion but an expression of gratitude to God for owning the country of Indonesia. The Red and White Flag is the pride of the nation, the honor of the nation. If we want to reflect on the red and white flag, we should be ashamed to be a country. Corruption will not commit corruption if they want to reflect on the nation's founder and the Red-White flag (Yahya et al., 2020, p. 160).

Third, the motivational framing. The framework of calling for "*Bela Negara*" is likely to be built on the idea that defending the state is a religious command. JATMAN admits that the spirit of defending the country is identical to the Sufis. Indonesian history has recorded that the Sufis played an active role in defending Indonesia's sovereignty from the Dutch colonialists. They admit that with the support of historical facts and referring to several verses and hadiths of the Prophet, many people can easily accept the call to defend the state. Not only Muslims but interfaith. Therefore, this movement encourages people to commit *Bela Negara*, emphasizing what individuals can do to evade division so that unity is strengthened. However, later I will prove that the concept of *Bela Negara* promoted by this movement does not stop at individual action but also collective action. Because this movement redefines *Bela Negara*, it must be carried out collectively under the banner of NKRI *Harga Mati*. This jargon means that whatever happens to this country, *Bela Negara* is obligatory.

The resource mobilization

JATMAN mobilizes resources to legitimize the strength of the movement and sustain the movement. As a social movement, the step to take advantage of the political opportunity structure must be accompanied by the mobilization of resources. The mobilization referred to here is forming masses, groups, associations, and organizations to achieve common goals (Locher, 2002). In mobilizing resources, factors such as finance, human resources, leaders which often appear in public, and the large number of people appointed to carry out the mission of a social movement must be considered because the success of mobilization is strongly influenced by these factors (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996).

It can be said that a social movement must understand and control the mass media, manage funds, and insemminate its ideology to realize massive resource mobilization. To bolster resources, JATMAN has made several efforts, such as ideological insemination through forums such as the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, *Haul, Kliwonan*, establishing close ties with the military, academics, and political elites. Friday Kliwon Forum was held at Kanzus *Shalawat* Building, Pekalongan. This forum is a monthly meeting between *Habib* Luthfi and his followers. In this forum, *Habib* Luthfi framed the action supported by the arguments he leaned on the Kitab *Jami al-Ushul fi al-Awliya* by *Sheikh* Baha' al-Din al-Naqshbandi. *Habib* Luthfi interprets this book and adapts it to the social and political context he is currently facing.

Collaborating with government and Indonesian soldiers (TNI) and Indonesian police (POLRI). The closeness of JATMAN and the military made it easier for JATMAN to mobilize military officials to work together to maintain national security. The proximity to political figures and military officials has kept JATMAN safe in carrying out *Tarekat* activities such as *Kliwonan* during the coronavirus disease pandemic. While other religious activities were restricted, the *Kliwonan* in Pekalongan continued. I noted that JATMAN held *Kliwonan* four times during the covid-19 pandemic within thousand people; 20 March 2020, 3 July 2020, 11 September 2020, and 16 October 2020. Thus, it can be seen that social movements that become government partners will receive facilities from the government, become a forum for socializing public policies, and maintain stability in society

Visiting interreligious figures by conducting interreligious dialogue and inviting some inter-religious figures in *maulid*, *haul*, and so on. For instance, *Habib* Luthfi will frame the celebration of the Prophet's birthday into a nationalist frame in the *maulid* procession, like *gebyar-maulid-red-white* (*maulid*-splendor of red and white. First held in 2005, the event included a *maulid* recitation before a parade by Banser troops, police, Banser personnel, and local pesantren students. They marched carrying the national flag, singing patriotic songs accompanied by marching bands. One day before the annual *maulid* celebration, the parade was held in Kanzus *Shalawat*. Every year, *Habib* Luthfi invites the ministers and generals of the government of Jakarta on occasion. He also asked community members to perform their cultural repertoire during the parade, such as the Chinese community of Pekalongan, which performs lion dances on occasion.

Establishing cells in the universities by establishing a special JATMAN wing for universities, *Mahasiswa Ahl al-Thariqat al-Mu'tabarrah al-Nahdliyyah* (MATAN), In strengthening legitimacy in universities, *Habib* Luthfi also wrote several scientific journals containing the content of nationalism. Such as "Musical expression of shalawat art in multicultural societies: A study of composition forms," which analyzes and describes musical expressions of shalawat that can culture with a multicultural form of culture. This study assumes that in multicultural cultures such as Indonesia, shalawat can adapt to the expression of local music from Java, Sunda, Lombok, and so on. This paper is the primary framing of *Habib* Luthfi. He affirms unity in the diversity that. Another scientific journal entitled "Reconstruction of Islamic Da'wah Thought to Inculcate Piety and Nationalism: The Da'wah Thoughts of *Habib* Lutfi," which describes narratives utilized by *Habib* Luthfi to disseminate nationalism and capture much mass with cultural framing about unity in diversity, *Handarbeni*, and being proud of the predecessors (Yahya et al., 2020).

Conclusion

Drawing on social movement theory, this article described that various motivations are overshadowed by the emergence of JATMAN within nationalism. This movement may not only be driven by piety and theological doctrine (Sufism) but also by social movement logics such as political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and cultural framing.

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