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SALAFISM IN RURAL JAVA: THE STRUGGLES OF INDONESIAN ISLAM SINCE THE FALL OF THE NEW ORDER

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Abstract

This study elucidates the factors that have driven the emergence of Salafism in rural Java, including the individual actors, the global Salafi movement, and the connections established amongst Islamic organizations since the fall of the New Order. This study emphasizes that the Salafi movement has not been purely religious in rural Java, but rather served to provide members with economic and political salvation. Diverse economic and political contestations have occurred within the Salafi movement as actors within the movement have established connections with individuals who share their vision and political ideology. This article concludes that the Salafi movement may be considered a form of political Islam, wherein individuals contest public spaces through public piety,

economic activities, and political approaches. Data for this study were collected through field research, interviews with informants, and a review of the literature. A political sociology approach was used to analyze the connections between village actors, the spread of Salafism, and the political and economic issues faced by religious organizations.

Keywords: Salafism, Java, Political Economy, Post-New Order Indonesia

A. Introduction

After the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesia began transitioning to a liberal democratic system (Törnquist et al. 2017) wherein the Indonesian public's political euphoria was realized. Although Indonesians did not enjoy absolute freedom (Hadiz 2017), they were nonetheless relieved to be free of the authoritarian politics that had marked Soeharto's New Order regime (Mietzner 2012). The availability of such democratic freedoms, though limited, made it possible for individuals and organizations to work towards goals that had long been stifled by those in power (Gaffar 2006). This included the public expression of Islam, as seen in the political, economic, and cultural fields (Fealy and White 2008; Weck and et al., 2011).

The resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998, which coincided with a series of monetary, economic, and political crises, was perceived as providing the momentum for Islam to begin playing an increasingly important role in Indonesian politics and civil society (Lewis 2013). This is evidenced by two factors: *first*, the rise of openly Islamic movements and political parties; *second*, the expression

of Islamic symbols and identities in public spaces (Fossati 2019). These movements—which included paramilitary organizations such as the Jihad Warriors (Laskar Jihad, LJ), the Islamic Defenders' Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), and the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) (Hasan 2006; Hasani and Naipospos 2010; Meuleman 2005) shaped society in new ways, causing significant concern for Indonesia's largest Islamic organizations: Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, both of which practiced a more moderate Islam (Hilmy 2013).

The recent mushrooming of puritanical Muslim lifestyles likewise highlights how technological advances and globalization have contributed to the spread of Salafism and Islamism in Indonesia (Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Roy 2004). Salafism has often been deemed the most appropriate means of exploiting the opportunities offered by globalization (Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Roy 2004). Salafism has spread throughout Indonesia, finding strong support in prayer groups and on university campuses. Through organizations such as the Indonesian Students Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI), Hizbut Tahrir, and the aforementioned MMI, Salafism has found fertile ground in Indonesia's universities (Arifianto 2019).

The spread of Salafism around the world, including in rural Indonesia, has produced a new global Islamic identity that is divorced from national references, local histories, and cultural institutions that are deemed non-Islamic (Bubalo and Fealy 2005). Such Salafism is perceived as better suited to the current global situation, wherein identities have been deterritorialized (Roy 2004; Tomlinson 2007). It has been

used to challenge Islamic beliefs that are considered deviant, to promote the reform of public morality (*akhlak*), and to purify cultural, national, traditional, and historical identities. It has predominantly targeted the cultural practices of Muslim-majority countries that are believed to deviate from the true teachings of Islam. This desire to manifest a pure form of Islam, having contributed significantly to the creation of new Islamic identities and religious performativities, has found particular traction amongst marginalized communities in both the West and in Muslim-majority countries (Bubalo and Fealy 2005).

This situation has significantly transformed the configuration of Indonesian Islam, including in Java, a situation that has been complicated by the diverse variables involved (i.e. modernization, globalization, and democracy). These effects have become increasingly evident in recent years (Ali 2011), as Indonesian Islam (created through a synthesis of Islam and local traditions) has come face-to-face with the puritanical Salafi movement. The influences of Middle Eastern Islam began to be felt tangibly in the 1980s and 1990s, and over time these views began to be embraced by Muslims in Indonesia. Traditional Islamic practices, including their specific characteristics, have slowly been eroded (Wildan 2013).

In Indonesia, studies of Salafism have been fascinating in the previous ten years. For example, Bruinessen (2018) highlights the emergence of religious conservatism, including Salafism. Elsewhere, Bruinessen (2011) examines the presence of a conservative religious and political parties in the United States from 1998 to 2000 from a historical

standpoint, giving the impression of a time series describing the emergence of conservativism in Indonesia and its impact on practical politics.

Meanwhile, Noorhaidi Hasan (Hasan 2009b) discusses the Salafism movement by focusing on the phenomenon of piety politics, which structures Islamic activities in both Muslim and non-Muslim universities. Hasan offers a critique of the Salafism movement and its effect on Islamic and non-Islamic colleges in terms of student activities and their efforts to control Indonesia's Islamic public spaces (Hasan 2012b)Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. According to Hasan, Salafism impacts pupils (as young Muslims) and their active development. Salafism's rise in Islamic and non-Islamic colleges may thus be attributed to the Prosperous Justice Party's (PKS) cadres.

Hasan also looks into the political disasters perpetrated by the Salafism movement in Indonesia (Hasan 2010)Salafists have dismantled political traditions that were seen as incompatible with Islam and replaced them with political beliefs that they deem more attuned to Islam. However, their goals have not been met, as their approaches have not been suited to the Indonesian environment and not received political support from Indonesian Muslims. During the civil war in Ambon, Hasan also studied Laskar Jihad, which became one of the elements promoting Salafism in Indonesia (Hasan 2006).

Din Wahid also performed research in Indonesia on Salafist groups (Wahid 2015), focusing much of his research on *pesantren*, which he classified as Salafi. According to Wahid's research, Salafist boarding schools prioritize worship

activities that they consider more in harmony with the Qur'an and Sunnah, and thus with Islamic law. Such schools' view Indonesian Muslims' worship as still intertwined with non-Islamic practices. It is also said to be a heretical (deviant from the pure teachings of Islam) because it is has influences from Hindu culture.

Buehler (2013) examines the Salafist political movement, which engages in a variety of political actions by advocating the implementation of Islamic law rules in a number of Indonesian provinces. Buechler's research of sharia legislation reveals an interesting political compromise between local elites and elite politicians. Politicians from both Islamic and religious parties are involved. Parties with the support of local elites and business people advocated for the introduction of sharia norms since they gained financial and popularity, allowing them to gain voter support during elections. This is regarded as part of the democratic process (Buehler et al. 1998; Buehler and Muhtada 2016).

Arifianto (2020) investigated the presence of Salafi groups and other organizations deemed to be extremist as an essential component of the rise of Indonesian Islam. According to Arifianto, the rise of Indonesian Islam resulted in fanaticism during the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. Salafist, extremist, and extreme Islamic organizations influenced Indonesian Islam in the public domain, carrying out diverse activities on campuses, in communities, and in mosques. Because of the democratic atmosphere of Indonesian Islamic society, Salafist Islamists have a profound and extensive influence in the country's Islamic community, as democratic politics supports even anti-electoral democracy movements.

Articles and studies of Salafism focus on several points. First, Salafism is viewed as a response to the state, which is thought to have marginalized Muslims throughout the New Order. Second, Salafism is understood as a movement for purifying worship among movements such as Muhammadiyah and NU in Java, which is considered to not reflect the primary references of Islam—namely the Qur'an and Sunnah. Third, Salafism is understood as a movement for purification of worship and fiqh Islamic movements such as Muhammadiyah and NU in Java, which is considered no longer in accordance with the primary references, namely the Qur'an and Sunnah. Therefore, Salafism is here to purify the worship and jurisprudence of Muslims. This article emphasizes that the Salafism movement in Kepakisan can be described as a reactionary *da'wah* and political movement that has seized economic resources to strengthen itself in broader *da'wah*, politics, and society at large. As such, the Salafism movement in rural areas has received broad support, particularly among those facing difficulties or financial trouble.

This study has several goals. First, it seeks to investigate the rise of Salafism in a Wonosobo community following the fall of the New Order. Second, it seeks to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Salafi movement's activities and public reactions to them. The author uses explanatory qualitative research methods, relying on interpretation of field data and the expressions of informants to understand what is available and link various indicators. Data was also collected through a review of the literature, which was used to map the research on Salafism in Indonesia (specifically in Java). In addition, between May–June 2020, the authors conducted

field observations over the course of one month in the village of Kepalkisan, Dieng, Wonosobo, to directly observe the Salafi movement's activities. The author also conducted in-depth interviews with informants from the Salafi movement (as well as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama). These interviews dealt with a variety of topics relating to Salafism, including their political, economic, and religious behavior. The author then categorized the data and conducted an analysis using the theoretical framework.

B. The Characteristics of Salafi Movements

Discussion of Salafism in Indonesia cannot be separated from the acceleration of modernization and development through the Five-Year Development Planning Program (better known as PELITA), one of the early New Order's most touted policies. Through PELITA, the Indonesian government was able to improve literacy rates by building schools throughout the Indonesian Archipelago. This was supported by massive efforts to develop the nation's infrastructure, both in the cities and in rural areas. Bridges, roads, health facilities, education facilities, and other infrastructure all contributed importantly to transforming Indonesia's urbanites into rational and modern beings (Hasan 2006).

A detailed understanding of Salafism and its characteristics facilitates the analysis and understanding of the movement. As stated by Wictorowicz, when discussing global Salafism, the categories "moderate", "radical", and "extreme" are commonly used (Hadiz and Robison 2012). Likewise, Schmid notes that many Salafi movements have been categorized as radical/extremist and associated with

terror and violence (Schmid 2013). However, such categories cannot be readily applied when analyzing Salafism in Indonesia. Some Salafis act as individuals, spreading their teachings and morality through sermons. At the same time, Salafi organizations such as Jamaah Tabligh teach their specific understandings of piety to their members and communities through structured means. As a result of globalization and transnational Islam, Indonesian Salafism is highly diverse—including in its response to social change, (Teik and Hadiz 2010).

This can be seen, for instance, in the rise of Salafism in Kepakisan, Wonosobo, in the late 1990s. Under the influence of globalization, the village became an open class society where traditional cultural boundaries were broken down (Von Holy and Lindsay 2006). Taking advantage of local and international political opportunity structures, Salafis were able to freely and collectively express their symbolic identity (Mahmood 2006). They presented their religious identities in new ways, including in their clothing. Men, for example, began to wear robes (*jalabiyyah*), keep beards (*lihyah*), and avoid pants that reached above their ankles (*isbal*). Women, meanwhile, began to wear loose, dark clothing, as well as full veils (*niqab*) (AM 2015)

Although Salafism has become widespread in Indonesia, especially in Java, there have remained tensions between Salafis and local communities that continue to adhere to traditional beliefs and uphold the status quo. Nevertheless, at the grassroots level, Salafism has found significant acceptance within the rural communities that have long been identified as strictly adhering to traditional culture, even as they are

underdeveloped and impoverished. Azra, writes that the success of Salafism and similar transnational Islamic movements lies in its ability to transform adherents' understandings of Islamic doctrine. These movements' transnational ideals have become contextualized, vernacularized, and even indigenized (Azra 2009).

Unlike the transnational movement Ikhwanul Muslimin, which used political instruments and organizations—in Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) (Wahid 2015) the Salafi movement in Kepakisan has not been associated with any particular political party. Rather, it has been influenced primarily by local contestations through which merchants, entrepreneurs, and brokers have attempted to control the village economy. Interestingly, Salafism first emerged in Kepakisan as a result of sermons in the local prayer rooms, which became used as an arena for ideological, political, and economic contestation. As such, this local approach to Salafism is distinct from that recognized by the literature.

This study differs from existing research, thus, in that the Salafi movement in Kepakisan, Wonosobo, has been driven by economic and political factors from the beginning (Hasan 2009a). It has been economic, because it has been driven by merchants and by brokers. At the same time, it has been political, being promoted by village officials—including the village chief (*lurah*) Supoyo Raharjo, who had previously gained recognition as a religious leader. After one of Jafar Umar Thalib's students was granted permission to preach at the local mosque, Salafi activities advanced rapidly. However, after the village chief left office, the Salafi movement lost its main political supporter,

and activities became less common (Al Qurtuby 2015). Nevertheless, this article will show that Salafism has continued to exist, even without broad political support.

The dual issues of Salafism and radicalism have received much attention in Indonesia. Discourses have been informed heavily by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Meijer 2009); the Bali Bombings of 2002; the bombing of the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels in 2003; the attack on the Australian Embassy in 2004; the Bali Bombings of 2005; and the attack on Thamrin, Sudirman, in 2016 (Colombijn 2018). In these cases, the perpetrators were rapidly identified as jihadis whose beliefs and appearances reflected those of Salafism (Sidel 2006, 4).

In Kepakisan, Wonosobo, understandings of Salafism have generally been moderate, rather than extreme or violent. Nevertheless, the economic and political activities undertaken by Salafi activists in the village have been oriented towards realizing cultural, political, and economic change while simultaneously wielding and maintaining power. Initially, Salafism in the village was focused more on *da'wah*, drawing inspiration from Ja'far Umar Thalib (Hasan and et.all 2019). Over time, however, it has become increasingly political as community members have competed to control economic spaces and wield political power (Umam 2006). In this, it differs little from the Salafism that is found throughout Indonesia (Al Qurtuby 2020).

C. Kepakisan: A Contested Arena

Kepakisan is a village in the Dieng Highlands, Wonosobo Regency. It lies approximately 30 kilometers

from Wonosobo City, the capital of the regency, a distance that requires ninety minutes to travel by car. The journey takes drivers along steep and winding roads, overlooking rice paddies as well as fields of potatoes, carrots, cabbage, and celery. Many large houses line the road to Kepakisan, as well as elementary schools and mosques.

Kepakisan is located along the border between Wonosobo and Banjarnegara, where many tourists travel in search of green fields and high mountains. Fog forms readily in the fresh mountain air. Nearby is the Sileri Crater, a major tourist destination that has many myths associated with it. It is said, for example, that people have drowned in the crater after insulting the Islamic beliefs of the local people. Traditionally, Kepakisan has been closely associated with Muhammadiyah, as evidenced by the presence of schools, mosques, and microfinance institutions associated with the organization. Being located in the Dieng Highlands, Kepakisan has a natural beauty that readily draws the eye. One would not expect Salafism to have found fertile ground in this village.

The residents of Kepakisan are very pious, remembering to do their worship even in the fields. Before leaving home in the morning, they prepare their meals as well as the items needed for their *dhuhur* and *ashar* prayers. After returning home from the fields, they do their domestic chores and then rest. When communal religious activities are held, they are welcomed enthusiastically; few are willing to miss worship.

According to data from the Kepakisan District, Kepakisan had a population of 2,975 in 2019, distributed amongst 790 families in four neighborhood associations (*rukun warga*) and fifteen neighborhoods (*rukun tetangga*). The village covers an

area of 562,882 hectares, divided into four hamlets; a third of the village is used for agricultural purposes. Homes are built close together, with little space between them. According to demographic data, and following the categories of Indonesian Islam offered by Geertz (while admitting the valid criticism of his theories (Burhani 2017), the people of Kepakisan are mostly adherents of *santri* Islam.

Historically, the residents of Kepakisan were mostly adherents of *abangan* Islam. Before the arrival of Islam, they had mostly followed the Hindu–Buddhist traditions that permeated the Dieng Highlands. As in other areas of Java, nature, myth, and the supernatural—including guardian spirits—have played important roles in traditional spirituality (Bruinessen 2015; Robert 1987). Significant changes occurred, however, after Supoyo Raharjo became the Village Chief of Kepakisan in 2010. In this official capacity, Supoyo promoted what he deemed a "pure" Islam, one with a heavy emphasis on Sharia law and symbols, and consequently challenged the Hindu and Buddhist influences that remained in society. This is interesting to note, as the people of Kepakisan ultimately transformed their beliefs, abandoning syncretic traditions in favor of a "pure" and "modern" Islam (Nashir et al. 2019). Although Muhammadiyah has long been active in the region, it has focused mostly on philanthropic activities (Latief and Nashir 2020) and avoided practical politics (Nashir et al. 2019).

The Muslims of Kepakisan have traditionally been involved in such practices as *Manakiban*, textual recitations (borrowing from the *Mawlid Barzanji*, the Tahlil, and Surah Ya-Sin), and death anniversaries (on the seventh, fortieth,

and hundredth day). Similarly, village cleansing activities have long been practiced, showing how villagers combined Islamic thought with local culture (Hefner 2018b). Over time, however, sermons by Supoyo Raharjo led residents to increasingly abandon such traditions. He taught that Islam should not be blended with local tradition, promoting what has been deemed "pure" Islam (Hefner 2018c). The village's main mosque, Nurul Haq Mosque, provided him with his main pulpit.

Supoyo found success preaching "pure" Islam in part due to the support of Muhammadiyah, the Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam, PERSIS), and the Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam, SI), long-standing organizations with a similar interest in promoting a "pure" Islam (Hefner 2016). Supoyo's close ties with these organizations facilitated his preaching activities. At the same time, he supported the invitation of Muhammad Adib, a student of Jafar Umar Thalib, to preach at the Nurul Haq Mosque. This marked the rise of Salafism in Kepakisan.

Muhammad Adib's sermons were attended by many members of the local community, and he was able to convince audiences by using references to the Qur'an and the Hadiths. The phrase "Return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah" was commonly used in his sermons (Hefner 2016). Over time, as it became evident that Muhammad Adib's religious beliefs differed from those of Muhammadiyah, the organization distanced itself from the preacher. During their sermons, Adib and Supoyo urged audiences to avoid becoming divided by their religious organizations (*ashobiyah*); they argued that one is Muslim, not a Muhammadiyah Muslim, NU Muslim,

PERSIS Muslim, etc. Such understandings became common among the people of Kepakisan. However, after Supoyo left office, contestation has become increasingly intense; Adib, the main proponent of Salafism in the village, has lost the political and economic resources needed to dominate the community's religious discourses.

D. The Rise of Salafism in Kepakisan

The emergence and development of Salafi thought in Kepakisan cannot be separated from Muhammad Adib, a student of Jafar Umar Thalib who first taught Salafism in the village. Raised in a family of NU members, Adib had previously studied at the NU-affiliated Berjan al-Nawawi Pesantren in Purworejo—one of Central Java's most famed Islamic boarding schools. After completing his secondary studies in Purworejo, he moved to Yogyakarta, where he studied mathematics education at the Faculty of Tarbiyah, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic Institute (now the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University). With these qualifications, he began teaching math at a madrasa in Wonosobo City. While living in the regency capital, he also became active as a preacher, in which capacity he became recognized for his skill and his influence.

Adib played an important role in spreading Salafism in Wonosobo, spreading its teachings from mosque to mosque. These understandings were also spread through a monthly magazine, titled *Salafy*, which was distributed to the general public. This magazine, which significantly supported the mission of the Degolan Salafi Institute, was designed in part to challenge the dominance of the magazine *as-Sunnah*, which

was deemed to no longer represent Salafi beliefs. Being heavily involved in this magazine, and with significant support from the people of Wonosobo, Adib and his associates became an important catalyst in the rapid spread of Salafi teachings throughout the regency.

As such, Adib's Salafi teachings spread rapidly throughout urban and rural Wonosobo. His interactions with Mat Thayib, a village leader in Kepakisan and close colleague of Supoyo Raharjo, laid the groundwork for Salafism's introduction to the village. It is through these networks that Muhammad Adib and Supoyo Raharjo were introduced. Learning of their shared vision and mission to eradicate shirk, *takhayyul* (superstition), and *bid'ah* (heresy). Supoyo later recommended that Adib take his position as a preacher. Supoyo became increasingly certain in his beliefs after reading *Salafy*, and began praising Salafism as providing the most comprehensive understanding of Islamic doctrine (Thayib 2019).

Wildan identifies several factors that have contributed to rural Indonesians' ready acceptance of Salafism, a Middle Eastern model of Islam. First, the people of rural Indonesia—especially in Java—are known for their friendliness and openness; *second,* rural peoples tend to emphasize harmony and tolerance in their culture; *third*, rural peoples tend to be more willing to accept new Islamic movements so long as said movements do not contradict their own Islamic traditions; *fourth*, modernization and globalization have made it possible to learn about diverse alternatives, and thus to choose the form best suited to one's interests; and *fifth*, rural peoples often face financial difficulties, which results in them being more likely to join social movements (Wildan 2013).

In Kepakisan, Salafism has been accepted as it has spread Islamic teachings while simultaneously offering a seemingly logical means of addressing issues: referring to the explicit teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, as understood through *al-Salaf as-Salih* (*al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah 'ala fahm al-salaf al-ummah*). Without this final element, it argues, the teachings and practices of Islam could never be correctly realized. At the same time, Salafism staunchly rejects *taqlīd* (blind adherence to the authority of later ulamas), emphasizing instead the primacy of the Qur'an and the Sunnah in Islamic belief and law (Hasan 2012a). In place of *taqlīd,* Salafism promotes an independent approach to exegesis, considering *ijtihad* the best means of addressing contemporary issues and problems (Meijer 2009).

Salafism's introduction to Kepakisan shows that the Islamic thought of the Middle East, as introduced through modernization and globalization, can cause significant socio-religious transformations even in areas where local traditions and beliefs have been strong (Rohmana 2019). Historically, the religious beliefs, morals, and practices of Kepakisan, a village located in an isolated part of the Dieng Highlands, have differed significantly from those of Salafism. For decades, the Islamic Reform promoted by Supoyo Raharjo had little effect on villagers' Islamic identities. However, once Salafism took root, it established a theological perspective and socio-political reality that challenged the longstanding traditions of the village; a similar phenomenon has been noted in Lombok (Sila 2020). As such, the rise of Salafism in Kepakisan can be understood as a continuation of the Islamic reform led and promoted by Supoyo Raharjo in his capacity as a religious

leader. It differed predominantly in its offering of new forms of religiosity and alternative symbols of identity.

The growth of Salafism in Kepakisan over the past decade is also inexorably tied to the community's success in teaching *d'ai* to spread its views (Chaplin 2020). After Muhammad Adib left the village to focus on managing the Ta'dhimus Sunnah Pesantren in Wonosobo City, several new preachers have taken his place. Many of these young Salafis, having received scholarships to study at the largest Salafi *pesantren* in Java, have obtained the understanding of Salafi doctrine and aptitude for preaching necessary to ensure the community's continued regeneration (Chaplin 2018). They are locally born, having been raised in Kepakisan's Salafi community, and thus know the village's particular needs and feel responsible for its continued wellbeing. Among the most prominent of these young *d'ai* are Arif, Musa, Ra'uf, and Kurnia. Arif studied under Ustadz Muslim Abu Ishaq at the al-Furqan Pesantren in Kroya, Cilacap; Musa was a student of Ustadz Muhammad Umar as-Sewed at Dhiya as-Sunnah Pesantren, Cirebon; Ra'uf learned from Ustadz Luqman Ba'abduh at the as-Salafy Pesantren in Jember; and Kurnia studied under Ustadz Affifuddin at al-Bayyinah Pesantren in Gresik before traveling to Yemen to continue his studies (Woodward 2017).

E. Conclusion

The development of Salafism in rural Java, as shown by the case of Kepakisan, cannot be separated from the political and economic transformations that have accompanied Indonesia's political reform and the ongoing process of globalization. The spread of Salafism is strongly driven by the

desire to consolidate political and economic power; however, as the movement presents itself primarily as a religious one, this motivation is not readily recognized. Likewise, the rise of Salafism in Indonesia has been inexorably intertwined with the political reforms implemented in the country since the collapse of the New Order in 1998. As Indonesia became increasingly democratic, new political and Islamic movements began vying to dominate public spaces, finding particularly fertile soil in the rural parts of the archipelago.

Many elites have integrated themselves into Indonesia's Salafi movements, including in rural Java. Such elites' efforts to control public religious discourses while simultaneously establishing new enclaves must be considered when exploring global Salafism. At the same time, the ideological motivations that underpin the Salafi movement must also be considered. Local and global motives intertwine, with the ultimate goal of replacing Indonesia's economic and political system with an Islamist one that is capable of protecting the nation from the destruction wrought by global capitalism.

The contestation between religious organizations and actors in rural Java has occurred, in part, as globalization has made it possible for transnational Islamism to spread around the world. Several of Indonesia's nascent Islamic movements trace their roots to the Middle East, be it to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or Iran, and their messages have resonated significantly in rural Java—including in Wonosobo, Central Java. It is because of this resonance that global Salafism has grown rapidly in Indonesia.

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