

**REVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC PROSELYTIZING ORGANIZATION:  
From Islamism to Moderate**

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**Abstract**

*The Student Islamic proselytizing Organization (LDK) became a machine of cadre forming and expansion for Islamic political movements, Ikhwanul Muslimim (Muslim Brotherhood) and Hizbut Tahrir to achieve their ideological ambitions. These movements were believed to have harmful threat for Islamic moderate in Indonesia. Therefore, the adherents of Islamic moderate at IAIN were trying to take over LDK IAIN Salatiga from Ikhwanul Muslimin. This study aimed to describe and analyze revolutionary movement and its development in shaping moderate LDK networking. This study used descriptive qualitative method. The data were taken from the study of literature, interview and field observation. Research findings showed that taking over LDK IAIN Salatiga by moderate group was started with shaping LDK Nusantara as a means to form*

*cadres. Having been successful in taking over LDK IAIN Salatiga, it then went out from the networking of LDK Ikhwanul Muslimin and planned to establish moderate LDK networking among universities which was called FKKDKN (Communication Forum for-in Campus Islamic proselytizing a whole Archipelago/Nusantara). This article is expected to inspire moderate movements on campuses believed to be machine to form cadres of Islamic political movement and radicalism.*

**Keywords:** LDK, Islamisme, Islamic Moderate, Revolutionary Movement.

## **A. Introduction**

Islamism is a global issue that emerged along with Islamism ideological proliferation throughout the world via transnational movement. Many Islamic countries in the world possess such movement. Egypt, for example, experienced Islamic movement along with the revolution and strong civil society movement (Berman, 2003). Likewise in Tunisia, Islamism emerged along with the country's transition (Zeghal, 2013). Pakistan also experienced the similar change where Islamism gave tremendous effect creating an outstanding Sunni militancy (Nasr, 2000).

In Indonesian context, the development of Islamism is so massive that various movements have lasted over the past four decades. Even today, the Islamism movement is increasingly strengthened in the lives of Indonesian society and carried out massive contestation in the lives, both structurally and culturally. The four decades were not a short journey. The first two decades was a period of underground struggle. They oriented towards cadres production at university level and strengthened them by intensifying the understanding and direction of the struggle to be the future pillar for this Islamic movement. This movement was called Student Islamic Proselytizing Organization (LDK). Thus, the LDK was born along with the Islamic movement at universities.

The last two decades was blatant struggle along with the

fall of New Order dominance that restrained them ideologically. This blatant endeavour continued with the LDK movement at some universities or with the formation of new organizations for activists outside the campus.

The preservation of LDK movement on campus was carried out more intensively by integrating LDK as part of the intra-campus activities with full support from the university. While the after-university action was carried out by forming social and political organizations as a forum to manage their effort. The group affiliated with *Jamaah Tarbiyah* formed The Action Group of Indonesian Moslem Student (KAMMI) and political parties that participate in Indonesian general election, namely the Justice Party which later known as Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). While LDK alumni affiliated with *Hizbut Tahrir* later became activists and leaders of *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) that always politically oriented even though it is out of the system available in Indonesia. These two organizations are the exponents of LDK alumni to continue the struggle from each group. So, it is clear that the period of open struggle was the massive movement period with LDK network on campus, as well as political organizations as the goals of their struggle.

Through this four decades movement, the Islamic religious life in Indonesia broke down into two groups, namely Islamist and moderate movement. Islamists always attack not only the ideology, but also the practice, tradition and even place of worship of its opponent. Many Islamic-based mosques were threatened with their ideological weapons, which were purely Islamic in accordance with *salafusshalih* life which was not contaminated by tradition and culture. Even the movement of pure Islam restoration was encouraged and was used to attack the worship practice of accultural tradition. The results were amazing. Many changes happened to religious life of the society, especially in millennial generations in the name of "*hijrah*".

In practical political life, many generations of underground Islamists period become crucial figures and political patrons

that persist on attacking traditionalist-moderate groups, both in political contestation and in the ideological debates. This was the result of their movement for the first two decades, so in the past two decades they were able to influence the Muslims' lives.

Cultural domain also significantly changed. Many platforms were controlled by Islamists, such as social, printed and electronic media, and the spread of Islamist books as millennial generations' literature. These all were the form of massive Islamist movement; surprisingly, it was originated from only one movement, which was proselytizing movement on campus in the form of LDK. As a result, with the first two decades, they were able to carry out massive and blatant movements and directly attacked traditional-moderate groups leading them to master the Islamic movement in Indonesia. As a matter of fact, traditional moderates are both defenders of Indonesia's moderate Islamic movement and also *Pancasila* ideology which is the antithesis of Islamist ideology. From this case, counter movement was established. There were discourse, movement and expansion that were carried out continuously by these two groups. Each of them conducted controversial movements, and the last thing was a new and interesting thing to study, namely the controversial movement of LDK.

What moderate Islamic groups did among the students of IAIN Salatiga by forming LDK Nusantara was one form of this movement. They were aware that LDK was based of massive production of Islamist generations. For this reason, they formed LDK Nusantara as the counterpart of Islamists LDK. The battle between Islamists and moderate Islam was started, namely proselytizing institution on campus. Then, what is LDK Nusantara like? What do the revolutionary movement they run? What is the impact of the movement on life of proselytizing on campus? These are the focus of this study. The aims of this study are to form an understanding related to LDK Nusantara, its formation, and its targets that will be achieved by carrying out the revolutionary movement.

To discuss the problems, this study is narrated qualitatively

by collecting data, information and sources from the field. The data were collected from information and sources in the field combined with related literary studies. The main object of this research is the dynamics of LDK organization at IAIN Salatiga which is central to this revolutionary movement. From the collected data, the writer categorized, classified, reduced, analyzed, and then interpreted it within research problem context. This was done in order to obtain conclusions in accordance with the research problems that have been stated.

## **B. LDK Movement: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

The discussion of LDK Movement is not new; many researches have been done on this matter. It usually focuses on three main groups, which are: *Jamaah Tarbiyah*, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, and *Jamaat Salafi*. The previous related studies were conducted by Taufani (Taufani, 2014), Kasinyo Harto at Unsri Palembang (Harto, 2008), Ilyya Muhsin at UNS Surakarta (Muhsin, 2016), Syamsul Arifin in Malang (S. Arifin, 2005), Flavius Floris Andries at Mosques of UGM and UIN Sunan Kalijaga (Andries, 2012), Arief Ihsan Rathomy (Rathomy, 2007) and Moch Muhtarom (Muhtarom, 2009).

There are also studies related to genealogy of Islamist movement which were conducted by Imdadun Rahmat (I. M. Rahmat, 2008), Haedar Nashir (Nashir, 2007) and Zuly Qodir (Qodir, 2013). The specific discussion of each movement such as PKS was discussed by Mathias Diederich (Mathias, 2002), Imdadun Rahmat (I. M. Rahmat, 2008), and Burhanuddin Muhtadi (Muhtadi, 2012). HTI movement was reviewed by Rakhmat Nur Hakim (Hakim, 2014) putting emphasis on its activity in Surabaya. Ilyya Muhsin discussed about social movement of HTI in Yogyakarta (Muhsin, 2012) while Masdar Hilmy specifically discussed about HTI movement transnationally (Hilmy, 2011) .

In relation with this Islamist movement, the latest pivotal research was carried out in UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta Postgraduate program focusing on the Islamist literacy movement (Hasan, 2018). Agus Iswanto also conducted the same investigation, he specifically discussed about ideology in religious literature of *da'wah* activists in ITB Bandung (Iswanto, 2017). While Alexander R. Arifianto focused on the discussion of propaganda teachings on campus, whether it conveyed radicalism or moderate (Arifianto, 2018).

The elaboration asserts that this research is a new study highlighting on the on-going process, not a permanent one. Therefore, this research has both novelty and subjectivity in the discussion, but still within the corridor of objective research rules. Novelty in this case suggests that this study is a new study attempting to produce new facts, while subjectivity here indicates that there are subjective interpretations of the writer in understanding the facts. Interpretation and conclusion of this study are still based on the principles of scientific and objective research; it is about LDK revolution from Islamism to moderate

Islamism itself shows that there is an active piety in some aspects of life (Bayat, 2005). More specifically, Islamism is a contemporary action regarding Islam as a political ideology. Therefore, the phenomenon of Islamic movement struggles for Islam as a political ideology and is more practical in political institution from the term that Islam is a political ideology as religion (Roy, 1994). Since it makes Islam as a political ideology, the exponents of Islamist ideology certainly fight for Islam as a political ideology. This is the antithesis of *Pancasila* ideology adopted by Indonesia and championed by moderate Islamic groups.

According to Muhammad Ali, moderate Islam is those who do not share the hard-line visions and actions (Ali, 2007). In other word, Ali states that moderate Islam refers to the Islamic

community that stressing on normal behaviour (*tawasuth*) implementing religious teachings they uphold; they are tolerant to different opinion, avoid violence, and prioritize thinking and dialogue as a strategy. Religious method of this way is the majority in Indonesia.

According to Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia is a country of moderate Islam (Wahid, 2006). Even more specifically, Azyumardi Azra asserts that Indonesia Islam is Islam with a smiling face, full of peace and moderate, so there is no problem with plurality, democracy, human rights and other tendencies in the modern world (Azra, 2003). From this point, it is expected to have a moderate religious attitude, which aims at developing the interpretation of religious texts in a peaceful religious language, polite, and wise, so the orientation of religiosity does not stop to solely having a religion, it is more important than that, namely to be more religious (Ali, 2003). This is the main concept of moderate Islam.

Terminologically, the word 'moderatism' is hard to interpret since it has different point of view based on each context and capacity (Hilmy, 2013). Masdar Hilmy points out the concept of moderatism in the context of Indonesian Islam has characteristics as follows; 1) non-violent ideology in propagating Islam; 2) adopting the modern way of life with its all derivatives, including science, technology, human rights, democracy, and the like; 3) using logical way of thinking; 4) applying contextual approach in comprehending Islam, and; 5) the utilization of *ijtihad* (intellectual exercises to make a legal opinion in case of the explicit justification absence from the Qur'an and Hadith). Those characteristics can be expanded into several more characteristics such as tolerance, cooperation and harmony among distinguished religious groups (Hilmy, 2013).

From this elaboration, it is known that Islamism and moderatism in Islamic religion diversity are different matters, even though it was quoted from the same source. As a result, it emerged

a battle between the two, in terms of its application in Indonesian context. This was perceived during the reformation era, where ideological Islamic groups turned into powerful strengths with various movements undertaken by them, in accordance with vision and mission of their respective groups. *Jamaah Tarbiyah* manifested itself in the strength of Justice Party which later turned into Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Their movement followed the movement system available in Indonesia in the political area. This was also supported by KAMMI and LDK movements on campus which kept producing generations of *Tarbiyah* and supplied cadres for PKS and KAMMI.

Likewise, *Hizbut Tahrir*, in reformation era, formed *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) organization which developed massively on media, on their exponents that spread massively, and also at every moment they held for the establishment of *Khilafah Islam*. They take action out of the system in Indonesia, because they assumed that the system in Indonesia is an infidel system which is not based on Islamic system.

The group fighting for Islamic ideology was born and developed massively. It began from LDK establishment in 1980. It started producing cadres, and spreading their ideology until the end of New Order behind the closed doors. Thus, the LDK movement of ideological Islamic groups was a collective social movement. The collective behaviour was carried out to achieve the desired goals by confronting their opponent. This is what Quintan Wiktorowicz called as Islamic activism. Wiktorowicz states that Islamic activism is the mobilization of hostility to support the interests and goals of Muslims (Wiktorowicz, 2012).

Wiktorowicz suggests that the term “Islamic activism” is defined broadly and inclusively. Thus, the understanding of Islamic activism includes a variety of feuds that often arise on behalf of “Islam”, including proselytizing movements, terrorist groups, collective behaviours coming from Islamic symbols and identities, political movements trying to establish an Islamic state, and inner-oriented

groups that bring Islamic spirituality through collective efforts (Wiktorowicz, 2012).

This Islamic activism naturally emerged as a form of strong collective identity to determine the decisions taken by the actors and how they adjusted their activities toward situation that changed continuously (Melucci, 1996). This collective identity was also driven by utilizing networks, so this collective identity could have great power. This network could be formal, hierarchical or informal social networks (Hasan, 2008). In this context, Islamism could be identified as a social movement resulting from dynamic struggle (Bayat, 2005). This could be seen from the very dynamic LDK movement, pointing out their capability to spread its movement network to a wider domain, such as PKS, KAMMI, HTI, and many other movement organs that they have.

From the process of activism of LDK movement of ideological Islamic groups, it is an antithesis with the ideology developed in Indonesia, namely the ideology of *Pancasila*. When viewed from the context of Islamic religion, the Islamic ideology which is puritanical, exclusive, and even conservative also becomes antithesis with the concept of moderate Islam developed by the majority of Islam in Indonesia. Moreover, this ideological Islamic movement is a transnational movement that probably will not develop if applied in Indonesia. There will be costs that must be paid when the transnational movement grows in Indonesia with its exclusive and puritanical movement. It is caused by Indonesia diversity nature, including with its various ethnics, religions, races, traditions and cultures. As a result, moderate Islamic groups carried out a counter-movement by holding a revolutionary movement revolting this ideological Islamic movement. In this context is LDK Nusantara movement.

In its movement, LDK Nusantara carried out a social movement in a revolutionary way, namely to destroy the old social order and replace it with the new one (Locher, 2002). Hence, LDK

Nusantara movement moves by carrying out total revolutionary changes. The goal is to entirely transform LDK society's ideology, from Islamic-exclusive to moderate. To reach this goal, LDK Nusantara also carries out Islamic activism, it is exactly the same as what had been done by LDK of ideological Islamic group.

### **C. LDK: Base of Ideological Islamic Nursery**

Campus proselytizing Institute (LDK) is basically the main pillar of Islamic proselytization in campus life. Its existence is very important to foster Islamic spirituality on campus, especially at public universities which are lack in religion. The forerunner of its existence has been known since the 1970s.

The *dakwah kampus* appeared in the early 1970s at Salman Mosque of Bandung Institute of Technology, but did not spread substantially until the crackdown on political student movement that had resisted Suharto's re-election in 1978. This time, Islamism provided alternative activity to political movement. Without a doubt, their religious cause was first encouraged by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and, later, by intensifying its propagation from Middle East, especially, from Saudi Arabia, seeking to counter the Shiah influence. Indonesia; thus, got involved both in a global Islamic surge and in contests among various international Islamic groups (Miichi, 2003).

Due to the policy of Campus Life Normalization by the New Order government in 1978, campus political life was tightly controlled by the government. It was not allowed to hold political activities on campus dying down the political activity of campus proselytizing movement.

On campuses, alternative religious-political currents commenced to develop from the early 1980s onwards. The *al-Ihwanul al-Muslimun* (Muslim Brothers) were an important source of inspiration for them. In addition to Indonesians' adherence of Sunni Islam, it was also the Iranian revolution which had contributed

to this development. Some students were impressed by the fact that an Islamic revolution had been successful in the 20th century. Students made mosques inside and outside campus as one of their few gathering places becoming the head-quarters for seemingly a political *dakwah*-activities (Mathias, 2002). From this case, then the influence of *Ikhwanul Muslimin* and Iran Islamic Revolution was very crucial as inspiration to carry out proselytizing activities on campus.

Apart from that, Indonesian Islamic proselytizing Council (DDII) formed by *Masyumi* leaders in 1967 played an important role (Hasan, 2014). The role of DDII was very crucial because it established a mean of transmission of revivalism movement from Middle East to Indonesia. This happened due to several factors: *first*, DDII was the first Islamic institution that seriously and organically organized students' despatch to the Middle East before Ministry of Religion took this role. The alumni of Middle East education were the main actors in spreading Islamic revivalism movement in Indonesia, especially the *Tarbiyah* Movement and *Da'wah Salafi*. *Second*, DDII and Muhammad Natsir were also the initiators of the establishment of the Islamic and Arabic Science Institute (LIPIA) which was a branch of Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh. The alumni of this university became the agent for *Salafi* movement and the important actors among *Tarbiyah* Movement. *Third*, DDII also put initial foundation of the campus proselytizing movement with the *Mujahid Dakwah* training program at Salman Mosque of ITB. This movement was the pioneer of the emergence of the *Tarbiyah* Movement (PKS) *Hizbut Tahrir*, and it contributed significantly to the development of the *Salafi* movement. *Fourth*, DDII also played an indirect role in translating the groundbreakers' works on the Middle East Islamic revivalism movement into Bahasa Indonesia (Rahmat, 2009).

Finally, the transnational movement came to Indonesia through campus by following the proselytizing method practiced

by *Ikhwanul Muslimin*. Terms such as *halaqah*, *usrah*, and the way of dressing and behaving of *Ikhwanul Muslimin's* style started to appear on campus life. From this starting point, LDK was established (Azra, 2000). In many of Indonesian universities, the establishment of local LDK branches dated back to the 1980s (Mathias, 2002).

Campus proselytizing movement firstly began at Salman Mosque ITB, where the role of Imaduddin Abdul Rahim was very significant in drafting the concept of Islamic materials at campus mosques (Rahmat, 2009). This concept then became a model and developed at campus mosques in Indonesia (Abdul Aziz, 1989). From this phenomenon, LDK was institutionalized with *Ikhwanul Muslimin* as the movement and understanding references. *Tarbiyah* movement was also established here as part of their affiliation toward *Ikhwanul Muslimin*.

The next chapter, Hizbut Tahrir which was centrally located in Jordan came to Indonesia brought by M. Mustofa and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi in 1982-1983(Rahmat, 2009). With *halaqah* system, *Hizbut Tahrir* instilled its thoughts to students. Thus, from this point *Hizbut Tahrir's* ideology developed along with the development of campus proselytizing movement.

It was *Jamaah Tarbiyah* and *Hizbut Tahrir* that became the sources of Islamic ideology on campus. Students' Islamism at prominent universities in Indonesia also appeared and later became the leaders for their movement. With intensive and continuous regeneration, it would create leaders who were then became the great figures of *Tarbiyah* in Indonesia. The establishment of *Jamaah Tarbiyah* certainly could not be separated from the role of two factors, namely DDII with LIPIA and *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (IM). DDII and LIPIA played a role in developing LDK on campuses. In addition, IM influenced *Tarbiyah* in terms of establishing political and religious point of view by studying IM figures' thought. The products of National Conference of IM, as well as the thought of Shaykh Hasan Al-Banna and other IM figures were studied by

cadres of *Tarbiyah* (M. I. Rahmat, 2009).

LDK then formed a network called Campus Proselytizing Gathering Forum (FSLDK) which became the *Tarbiyah* network for Indonesian universities alumni. FSLDK formed KAMMI, and KAMMI formed a political party called PK which then transformed into PKS.

*Hizbut Tahrir* was established and developed due to the enthusiasm of LDK. Just like *Tarbiyah*, *Hizbut Tahrir* also developed in the form of gathering (*halaqah*) in campus mosques. The difference was that *Hizbut Tahrir* explored the thoughts of its figures, especially the idea from Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani (Rahmat, 2009). This idea was then developed on campus and carried out intensively and cooperatively through the network of Coordination Board of Campus Proselytizing Institute (BKLDK).

The success of *Tarbiyah* and *Hizbut Tahrir* certainly could not be separated from the role of DDII which developed LDK. Even though *Jamaah Tarbiyah* and HTI had their own ideological and genealogical thought, DDII was able to play a role as *umm al-radha'ah* for both movements (Rahmat, 2009).

The generations were formed massively and structurally, but it was cultural in the form of campus proselytizing which lasted nearly two decades. Along with the collapse of New Order, the political phenomenon on campus was ended. The freedom of having political expression among students by bringing an Islamic ideology was unstoppable. From this matter, *Jamaah Tarbiyah* managed to form a political party that enlivened the national political map after the New Order, namely Justice Party which later metamorphosed into the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and also KAMMI as a political mean for students.

*Hizbut Tahrir*, which at first acted in discretion, after the collapse of New Order, moved openly. With the strength of militant mass base, they took a strategy of interacting with the people openly and at the same time they carried out social and political criticism and introduced that the only solution was by establishing

*khilafah Islamiyah*. In Indonesian context, HTI found its momentum. Depravity and deterioration in all aspect experienced by Indonesia encouraged HTI to continue the establishment of Islamic law. According to HTI, the multidimensional crisis that hit Indonesia was caused by the secular system used to implement secular laws of human (Muhsin, 2012).

From the explanation above, the presence of *Jamaah Tarbiyah* and HTI as ideological Islamic exponents in Indonesia was born due to their mass production for more than four decades. Four decades was not a short time, so no wonder if Islamic ideological movement had developed so fast in recent lives of millennial. If this issue keeps persisting, it will certainly provides a great counterpart for the ideology of *Pancasila*. In the perspective of Islamic religiosity, this also serves as the counterpart to moderates Islam. This is what we should consider in the context of diversity and nationality in Indonesia.

#### **D. LDK Revolution: From Islamism to Moderate**

From the beginning, LDK of IAIN Salatiga, or commonly known as LDK *Fathir Ar-Rasyid* was controlled by FSLDK network. Thus, IAIN Salatiga became a massive production base for *Tarbiyah* members. For this reason, in the context of conducting counterparts to this mass production, the younger generation of moderate Islam group at IAIN Salatiga did controversial movement against LDK of *Tarbiyah* group. They established what so called LDK Nusantara. This was established because of the concern of LDK as one of student organizations on campus that received fund and facilities and was controlled by *Tarbiyah* group with Islamic ideology. This was ironic, considering the high education, especially in public state universities, was a part of government. So, indirectly the government had facilitated the movements that ideologically opposing the ideology from the government.

According to the Chairman of LDK Nusantara, M. Fauzil

Adhim, there was injustice when LDK *Fatir Ar-Rasyid* of IAIN Salatiga, which normally should be a neutral organization, was controlled by Islamists. Moreover, there was intervention from outsiders, namely *Tarbiyah* alumni group, such as in the selection process of LDK chairman, in the group discussions, and in the appointment of the speakers and in the process of designing the curriculum (Adhim, 2018).

From this phenomenon, M. Fauzil Adhim argued that LDK should be neutral and cannot be interfered by certain groups with contradict ideology from the nation (Adhim, 2018). The case which happened at IAIN Salatiga showed that new students who were accepted at IAIN from *madrassa*, Islamic Boarding School and traditional communities with NU backgrounds did not realize that LDK was the production of *Tarbiyah* cadres. They said it was just common student organization, so they joined as members. As a result, they were indoctrinated by following the *liqa* and *halaqah*. They were also influenced by *Tarbiyah's* dressing style, curriculum, and way of thinking. The students with NU backgrounds did not get a systematic cadre from NU organization, so their NU was lost and turned into *Tarbiyah* (Arifin, 2018).

The students from NU background consolidated at one of Islamic Boarding Schools in Salatiga. At the first meeting, there were only 9 people, and then the next meeting there were 35 people. In the meeting they discussed about mapping of LDK on campus. LDK, FSLDK, KAMMI and PKS were under one supervision namely *Jamaah Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin*. *Jamaah Tarbiyah* firstly came to Indonesia from the LDK establishment on campus. To facilitate LDK members consolidation, LDK founded FSLDK. The tenth meeting of FSLDK, which took place in Malang, established KAMMI which later founded Justice Party before it finally transformed into Prosperity Justice Party (PKS). New students who joined LDK must follow activity called *liqa*. They were unconsciously following *Tarbiyah* process of regeneration. They got *Tarbiyah's* curriculum,

ideology, and culture. Surprisingly, their teacher was an outsider, the *Tarbiyah* alumni, so it was obvious that there was intervention in LDK (Arifin, 2018). As a result, students who initially had NU backgrounds, they gradually became PKS cadres. Starting from that issue, some members realized that NU students should make their own LDK, and then they established LDK Nusantara (Arifin, 2018).

Secretary of LDK Nusantara, Awaliyah states LDK Nusantara is an external organization aiming to make NU students aware of LDK and political map of Islamist movement on campus (Awaliyah, 2018). *LDK Nusantara* also has regeneration which is made similar to that of on campus LDK. Its name is *LDK Nusantara Cadre School*. This cadre is made systematically, beginning with filling out the registration forms to recording the identity of new members and following the discussion with material and presenters from lecturers whose background is NU.

*LDK Nusantara Cadre School* is a medium of character building which is specially designed for NU students, alumni of Islamic Boarding School, alumni of NU-based MA/SMA/SMK who are active in LDK IAIN Salatiga. The goal is to build strong ideological character of LDK activists (*syahada, aqidah, amaliyah, harakah and siyasah*), academically qualified, and well-mannered. *LDK Nusantara Cadre School Model* is designed in the form of small discussion group and big discussion group which are taken care of by lecturers of IAIN Salatiga. Small discussion group is held every two weeks at lecturers' houses or certain places based on agreement, while the big discussion group is held once a month at NU building Salatiga (Awaliyah, 2018).

The curriculum is arranged in detail in accordance with area of study and tendency of lecturers and their students. However, there is a specific curriculum which is generally accepted and must be taught to students, in addition to specific materials in accordance with lecturers' competencies. In order to be systematic and sustainable, they continuously monitor the students during

their study at IAIN Salatiga. They keep supervising and directing the students even though they have reached high level of education. To have global competence, the members are also given language training, especially Arabic and English (Awaliyah, 2018).

From the elaboration above, it is clear that *LDK Nusantara* is a counterpart which is similar to Islamism LDK group. Though, it is an external organization, its movement has strong impact on both organization and regeneration. This all becomes a strong reason to revolutionize LDK at IAIN Salatiga.

Basically, the revolution was begun by replacing the name used by the members of *LDK Nusantara* when compared to Islamists LDK. The name of *Murabbi* was replaced with caretaker, *mutarabbi* was replaced with *santri*, and the term *ikhwan* and *akhwat* were replaced *sahabati-sahabati*.

A small discussion group is attended by 7-9 students with two caretakers, and the students are taught about the importance of political understanding and political mapping in Indonesia. The big discussion group is attended by 40 students. The program starts with singing national anthem of Indonesia, *Yahlal Wathan* song which is popular among NU members, reading *barjanzi*, *tahlilan*, and then presenting the material of discussion. By doing so, the traditions of NU are preserved in every meeting. This is of absolutely different from LDK of Islamism group that increasingly strengthens revolution (Awaliyah, 2018).

By strengthening such organization and regeneration, *LDK Nusantara* is ready to conduct a coup d'état. This was preceded by holding meetings to formulate strategies in order to be able to take over LDK. LDK Nusantara insisted that the discussion was not held in mosque of Campus 1 because it is the basis of Islamic LDK. The discussion was held on campus 2 (Sharia Faculty) which was based on NU so that it could be controlled (Anam, 2018).

The next crucial step to do was how to eliminate the role of syura council which was represented by alumni of *Jamaah Tarbiyah*.

In a great meeting, there were three presidium teams that led the meeting. This presidium teams would lead the meeting, including the amendment of Articles of Association of meeting. The strategy was implemented and the presidium teams were controlled by the members of *LDK Nusantara*. By doing this, the meeting was well-controlled. The main agenda of the meeting was to eliminate syura council because they played a big role and owned the authority in choosing LDK chairman (Anam, 2018).

With the existing condition, the meeting was successful in eliminating syura council. It was because the role of syura council which was not the student of IAIN Salatiga anymore. In addition, in the process of electing the previous LDK chairman, alumni were clearly unfair and undemocratic. They chose the chairman who was in fact losing the election, just because he was close and loyal to *Jamaah Tarbiyah*. From these facts, the syura council was successfully eliminated following LDK and *Tarbiyah* failure to defend it (Anam, 2018).

After syura council elimination, the alumni's intervention toward LDK succession was eliminated either. This was a clear and easy way to conduct revolution. The further strategy was conditioning the election by selecting the chairman in the same night as the election and not in the later day. This was to anticipate alumni's obstruction toward the succession. If it was done at midnight or early morning, the alumni were expected to be reluctant to attend the event. As a result, the succession ran well. In spite of debates, the succession started at 02.00 a.m. and was successfully completed at 04.00 a.m. Finally, Muhammad Tajul Arifin from *LDK Nusantara* won over his rival. He got 59 votes defeating his rival from Islamist LDK who got 23 votes (Arifin, 2018). The succession ran well and democratical for the first time. This also marked the beginning of LDK revolution. This great meeting took place on December 2017 (Arifin, 2018).

### **E. Moderate Islamic Campaign: The Impact of LDK Revolution at IAIN Salatiga**

LDK Revolution at IAIN Salatiga ran well. This was the first step to stop Islamism as well as to re-campaign moderate Islam on campus. Therefore, after the revolution, LDK IAIN Salatiga cut the connection of FSLDK, and FSLDK may not intervene in any activity conducted by LDK IAIN Salatiga. This is so important in order to stop the production of Islamist generation, and at the same time re-campaigning for moderate Islam.

The next important step to do is to establish LDK network of moderate Islam. In this case, *LDK Nusantara* then cooperated with several state and private universities to explore the possibility of making moderate LDK network. From this communication link the representative members of LDK from six universities came to campus II of IAIN Salatiga to discuss about working programs from May 5-6, 2018. The six universities were IAIN Salatiga, UNSIQ Wonosobo, UNISSULA Semarang, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, IAIN Kudus and STAINU Temanggung (Shofiyatun, 2018).

The meeting was intended to discuss several things, which were: *first*, the nomenclature of LDK network of moderate Islam; it was named the Communication Forum of the *Nusantara* Campus Proselytizing Corps (FKKDKN). *Second*, articles arrangement of FKKDKN association. *Third*, election of Teguh Gumelar from UNSIQ Wonosobo as a temporary general leader, Zaky Faiz from LDK UIN Sunan Kalijaga as a coordinator for Yogyakarta area, the general chairman and regional coordinator: the coordinator for *pantura* area is Fauzil Adhim from IAIN Salatiga; and Islah from STAINU Temanggung as the coordinator for Temanggung area. *Fourth*, scheduling for the next meeting which would take place at UNSIQ Wonosobo on September 7-9, 2018 to discuss about the fortification of the organization and movement (Shofiyatun, 2018).

Shofiyatun explains that the day after the meeting, exactly on May 7, 2018, FKKDKN was launched and continued by holding a

national seminar entitled “The Challenges of Campus Proselytizing Institute in Shaping Generations of Moderate Muslim Students and Loving NKRI in Higher Education” at auditorium of Campus 1 IAIN Salatiga (Shofiyatun, 2018). The speaker of the seminar was Dhimas Oky Nugroho, M.Phil., Ph.D (Founder of Fellowship National Cadre) and Najib Kailani, MA., Ph.D (Postgraduate Lecturer of UIN Yogyakarta).

The second meeting of FKKDKN was held on September, 7-9 2018 at campus 1 of UNSIQ Wonosobo, Central Java which was attended by LDK IAIN Salatiga, LDK UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, LDK UNISSULA Semarang, LDK IAIN Kudus, LDK STAINU Temanggung, LDK IAINU Kebumen, and LDK UNSIQ Wonosobo. This meeting was intended to discuss the procedures of the general leader election, Memorandum and Article of Association, Broad Outlines of Organization Policy, and Broad Outlines of Work Policy (Shofiyatun, 2018).

In this second meeting Teguh Gumelar was elected as general leader for period of 2018 – 2020, and decided the regional division of work networking which includes (1) Semarang, (2) Kedu, (3) Yogyakarta. Semarang region consists of LDK IAIN Salatiga, LDK UNISSULA Semarang, and LDK IAIN Kudus. Kedu region consists of LDK UNSIQ, LDK IAINU Kebumen, and LDK STAINU Temanggung. Yogyakarta region consists of LDK UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, LDK IIQ An-Nur, and LDK STAIYO (Shofiyatun, 2018).

On second day of meeting, they discussed about mapping proselytizing movement in Indonesia. At the same time, they also created logo of FKKDKN. The logo was collaborative work from logos proposed by LDK IAIN Salatiga and LDK Kudus (Shofiyatun, 2018).

The third meeting was held on November, 23-25 2018 at IAIN Kudus, and attended by LDK UNSIQ Wonosobo, LDK UNISSULA Semarang, LDK IAIN Kudus, and LDK STAINU Temanggung. The theme discussed in the third meeting was “Institutional Construction

as Legitimation Structure of FKKDKN". In this meeting they also discussed about target, strategy, annual work program and the completion of central and regional boards structure (Shofiyatun, 2018).

In the third meeting, they also discussed about the importance of conducting Facilitator Training with all member of FKKDKN which would be held in Wonosobo on February, 17-23 2019, filming training on February 4-10 2019 in Purbalingga, speech training on February 18-24 2019 in Semarang, and Arabic translation training and literature writing training at Baitul Khikmah, Bantul, Yogyakarta on February, 11-24 2019 (Shofiyatun, 2018).

In addition to carrying out revolution of LDK IAIN Salatiga and forming a moderate LDK networking, one of important things in campaigning moderate Islam is changing the curriculum taught in LDKs. The materials such as Islam Nusantara, criticism of discourse analysis, gender analysis, aswaja, deconstruction of sharia, Islamic traditionalism, post-traditionalism, and specific materials of moderate movements. Those are important to inculcate in curriculum of LDK regeneration.

The determination of curriculum certainly must be in line with reading resources provided for cadres. In this case, the strength of Islamist movement is in massive production of references. The Islamist movement has a book publishing and printing networking that has a significant influence on the spread of their understanding and thinking. Therefore, reading the resources should be a serious focus so that the Islamic moderation campaign can be an effective counterpart.

## **F. Conclusion**

LDK revolution at IAIN Salatiga lasted dramatically and was full of intrigue and strategy. With good preparation and right strategy, LDK Nusantara was able to take over the Islamist LDK

and then made significant changes for the LDK itself. Through a developed and systematic networking, the revolution of LDK at IAIN Salatiga is expected to be inspirational for other universities to conduct similar activities.

The success of counterpart toward Islamist LDK movement on campus can be reached by; *first*, taking over the organisation from Islamist LDK on each campus as done by LDK Nusantara IAIN Salatiga; *second*, establishing FKKDKN as moderate LDK networking among campuses which aim to stop FSLDK and BKLDK which are representative of Islamist LDK; *Third*, regenerating the curriculum of LDK to reflect moderate Islam and is supported by comprehensive discourse output; *fourth*, systematic and ongoing regeneration product.

Those are the way to campaign moderate Muslim on campus through LDK. The success of LDK Nusantara in revolution and FKKDKN establishment is the way to stop producing Islamist cadres in Indonesia as well as to campaign moderate Muslim which is *rahmatan lil 'alamin*.

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