

The Religious Politics of Habaib in Surabaya and Bangil East Java: A Socio-Religio-Political Approach

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Abstract

This study examines the socio-political activities of the habaib in East Java, Indonesia, which are heterogeneous and have different tendencies for affiliation among them. This diversity of work also underlies the diversity of their respective sympathizers and followers. This type of research is mixed research (library and field), with a critical-qualitative design. The approach used in this research is political sociology. The theory used to analyze the data is the theory of political behavior. This study found, first, that habaib's socio-political behavior transformed, from the driving force of the integration of the socio-political life of the community to being part of the cause of disintegration. Second, habaib's socio-political

network influences and shapes the views of its community, and is unable to reach the wider community outside. The conclusions of the findings of this study contribute to the enrichment of the study of political sociology, especially regarding the socio-political gait and behavior of the habaib, as a subsystem that determines whether or not the socio-political life of the people in Indonesia is turbulent.

Keywords: Habaib, Indonesia, Behaviour, Politics, Social.

A. Introduction

The political gait of the habaib with a religious dimension is a social phenomenon that cannot be ignored. Since the first arrival of the habaib from the Middle East, political nuances have been seen. They came as merchants and most of them were single, but the main goal was to preach Islam and build an Arab-Javanese community through marriage strategies. They were not coming only for trading and preaching but also built a more civilized social life through networking with local elites. Habaib's contribution to the nation and the people is massive, even participating in the Indonesian independence movement. The success of building the people and the state places habaib as the prominent actor driving social integration. With a fanatical mass base, habaib has succeeded as the "glue" that binds the people and the state.

The political gait that has a religious dimension pioneered by habaib has been widely studied by researchers. Muhammad Isrofil emphasized that social life in Indonesia cannot be separated from the existence of the habaib community. This community in the context of social life

has strategic roles, including being a cultural broker. In this cultural dimension, the habaib also play other social roles, namely carrying out Islamic da'wah activities and transferring religious knowledge (Islam). At another moment, not only as a da'i (da'i) but also as a counselor for people who are in need of consulting services. In playing these three main roles, the habaib community has specific strategies, as part of building and guaranteeing the loyalty of their congregations. As evidence, in order to bind the congregation to always attend recitations at the knowledge council and dhikr assemblies, the habaib perform indoctrination, optimize the modality of their social status or title as a habib (descendant of the Prophet), package their lecture studies with attractive and applicable concepts, provide various treats and door prizes to the congregation, and strengthen the system of clerics and kinship networks among fellow habaib (Isrofil, 2015).

The important role of habaib amid such an urgent society prompted Imam Kanafi to call them cultural brokers. These habaib as 'cultural brokers', at their peak, must work on all socio-cultural dimensions so that they have heterogeneous characteristics. For example, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya Pekalongan, as chairman of the Tariqah Mu'tabarah Jam'iyya Ahl al-Nahdhiyyah, tends to popularize the spirit of nationalism. The state and national affairs are always viewed from the perspective of tarekat and Sufism. The tarekat is a vehicle for inculcating nationalism among tarekat practitioners. Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, as an Arab descendant from the sayyid circle, has a high khidmah towards social and national issues in Indonesia. He also builds broad social relations, with various communities. This relationship has

also shaped his thinking to be pluralist and multicultural. For him, love for the homeland and nation is a manifestation of love for Allah and the Prophet. Defending the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is more for theological reasons, as well as continuing the struggle of the waliyullah. The creation of a just social system and the prosperity of the people in the path to perfection in worshipping God. Therefore, protecting the country and respecting the leader is a religious obligation. Positive thinking and supporting brotherhood and state security is a responsibility that must be nurtured and developed (Kanafi, 2014). These are the thoughts and actions of Habib Luthfi bin Yahya that continue to be inflamed.

Unlike the case of other habib characteristics, for example, the results of Fikri Fitriya's research exemplify the characteristics of politics with a religious dimension pioneered and fronted by Habib Rizieq Shihab. According to it, the political characteristics of Habib Rizieq Shihab are often viral on social media because they are very controversial and are often considered to violate the principles of politeness in language and in delivering religious messages. Habib Rizieq Shihab's lectures are considered to violate the principle of politeness in language, because they meet several indicators of intolerance, such as forcing, requiring, not using good diction, and often demeaning the honor of the target parties he attacks (Fitriya, 2021). Thus, the heterogeneity of the personal characteristics of these habaib is a social reality that cannot be denied, and at the same time creates polarization among themselves.

The polarization of socio-political behavior, between polite and impolite, covers all age categories. A study was

conducted by Rizky Nur Lilis Rochmatin, by presenting an example of a habib who was categorized as young. Rochmatin gave an example of Habib Bahar bin Smith. In each of his lectures, according to Rochmatin, Habib Bahar also often displays hate speech and is socialized through social media such as YouTube. One example, Habib Bahar said that President Jokowi behaved like an effeminate man. The case was reported by the Jokowi Mania and Cyber Indonesia communities to the police, and the report accused Habib Bahar of spreading hate speech, as well as racial and ethnic discrimination. Even though Habib Bahar's lecture was aimed at inviting the public not to believe the promises of the President-elect and inviting them to monitor the government's performance, at the same time, what he said was not all true, including the issue of hatred towards President Jokowi (Rochmatin, 2019).

Unlike the case with the research results of Muhammad Haris Fiardhi. By presenting the example of another habib who is also from the young age category, Muhammad Haris Fardhi found a habib figure who was in the polite category. Namely, Habib Husein Ja'far. In preaching, Habib Husein Ja'far is different from Habib Bahar Smith. Husein Jafar introduced the concept of "dakwahtainment", namely da'wah activities that combine the concept of Islamic religious da'wah with entertainment programs that attract the attention of the audience (mad'u). He chose to deliver his da'wah through digital platforms, targeting millennial youth, especially youths who were lost. Unlike Habib Bahar bin Smith, Habib Husein Ja'far is more open and able to accept various groups, both those who already understand religion well and those who have tattoos, do not wear the hijab, and other lost people.

The approach used in preaching is Islam that spreads peace, happiness, not terror and fear, makes it easier not difficult, and unites and does not scatter the people (Fiardhi, 2021). If Habib Bahar approaches the preaching pattern of Habib Rizieq Shihab, then Habib Husein Ja'far approaches the preaching pattern of Habib Luthfi bin Yahya.

The diversity of religious behavior patterns of the habaib across generations, as can be seen from the way they interact socially with the community, is equated in one dimension, which is both in contact with the political dimension. Therefore, Habaib's political existence, even though it contains hate speech in every lecture, is still considered important. At least to guard democracy that continues to lead to liberalism, pragmatic politics, and oligarchic power. This can be seen from the findings of M. Asep Rahmatullah and Nur Halimah regarding Habib Rizieq Shihab, who by his supporters is still considered to characterize Islamic identity by carrying out idealistic and ideological values, and is considered capable of grounding Islamic politics for Indonesia (Rahmatullah & Halimah, 2020). The political dimension is able to change the image of a person, group, and certain entity according to political goals, even though sometimes it is not in accordance with the actual reality.

The Islamic Defenders Front Organization Movement (FPI) has been banned by the government. However, Habib Rizieq's leadership is still considered successful in uniting Muslims in Indonesia in upholding Islamic teachings. Even, he continues to carry out da'wah and jihad movements amar ma'ruf nahyi munkar, and criticizes the government under President Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin. Habib Rizieq Shihab

is considered capable of creating new forces for the political axis of Islam that turns differences into equality, division into unity, and strengthening the political identity of Indonesian Islam, making Muslims aware that politics is essential to carry out the teachings of Islam rahmatal lil alamin. His leadership style is considered capable of healing the hearts of Indonesian Muslims from a leadership crisis, symbolizing courage in addition to simplicity and exemplary that is admired by his supporters (Rahmatullah & Halimah, 2020).

The diversity of patterns of behavior of the habaib, both in the socio-religious and political dimensions, gave birth to another social phenomenon in the form of increasing popularity of preachers from the Arab Hadhrami, Yemen, and Muslim youth circles in contemporary Indonesia. In every lecture opportunity, many preachers claim to be descendants of the Prophet, so the terminology *habib* (singular) or *habaib* (plural) is becoming increasingly popular. For example, the case of the late Habib Munzir al-Musawa and his sermon group (the Prophet's Assembly). The youth of the capital city (Jakarta) have many affiliations to become his followers. *Majelis Rasulullah* is one of the most popular assemblies in Indonesia and has succeeded in attracting tens of thousands of people in its public *da'wah*, mainly from the millennial youth. Indonesian Muslim youth, especially the capital city, have many goals in participating with *habaib da'wah*, such as spiritual protection, making the assembly a place to express piety, and as a support for identity amid uncertainty, dissatisfaction, and limited space for urban youth (Rijal, 2018).

The popularity that these *habaib* achieved became a symbolic social capital used to achieve pragmatic-praxis

interests, such as involvement in electoral politics. For example, there is the Ulama and Habaib Forum (FUHAB), which is armed with social capital in the form of a large enough mass base, to support the candidate pair Anies-Sandi in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election (Pilkada). community economic format and based on socio-religious identity. FUHAB perceives several programs offered by Anies-Sandi as political programs that are pro-people and represent the voices of the urban poor, such as stopping the reclamation project. Practically, FUHAB's political support was liquid, because in the initial round they supported Agus-Silvi. Their political strategies to mobilize the masses include using the Koran and the opportunity for Friday sermons, as well as securing votes at lower levels in the voting process. After Anies-Sandi won, the Habaib Ulama Forum (Fuhab), like other organizations, received grants from the government. That way, the Habaib community has a strong political bargaining position in every election round (Ginanjari, Herdiansah, & Sumadinata, 2021).

Thus, the ideological issues and personal understanding of the heterogeneous habaib have a major influence in shaping the understanding and behavior of their supporters in various lines of life, social, religious and political, which is an important issue. The existence of the Habaib community in Indonesia is a subsystem of the life of the Indonesian people in general, cannot be separated, and always participates in the dynamic flow of socio-political changes. As a subsystem that is always present in every line of life, understanding the origins of the heterogeneity of the views and behavior of the habaib, which then helps shape the diversity of views and behavior of the mass supporters, especially in the socio-political field is an important area of socio-political study.

Of the many previous findings about the central role of the habaib in Indonesian politics and religion, the dimensions of the habib network and its role which tends to change in the course of history, have not been widely carried out. By raising the case of the Habaib community in Surabaya and Pasuruan, East Java, this study examines further how the polarization among the habaib themselves and its effect on the polarization of their supporters, especially in the political field. This topic is very important because habaib transforms social roles, starting from driving social integration to a new role that tends to be counterproductive, namely being one of the causes of social disintegration. Even though the positive image of habaib persists, as the status, image and role have been successfully built by their predecessors, but in this contemporary era all of this is limited to a narrow environment, at least only among their fanatical supporters. These two urgent things are the contributions of this study to enrich the findings of previous studies.

B. Methodology and Theory

This type of research is a mixed research between library research and field research. With this kind of literature research, researchers can make efforts to identify patterns of understanding and behavior of the habaib, as well as their socio-political impact on the understanding and behavior of their supporters, through various available literature sources. In addition, researchers can also place other sources that provide factual information or personal/expert opinions on research questions; namely the components needed in research and which are scattered in several other

places (Richardson, 2019). Meanwhile, field research is needed to collect data from the first informants, especially informants in the cities of Surabaya and Bangil. The purpose of this field research is to observe, interact, and understand the understanding and behavior of the habaib where they live in a natural environment (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973).

This study used a socio-political approach by running data analysis from many informants and looking for library sources. Through this, the study can further examine the relationship between power and aspects of society, including the state and the socio-political conflicts within it (Clemens, 2016). In this context, it is recognized that the emergence of the power of the habaib, reproduces the power they continue to exercise, as well as the transformation of various forms of their socio-political dimensions. It is a visible phenomenon and reality. In this research, the habaib get the political stage for their power to emerge from the context of a particular historical space which is constantly being reproduced and changing from one form to another.

If we look further, it is very striking that from the beginning of the emergence of the power of the habaib in society, until the final forms of transformation of socio-political power, they carry a pattern of various socio-political understanding and behavior. To analyze the socio-political understanding and behavior of these habaib, the theory used in this research is the theory of political behavior. In the study of political behavior, Jeffrey J. Mondak sees that there is one important aspect and at the same time the foundation for political behavior itself, namely the aspect of one's personality. Jeffrey J. Mondak sees a close relationship between personality, information, participation, and finally with attitudes or attitudes (Mondak, 2010).

Habaib's personality that occurs in Indonesia is especially closely related to information, and in the context of this research is political information. Habaib have an important source of information for the public on how to respond to and be involved in state and national politics. Not only that, personality is also measured by their involvement or participation in politics. Thus, automatically, the habaib and their supporters become a networked axis with various dimensions, both social and political. Therefore, Chartchai Na Chiangmai views that political behavior cannot be separated from social networks and social change (Chiangmai, 1984).

The socio-political behavior of the habaib becomes a stimulant that stimulates the views and behavior of the socio-political behavior of the mass supporters and culminates in the creation of social change. The close relationship between habaib and its mass supporters, in the end, provides the prerequisites and conditions needed to give birth to public actions and social change. Because, habaib and its supporters are actors who build social relations, to create change. The socio-political changes of habaib and its supporters are the main topics analyzed in this research.

C. Results and Discussion

1. *Habaib*, from the Driver of Integration to Social Disintegration

Habaib's personality greatly determines the social role he plays. The presence of the habaib in East Java has colored the important actors in the history of the

Indonesian nation. Habaib is understood by indigenous people as a community of immigrants who work as merchants, bring new teaching called Islam, and become part of the natives through marriage. This long dynamic brought the habaib community to the peak of its social role, both as a driver of social integration and as a cause of disintegration.

Starting from the arrival of the Arabs, who then chose to continue to live in Indonesia. They are more from Hadramaut, Yemen, than those from Hejaz and Egypt. The habaib community were Yemeni Arab traders, who later stopped and settled in Surabaya. At that time, the natural conditions of Yemen's Arabs, especially Hadramaut, were very arid, plus prolonged social problems that created tight social stratification due to clans (fam). Surabaya is considered a strategic place, plus it is a bustling trading city, although it also has a myriad of complex problems, especially for this Arab merchant community. For example, the Dutch East Indies government created various regulations that were applied differently to the merchant community from Arab, Chinese, Indian, and Indigenous. The policies of the Dutch East Indies government gave rise to successful habaib figures (Haidar & Safira, 2014). In addition to working as traders, many of these habaib are also single. They are known to be good at socializing with local residents, and eventually, choose to marry local residents. From this trade and marriage strategy, these Hadramaut merchant habaib formed an Arab-Javanese community (Noer, 1996).

The Arab community is known to be quite strong in holding on to local traditions and culture that they brought from their home country. However, at the same time, they remain open in interacting with local residents. The consequence of the inclusive attitude of these habaib, in the end, gave rise to new dynamics of social life in Javanese society. Habaib are present in the midst of society by giving a big influence on the socio-religious aspects of Javanese society. In this socio-religious aspect, the role of their figures, especially in providing religious teachings and knowledge, began to appear in the eyes of the community. Religious leaders from the habaib circles, by some people, are perceived as having an important position in many things, such as experts in the field of Islam, teaching and guiding the community; as a social controller who provides solutions to various social problems of the community; and as a mover of the people (Dhofier, 2011).

As an activator of the ummah and solving various social problems, Habaib's personality increased, along with the needs of his time. In the eyes of Jeffrey J. Mondak, habaib is a source of information, especially about the teachings of a new religion (Islam). This role as a source of information is institutionalized into an educational institution. Habaib held many ta'lim majlis, founded madrasas, and school institutions, finally establishing pesantren. KH. Muhammad Zaki Hadziq, chairman of RMI East Java whom the researcher interviewed, said:

“Among the habaib, a very well known by the people is Habib Syech al-Musawa, who is known

as the teacher of kiai and habaib in Surabaya. Habib, who is in his 90s, is still opening a taklim meeting at his house on Jalan Kalimasudik II. Surabaya and teaches Sufism at the Majlis Burdah under the care of Habib Syekh bin Muhammad Alaydrus on Jalan Ketapang Kecil, Surabaya, every Thursday afternoon until dusk. Then there is also Habib Hasan bin Umar Bangil, son of Habib Umar Bangil, who is also very well known as a scholar and preacher in Surabaya. Habib Hasan is also known as the caretaker of PP. Al-Huda, on Jln. K.H. Mas Mansyur 220, Surabaya. Habib Hasan's Al-Huda Islamic Boarding School is also the only branch of Pondok Darul Mustafa, Yemen, in East Java. Because Habib Hasan himself is an alumnus of Darul Mustafa, Tarim, Yemen under the care of Habib Umar bin Hafidz." (Hadziq, 2018).

When the social role is as a source of information and manager of Islamic boarding schools, habaib participates in social activities further. For example, we can trace habaib's socio-political participation to the late 18th century. At that time, Hadramaut Arabs in Surabaya spread in many fields; economic, cultural, and political, because Surabaya at that time was the center of trade since Van den Bosch imposed forced cultivation in 1830 in Java. Van den Bosch introduced a system of forced cultivation to Javanese society and required paying taxes on the produce of farmer groups. Farmers are encouraged to cultivate various crops such as sugar, tea, tobacco, pepper, cinnamon, coffee, cloves, and spices. It is also to meet the needs of the European market. The habaib from Hadramaut at that time had already started their communication with the Surabaya authorities, to actively participate with the people to discuss aspects

of national politics, especially against colonialism. In addition, it aims to create a new atmosphere, such as the implementation of Islamic law in the kingdom controlled by Prince Cokronegoro (Al-Jufri, 2019).

The population of habaib in Surabaya, East Java, continues to increase along with the creation of social integration, especially after they participated in the political movement of the country, both before and after Indonesian independence. This social integration between Arab and indigenous descent resulted in the active participation of habaib in pro-indigenous economics and politics. Participation breeds social integration; a long continuous process, since the arrival of their ancestors for the first time. This social integration is based on the same value, namely Islam. Religion is the most important factor that gives birth to socio-political integration between habaib and the natives, and as a value system that always inspires their activities and their common church. In the political field, for example, habaib declared the Indonesian Arab Party as a national political and Islamic movement. As development progressed, the Islamic spirit encouraged them to establish educational institutions and supported their further participation in various indigenous social organizations and economic activities (Patji, 1991).

In the field of education, Habaib Bangil founded several Islamic boarding schools, including: Pencangaan Islamic Boarding School, Darul Ulum, Riyadul Ulum, Tanwirul Hijah, Princess Salafiyah, Datuk Kalampayan, Princess Salafiyah Diwet, Nurul Dholam, PONPES KH. A. Wahid Hasyim, Dalwah Raci, Darul Ihya'liulumudhin, Nurul Iman, Princess Salafiyah

Al-Azhar Sidowayah, Dzunurain Kalikunting, Nurul Madina Kalirejo, Darul Tauhid Gempeng. Ahmad Mudhirul Haq, from PC. RMI Pasuruan City: “because of the strong Aswaja sect held by the habaib and masyayikh in Bangil, Bangil is known as the city of Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah,” (Haq A. M., 2018). Another Islamic educational institution managed by the habaib family is the Bangil Islamic Boarding School Foundation (YAPI). This educational institution was founded on June 21, 1976 by Al-Marhum Habib Husein bin Abu Bakr al-Habsyi. YAPI opened several educational institutions; Men’s boarding schools in charge of SMP Plus, SMA Plus and Hauzah, Islamic boarding schools in charge of SMP Plus, SMA Plus, and Hauzah, and Kindergarten Plus of Al-Abrar.

After the reformation, Habaib’s participation in national politics did not disappear. Their socio-political-economic participation is increasingly diverse. For example, habib penetrated the cultural dimension, as was the choice of Habib Sheikh in Abdul Qadir Assegaf. Sang Habib founded the alawāt Assembly, which aims to foster the spirit of nationalism in the Mataraman area, East Java, in addition to the spiritual aspect. The context has also changed, it is no longer colonialism but a change in the behavior of the younger generation (teenagers) in several regions who have begun to doubt Pancasila as the state’s foundation. In fact, the ideology of the nation (Pancasila) is often contrasted with the ideology of religion (Islam). The existence of the alawāt Habib Syekh assembly was present in the context of growing the undermined nationalism. In some of his assembly activities, Habib Sheikh openly invites his congregation to love his nation and country.

Whenever Habib Sheikh appears on stage, at the end of the event, he always sings nationalist songs. The songs that are sung, whether we realize it or not, are an important part in instilling nationalism (Imaduddin, 2019).

However, the Hadhrami community in Indonesia, including in East Java, underwent a fundamental change. In Jeffry J. Mondak's point of view, these changes are related to the attitudes of habaib himself. For example, in this contemporary era, we see theological orientation and competition for religious authority among the Hadhramis themselves. This competition is an indicator of changes in attitudes and behavior of the habaib. This change in attitude and behavior is the most dominant reason for social conflicts, which often occur in recent times. For example, the dispute about Shia among Sayyid and Salafism in Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah is an example of the existence of theological roots which are politicized so that it creates more conflict and social disintegration. The habaib and sayyid are no longer the motors of social integration like their predecessors. In other words, this contemporary development shows a transformation of Habaib's understanding, attitudes, and social behavior, which are different from before. This change in contemporary attitudes and behavior is no longer able to form social cohesion in Indonesia (Rijal, Syamsul, 2017).

KH. Wildan Choiron Syakur, PCNU Bangil, said:

“Through the YAPI phenomenon, it can be seen that, in Bangil, even if a person has the blood of Habib, but if he is proven to be Shia, he will still be hated and respected, not respected and glorified. That is,

the habaib who have a strong influence in Bangil are the habaib who understand Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah. In Bangil, people who are seen as truly habaib are certainly those who understand ASWAJA. Those who are Shia or Wahabi, will not be respected by Bangil residents even though they are called the grandchildren of the Prophet.” (Syakur, 2018).

Social disintegration and the end of the era of the solidity of the habaib in forming community cohesion, are getting worse in the contemporary era. For example, when Indonesia was threatened by the coronavirus pandemic, Habib's behavior was no longer ideal. Habib has lost his charisma and prestige in the eyes of the public, as happened due to a dispute between members of the Surabaya City Satpol PP who was involved in a dispute with Habib Umar Abdullah Assegaf, the caretaker of the Roudhotus Salaf Bangil Assembly, Pasuruan. Previously, Habib Umar clashed with officers at the large-scale social restriction (PSBB) checkpoint at the Surabaya Satellite Toll Exit. This incident was regretted by many parties, such as the Indonesian Ulama Council because the Satpol PP was unable to hold back and be more polite to an elderly habib who was respected by his supporters. This can trigger a prolonged conflict in the community (JPNN, 2020). Whatever ideally the Satpol PP member should do, the public has judged that a habib still violates the PSBB rules from the government (Ariefana & Aditya, 2020).

According to Quraish Shihab, the social disintegration caused by the habaib's actions is due to the game of identity politics, by using the titles sayid

and habib. The difference, according to Quraish Shihab, is that the game of identity politics in the past and now is different. There was also identity politics in the past, but it was well-received by the whole community. Quraish Shihab gave an example of Habib Salim bin Jindan, who was loud and fiery every time he gave a speech. However, because of his deep knowledge, many people gathered to him, plus Habib Salim's morals were very noble. Unlike today, many people involved in the sayyid flag do not understand religion (Tirto.id, 2017). As a result, the religious understanding and patterns of the social, religious, and political behavior of the habaib have experienced shifts and changes on the one hand, and society's acceptance of them has also changed on the other. Even if they come from the same origin, Arab, they still have different ways from each other. Partly a driver of integration, and partly a driver of social disintegration.

So far, the common thread can be drawn that the habaib in Surabaya and Bangil have similar behavior patterns as well as differences. The point of resemblance between these two communities, but with different geographical locations, is the ability of their personalities to influence the social, religious, and political understanding of their respective mass bases. They are not only a source of information, which later manifests as an educational institution, but also become role models for ideal attitudes and behavior, which are in accordance with religious values. The difference is that the habaib in Surabaya are more inclined to the national class habib figure from Pekalongan, namely Habib Luthfi

bin Yahya. Meanwhile, the habaib in Bangil are more inclined to another national class habib figure, namely Habib Rizieq Shihab. For this reason, the potential of the habaib of Surabaya to continue its role as a driver of social integration is far greater than the potential of the habaib of Bangil, which tends to cause disintegration, such as the case of the conflict between Habib Umar Abdullah Assegaf and members of the Surabaya Satpol PP.

2. The Habaib Network and Their Supporters

The network between habaib and his mass supporters is socio-religious. The average reason people use, in Surabaya in particular, in respecting the habaib is their social status as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad SAW. Ariful Haq, from PP. At-Tawhid, Sidoresmo, said:

“This theological-biological reason is taught by many NU kiai in Surabaya to the students and the public, about the need for a Muslim to respect and honor the habaib. In this case, the kiai emphasize that the habaib must be respected because they are the descendants of the noblest human being, the Messenger of Allah. If later humans hope for intercession from the Prophet’s brother. then one way is to respect and honor their children and grandchildren, (habib or habaib). In this case, the relationship between habaib and its supporters is based on the issue of biological descent, lineage, and genealogy of the Prophet, although not necessarily scientifically. That is, respecting habaib is not because they are pious or intellectual aspects, but rather because they are descendants of the Messenger of Allah, whether pious or unscientific.” (Haq, 2018).

Moreover, the social behavior of the Muslim community in Surabaya, especially those who are members of the Jam'iyah Nahdlatul Ulama, always tries to uphold and glorify the habaib. Although a Javanese santri has a higher scientific capacity than a habib, the santri still uphold the habib's social position. In fact, there are many kiai and ustadz of pesantren who have broad knowledge and are very pious, but they are still willing and willing to kiss the hand of a habib whose knowledge is, in fact, mediocre. Because, for the santri, kiai, and ustadz, the thing that is seen as the most important here is not sola knowledge, but about heredity or lineage. The kiai and ustadz who are more pious than the habib view that the lineage of a habib is higher and greater than their own lineage because the habibs are clearly descendants of the Messenger of Allah. This kind of view is common in the Nahdlatul Ulama organization in Surabaya (Haq, 2018).

Respect for habaib is only because of lineage and genealogy, not the intellectual capacity of habaib itself, and the existence of cultural support from the NU organization is the beginning of the spirit of collectivity and social solidarity. In Durkheim and Collins' theory of ritual, the collective spirit is the main engine that drives social solidarity. In addition, according to Durkheim and Collins, organizational attendance is highly correlated with dependent variables such as respect. There is a reason why an organizational environment like NU contributes to strengthening social relations between habaib and society. First, rituals within organizations tend to be more emotionally beneficial. Second, the

rituals within the organization, which are often followed by the congregation, are useful for creating bonds and strengthening networks. Third, most importantly, there is a consistent and strong relationship between the spirit of respect for the descendants of the Prophet and the social solidarity among them. These are some of the reasons why religious organizations are more effective than others, in providing emotional and symbolic rewards for their members (Draper, 2014).

This social solidarity that forms a strong network between habaib and his supporters has long historical roots, not only in Surabaya but throughout the archipelago. For example, in the 1970s, in the process of Islamization in Java, the habaib had spread throughout Java, covering areas of Jakarta, Central Java, and East Java. In Jakarta there are several famous habibs such as Habib Kampung Bandan, Habib Jindan, Habib Ali Kwitang, Habib Ali Bugur and Habib Usman Bun Yahya. In West Java, there are Al-Habib Alwi bin Muhammad bin Thohiral-Haddad, Habib Syarief Muhammad al-Aydrus and Al-Habib-Muhammad-Bin-Syekh-Bin-Yahya. In Central Java, starting with Al-Habib Husein bin Muhammad bin Thohir al-Haddad, and Habib Lutfi. In East Java, there are Al-Habib Ja'far bin Sheikh Assegaf, Al-Habib Abdul Qadir bin Ahmad Bilfaqih and Habib Abdul Qadir bin Husein Assegaf (Permana, Mawardi, & Kusdiana, 2018). Thus, the network and solidarity of the habaib have enveloped the entire atmosphere of the life of the Javanese people in particular and the archipelago in general.

Most interestingly, the existence of a strong network and strong solidarity between the habaib and their supporters created a new religious behavior among the people of East Java in general and Surabaya-Pasuruan in particular. M. Ainul Mubarak, from PP. Al-Jihad, Wonocolo Surabaya, said:

“People not only respect and glorify habaib, but they also like to imitate (tafa’ulan) the behavior of habib, such as wearing a robe, wearing a turban, wearing perfume, even choosing food. All these imitations of social behavior are carried out in the hope of getting blessings (tabarrukan) from habaib. As a form of tafa’ulan and tabarrukan against the habaib, the Surabaya Muslim community also participated in many recitations, prayer meetings, and istighotsah held or attended by the habaib. Often in the Surabaya area, especially in the Ampel area, recitation events are held in the context of maulid, isra’-mi’raj, haul and so on which are attended by habaib. As in the framework of the Sunan Ampel haul from last year, this event was attended by Habib Luthfi bin Yahya from Pekalongan. So many worshipers flocked to this event, in addition to gathering blessings with Sunan Ampel, they also wanted to share blessings with Habi Luthfi. As a descendant of the Prophet, a habib is seen by the Surabaya Islamic community as having blessings.” (Mubarak, Albar, & Anshori, 2018).

Since habaib is considered so noble for traditional groups and Nahdliyyin, many of them become followers of the activities of habaib-driven organizations. For example, in Surabaya, there is a strong Islamic organization group, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) Surabaya Branch. This group has many followers, one

of the factors is because the organization is also driven by the habaib with the reason to do amar makruf nahi munkar. The attraction of habaib in Surabaya, then, is only among traditional Muslim groups. Other Muslim groups, such as modernist Muslims or nationalists (abangan) are not very interested in habaib. Even if the modernist and nationalist (abangan) groups follow organizations driven by hababib such as the FPI, then in fact they join the organization not because they want to gain blessings with habaib figs in it, but rather for other, more concrete and materialistic reasons, for example, to attract support. politics, for business networks, and so on (Mubarak, Albar, & Anshori, 2018).

To strengthen this finding, the researchers traced the theological genealogical roots of Haba'ib, who tended to be harsh in thought and action. Researchers found that the anti-Shia Haba'ib NU often occurred in the Surabaya and Bangil areas as well in several other areas of East Java. One of them is Habib Zein as Chairman of the Al-Bayyinat Foundation who is often referred to as a 'Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) figure' who fiercely calls for fighting the Shi'ites. It is why the name NU is often tarnished by Habib Zein's overly hard and uncompromising anti-Shia movement. So, on the one hand, NU is often harmed by its ultra-hard behavior. Because the predicate of 'NU figure' is interpreted by ordinary people as 'NU is anti-Shia, rejects Shia, or declares Shia as a heretical sect'. Some NU practices are strongly related to Shi'ite traditions, such as the Mauludan event, which commemorates the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, and the ritual in the month of

Ashura' which commemorates the killing of Ali's two sons, Hasan and Husen, in the Karbala war. In this context, the actions of Habib Zein and his congregation are counter-productive to the NU culture which tends to be tolerant and accommodating (Ubaidillah, 2018).

With the position of Habib Zein who was very hard in hitting the Shia, without realizing it, he was closer to the Wahabi movement. Habib Zein's attitude often contradicts the NU administrators of the East Java region, who are generally more moderate. Habib Zein also accused and tried KH. Said Aqil Siradj as a Shia follower in a book review at PP. Bumi Sholawat, Reinforcement, Sidoarjo led KH. Agus Ali Masyhuri. With his character like this, NU was then dragged into the flow of Shia rejection in Indonesia by Habib Zein considering that he was indeed listed as an administrator of NU in East Java. However, everything he did relate to the Shia rejection, actually his attitude and decisions were individual and not representative of the decisions of the East Java NU organization. Because, if you refer to the representation of the East Java NU organization, then those who are entitled to represent it are Rais Syuriah and the general chairman of the East Java NU Tanfidziyah which is now held by KH. Aziz Mansyur and KH. Marzuki Mustamar (Ubaidillah, 2018).

As a result of Habib's strong thoughts, attitudes, and actions which tend to resemble the Wahabi movement, some of his congregants have interpreted this as a guiding direction in political affiliation, namely as sympathizers of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development Party. These two parties are ideologically

Islamic. PKS, politically and ideologically is a formalist Islam with Wahabism, while PPP is part of the continuation of the Masyumi struggle which has an Islamic formalist ideology. In this case, the ideological estuary is Wahabism. It is certainly different from the National Awakening Party (PKB) which was founded by Gus Dur, a political channel for NU residents (Ubaidillah, 2018).

On the other hand, in 2017, before becoming a fugitive to Saudi Arabia, Habib Rizieq Shihab was rumored to be giving a lecture at a recitation in Ampel, Surabaya. However, his arrival plan to Surabaya was refused by some Surabaya residents. Approximately twenty people demonstrated on the highway near the entrance to the mosque and the tomb of Sunan Ampel. In the demonstration, besides giving speeches against the arrival of Rizieq Shihab, people also held up a banner. The poster reads, among other things, “Suroboyo is peaceful, don’t spoil it, Rizieq, Arek Suroboyo rejects Rizieq Shihab, Rejects Rizieq Shihab, We reject Rizieq Shihab’s presence at the Ampel Mosque” (Mubarak, Albar, & Anshori, 2018).

If in Surabaya the attitude of the people is very diverse, then in Bangil it is almost homogeneous. This means that most people respect and even make *habaib* sacred. Abdillah Aufa Bad’us Sholeh, from PP. Wahid Hasyim, Bangil, said:

“Even so fanatical about habaib, there is a lack of respect for local kiai. This group which glorifies habaib more than the local kiai consists not only of Arab descent but also Javanese people. From here, not infrequently, they then tend to glorify the habaib and ordinarily respect local kiai,

even though the local kiai are older than habib.”
(Sholeh, 2018).

But for NU residents in Bangil and Pasuruan, as is the case for NU residents in other areas, it is always emphasized the need to equally respect the kiai (masyayikh) with the habaib; NU citizens must respect the kiai and habaib and NU does not at all teach to differentiate between the two. KH. Wildan Choiron Syakur, PCNU Bangil, said:

“For Bangil residents who really follow the teachings of ASWAJA-An-Nahdliyyah, they can always position themselves between respecting the habaib and the kiai, where they do not position one higher than the other; they put the hababib and the kiai in the same position; together as teachers to study and get blessings.” (Syakur, 2018).

An interesting incident was when a habib from Bangil was in the Surabaya area where the people were homogeneous, namely the incident of a physical fight between Habib Umar Assegaf from Bangil and a Satpol PP officer named Asmadi from Surabaya. The incident of the physical fight had gone viral on social media, although in the end, it ended in peace. Peace efforts between Habib Umar Assegaf Bangil and Asmadi must involve a third party, namely the East Java Regional Police. Seen in the peace process, Asmadi apologized and kissed the hand of Habib Umar Assegaf Bangil. The two peaceful actions also received a good response from the parties, even Asmadi was given the gift of Umrah to the Holy Land of Mecca, namely Ahmad Alhabsyi (VIVA, 2020). In other

words, when a habib is outside his community and his fanatical supporters, then violates the rules agreed upon by the public, then that's when the habib's influence declines. Habaib's influence is limited, and is only able to influence people's mindset and behavior to a certain extent. In other words, the network of habaib also has its limitations. Likewise, the solidarity between habaib and the masses of its supporters is in a certain scope.

Another proof of the limited influence, network, and social solidarity between the habaib and the community is the incident of the road closure by Habib Umar Assegaf. People think that Habib likes to close the road when he is holding religious recitations. The religious recitation of Habib Umar Assegaf Bangil is in an area near the headquarters of his assembly. Meanwhile, Habib Umar Assegaf Bangil himself is the caretaker of the Maulid Wat Ta'lim Roudlotussalaf Assembly, Pasuruan, East Java. When a reporter from one of the local media asked about the figure of Habib Umar Assegaf Bangil to residents, one of whom was Maji, the residents said that "Umar (without a habib title) often closed the Shark road, for reasons of recitation." Habib Umar Assegaf Bangil also rarely goes out to socialize with the community. So people do not know this Habib figure (Ariefana, Pebriansyah, 2020). The public's preference, who feels disadvantaged by the way of preaching the habib in Bangil, shows the limited influence and network of the habaib in general and the habib in Pasuran in particular. When their influence is limited, their social networks and solidarity are automatically limited.

D. Conclusions

The socio-political behavior of the habaib in Indonesia is like a magnetic field that attracts the behavior of religious people. For the cases in Surabaya and Bangil, religious fanaticism in dealing with and interacting with the habaib is based more on theological basis, rather than rationalism and intellect. Therefore, the habaib have full authority in carrying out social change, because the social network is very strong with a large mass base. Over time, the socio-political behavior of these habaib began to lose their prestige and image. Their authority began to become increasingly difficult to maintain. There are at least two factors, first, the network among the habaib themselves is weakened, with the absence of uniformity of thought and behavior patterns, thus encouraging the people to be divided according to their respective idol figures from among the habaib. Second, the personal behavior of the habaib often contradicts the common consensus in the governance of the state, and this triggers the public's courage to criticize and even physically collide with the habib. From there, a common thread can be drawn that the habaib who used to be the driving force of social integration were even able to mobilize the masses in the struggle for independence, more and more in the reform era until now they have become the culprits of social disintegration. The influence, network, and solidarity between the habaib community and the general public began to drift apart, or at least the habaib's influence was limited to its own masses, not to the wider community.

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